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Abstract 
This thesis explores who counts: who is part of the so-called moral 
community, and why. If personhood is the measure of full moral 
considerability—as many take it to be—then marginal humans will not 
count as fully morally considerable. At best, we will have to say that they 
matter the way that sentient non-human animals do. Most of us will find 
this unsavoury.  
 
To give an account of the moral status of marginal humans just is to give 
an account of moral status—of what features are morally salient or 
valuable. To this end, I discuss one of the most puzzling examples of 
marginal humanity: babies. I look at how we can account (if indeed we 
can) for the moral status of babies on a personhood-bound account of 
moral status, and more broadly at how we can account for the moral 
requirements on us with respect to babies.  
 
In part one, I explore the moral status of babies by looking at whether 
birth can change moral status. I look at the two most plausible accounts 
of the moral significance of birth, both of which rely on variants of a 
relational account of moral significance. I argue that neither can 
successfully motivate the claim that birth is morally significant; but that 
relationships can change the moral quality of an act by changing the 
moral context.  
 
In part two, I explore other ways of accounting for moral obligations to 
babies. I discuss how we ought to understand the most central of our 
special obligations to babies: parental obligations. I argue that a causal 
account of parental obligation is the best such account, and I discuss 
important consequences of this view.   
 
Key words: moral status, marginal humans, personhood, special 
obligations, parenthood, abortion, infanticide  
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Part One 
THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BIRTH 

The Moral Significance of Birth 
 1 
Introduction 
The broad aim of this thesis is to explore who counts in our moral 
reasoning: who is morally one of us, and on what grounds; and how and 
to what extent we must take beings into account in our moral reasoning. 
As I shall be using the terms, if you are ‘morally considerable’, then you 
are such that we must take you (perhaps, your interests) into account in 
our moral reasoning and decision-making; you are such that at least 
some of us may have obligations towards you; and probably, you have 
rights. When we enquire into a creature’s ‘moral status’, we ask whether 
and to what extent that creature is morally considerable: does or ought it 
or he or she figure into our moral thinking, and how and (sometimes) how 
prominently so.  
 
My overarching aim is to explore the grounds on which we attribute moral 
considerability; and relatedly, the scope and import of moral status in our 
broader understanding of right action. I will be doing this by examining a 
particular instance (babies) of a problem class of beings (marginal 
humans); beings who seem, prima facie, to be morally considerable, and 
yet do not seem to fit our standard ways of delineating moral status in 
theory. Getting to grips with this problem class of beings, I will argue 
below, is crucial to discovering a workable account of moral status.      
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1. Moral Status: the standard approach 
The standard approach to moral status in contemporary moral philosophy 
is what I will call personhood-bound. A personhood-bound theory of moral 
status places persons at the centre of its conceptualisation of moral 
considerability: persons, on such accounts, are both the primary unit of 
moral concern, and the paradigm of moral considerability. On some 
personhood-bound accounts, persons exhaust the class of morally 
considerable beings.1 However, on most contemporary accounts, 
persons exhaust the class of fully morally considerable beings, whereas 
personlike beings are fitted in around the periphery. Being personlike—for 
example, being human, or being sentient—affords one limited, or minimal 
moral considerability.  
 
There are two ways that person, as a term-of-art, is commonly used in 
moral discourse, and it is important to be clear about how it is being used 
in this thesis. On the use most commonly employed in popular discourse 
on morality, personhood picks out moral considerability.2 So, on this use, 
                                                
1 E.g. Kant (1991) (1997).  
2 These days, this use of the term tends to be the popular use, while 
philosophers tend to use the term in the second way, to be discussed 
below. Contemporary ‘personhood movements’, particularly in the US—
that argue that foetuses ought to be declared persons—are employing 
this first use. But this first use is, it seems to me, also the older, perhaps 
the historical use within philosophy: Tooley (1972), to be discussed 
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we call all and only those creatures who are morally considerable 
persons. This use assumes criteria for moral considerability (assumes 
some set; or simply assumes that there is such a set), and calls those 
who meet the criteria, whatever they are, persons. On such a use, one 
asks questions like ‘are foetuses persons?’, ‘are chimpanzees persons?’ 
and so on; and what one is asking is are foetuses morally considerable? 
Are chimpanzees morally considerable? That is, considerability is what is 
built into the term, and what generates considerability is the separate, 
morally substantive question. That persons are morally considerable, on 
this use, is not a substantive claim: it is definitional.  
 
However, on a second and more substantive use, whether persons are 
morally considerable, or singularly morally considerable, and why, is a 
substantive question. On this use, person picks out all and only those 
creatures who have a certain constellation of features—like rational 
agency; self-awareness; moral sensitivity; and so on—thought to be 
morally salient, though whether the features are indeed morally salient, 
and considerability-generating, is not assumed in picking them out.  
 
                                                                                                                               
below, seems to have been an instrumental part of the shift from this use 
to the next one I will discuss, but he is indeed using ‘personhood’ in this 
first way. Philosophers such as Finnis (1994) and even Thomson (1971) 
regularly use the term in this way. Their doing so was the birth of ‘person’ 
as a term of art: prior to these uses, ‘person’ was standardly used 
interchangeably with ‘human being’ (see e.g. Wertheimer (1971)). 
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On this use, it makes no sense to ask ‘are foetuses persons?’; rather, we 
agree (on empirical grounds) that foetuses are not persons, but ask ‘are 
they nonetheless morally considerable?’ We can also ask whether and 
why persons are morally privileged: it needs argument on this use, that, 
for example, all and only persons are fully morally considerable. The aim 
of theoretical exploration, on this use, is to determine whether those 
features that comprise personhood, so understood, are morally salient, 
and if so, why; and further to determine whether these features alone 
generate moral considerability, or whether additional features might also 
make a creature morally considerable.  
 
In the following, I will be using person in this second way. So, whether a 
creature is or isn’t a person is an empirical question. Whether that 
creature is morally considerable is a separate, substantive moral question 
even if the answer to the personhood question is yes.  
 
Personhood-bound accounts, then, are accounts that make the 
(substantive) claim that personhood drives moral considerability: that the 
natural features that characterise personhood are morally salient. Various 
explanations arise as to why personhood drives moral considerability: for 
example, because persons are part of the ‘kingdom of ends’ in virtue of 
being able to engage in moral decision-making;3 or because persons 
have reason for self-regarding care, or have interests;4 etc.  But these 
                                                
3 Kant, Groundwork, especially sec. II 4:428 
4 See, for example, Tooley (1972).  
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theories all agree that persons are all (and sometimes only) fully morally 
considerable.  
 
2. The Marginal Humans Problem 
Personhood-bound theories of moral status draw a tight circle around 
‘us’. They are appealing theories, in that reasons for supposing that the 
constitutive features of personhood are salient are often very compelling; 
but they have their strength at the expense of an unintuitive exclusivity.  
 
On a simple personhood-bound account, anyone reading this thesis has 
full moral considerability. If there is such a thing as a right to life, for 
example, you have one. Animals, however, mostly do not. Foetuses do 
not. Severely cognitively disabled individuals do not. Normal, healthy 
human babies do not. Worse than this, on a simple personhood account, 
it’s not simply that these creatures have no right to life: they are not 
considerable at all; they do not themselves, for their own sake, figure into 
our moral reasoning. Kant, of course, famously, thought that treating 
animals cruelly was only of moral import insofar as it may cultivate cruelty 
in the nature of the actor. ‘Animality’, on his account, was indeed directly 
opposed to ‘rationality’—to personhood and moral considerability, in other 
words.  
 
When one behaves cruelly towards a ‘nonrational’ creature, Kant wrote, ‘it 
dulls his shared feeling of their pain and so weakens and gradually 
uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in 
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one’s relations with other men.’ A caring attitude towards animals, he 
thought, ‘belongs indirectly to man’s duty with regard to these animals; 
considered as a direct duty, however, it is always only a duty of man to 
himself.’5  
 
In other words, on Kant’s pure personhood approach to moral status, 
nonpersons are morally inconsiderable, full-stop: we do not have duties 
towards them, they are not the sorts of beings towards whom one could 
have a duty.6 Insofar as we ought to treat animals kindly, we ought to do 
so out of care for ourselves and for our fellow persons.  
 
While many of us find it morally acceptable to kill animals for food or other 
resources, surely it is wrong to suppose that we have no duties towards 
animals. Many contemporary philosophers, then, turn to two-tiered 
personhood-bound accounts to accommodate the intuition that we have, 
at the very least, weak beneficent duty towards animals.7 
 
On a two-tiered account, the story is usually that, while personhood 
confers full moral considerability, sentience (for example) confers limited 
                                                
5 Kant (1991) p 238.  
6 For an attempt to reconcile Kantian theory with duties to animals see 
Wood (1998). 
7 See e.g. McMahan (2002). McMahan has a more elaborate story to tell 
about marginal humans and what we owe to them, but his account is, 
broadly-speaking, a two-tiered persons-and-sentience account.    
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or minimal considerability. Usually, merely-sentient creatures are such 
that we ought not cause them unnecessary harm; or unnecessary pain; 
etc. But their sentience does not generate a prohibition—even a pro tanto 
prohibition—on making them dead. Persons, meanwhile, are such that 
we ought not cause them unnecessary harm and also we ought not make 
them dead. Sometimes this is cashed out in terms of rights: we have 
imperfect beneficent duty towards sentient creatures, but these creatures 
are not rights-bearers. Only persons are rights bearers, and as such, only 
persons have a right to life. 
 
The two-tiered personhood-bound account is not without obstacles, with 
respect to non-human animals. If we say that sentience motivates a 
prohibition on the unnecessary causing of suffering, we are still left with 
the task of spelling out this necessity. Usually, what we mean 
pretheoretically when we talk about unnecessary cruelty to animals is 
something like necessity with respect to the needs of persons. But if the 
considerability, even minimal considerability, of non-human animals is to 
be taken seriously, we need to either take seriously the needs of animals 
when spelling out necessity; or we need to give an account of why 
beneficence to animals should be circumscribed by the needs of persons.  
 
Even if we suppose that a two-tiered account can successfully motivate a 
duty of beneficence towards non-human animals (if not stronger, rights-
based claims about what we owe to them), there is still a glaring problem 
with personhood-bound accounts: some human beings are not persons. 
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So, on a simple personhood-bound account, we cannot motivate duty or 
obligation towards any non-persons, and this leaves marginal humans, 
like severely cognitively disabled individuals and human babies outside of 
our moral realm.  
 
On a two-tiered account, we can motivate modest beneficence claims 
regarding marginal humans, but no more. We cannot claim that they have 
a right to life; we can only say that, as with non-human animals, we ought 
not cause them harm unless it is necessary.8 But this doesn’t seem to 
capture the intuitions most of us have about marginal humans. Most of us 
think that it is morally permissible—or at least, minimally morally 
problematic—to breed and kill non-human animals for food and clothing. 
Even if we think that causing these animals to suffer unnecessarily in the 
course of breeding them for food is impermissible, it is still the case that 
we accept their use ‘as a means’, and to what are essentially 
unnecessary ends (after all, we could wear cotton; we could eat beans); 
and we accept that ending their lives for our own ends is morally 
permissible. So, even if we suppose that non-human animals ought not 
                                                
8 Indeed, it is not clear whether we can derive positive care duties 
towards marginal humans from a two-tiered account. In part two of this 
thesis, I will suggest that we might be able to motivate special obligations 
towards some marginal humans that do not arise from their moral status 
directly. I will explore parental obligation, in particular, as a way of 
fleshing out this possibility.  
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be made to suffer unnecessarily, the claim that marginal persons have 
the same moral status as non-human animals is a hefty bullet to bite.  
 
There is a sizable literature surrounding the question of whether we ought 
to bite this bullet: whether we ought to accept a theory that generates the 
conclusion that human non-persons are morally on a par with non-human 
animals.9 Usually, when the bullet is bitten, it is done so lightly: the claim 
is not that we may eat marginal humans; rather, that non-human animals 
are deserving of much higher moral regard than we pretheoretically afford 
them.10 So, the claim is not that it is permissible to kill marginal humans 
for our own ends, but rather that it is impermissible to do so with non-
human animals.11  
 
This lightened bullet-biting is still rather undesirable; it still leaves 
marginal humans with a lesser status than those of us fortunate enough 
to fit the personhood bill. This means that, when the rights or desert of 
marginal humans come into conflict with those of persons, our theory will 
                                                
9 See, for example, McMahan (2005) and Kittay (2005).  
10 See, for example, Singer (1975). 
11 Frey (2002) seems to toy with the idea of biting the bullet properly: that 
is, of accepting that some uses of non-human animals—particularly, in 
important medical research—are morally permissible, and that if this is 
so, so too is use of marginal humans for this purpose. It is not clear to me 
whether he means this as a reductio, or whether he is in earnest.  
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dictate a favouring of persons. So for example, the use of marginal 
humans in research towards life-saving treatment may still be justified.12 
 
The marginal humans problem has led many philosophers to reject 
personhood-bound accounts, and to claim instead that being a member 
of the human species is what confers full moral considerability. Any 
human being, then, is fully morally considerable, no matter what features 
they do or do not possess; any non-human is at best minimally 
considerable. But if personhood-bound accounts sacrifice intuitive appeal 
for theoretical plausibility, these humanity accounts do the reverse: 
everyone we pretheoretically want to include in ‘us’ is included, but the 
theoretical grounds are mysterious.  
 
First, it is unclear why a biological fact should be morally salient: what do 
chemical sequences in cells have to do with moral worth? The answer 
cannot be that those chemical sequences produce morally-valuable 
attributes, since this will simply collapse into a personhood-bound 
account. The problem, again, is that not all human beings have the 
constellation of cognitive features or capacities that characterise 
personhood. If we say that the moral value of the biological fact of being 
                                                
12 Lifesaving treatment for human persons will of course also benefit 
human non-persons. So, the worry probably isn’t, in this case, that we’re 
using marginal persons as means to our own ends. Rather, the worry is 
that they are second-class: we choose their suffering over our own, as a 
matter of principle, on this picture.  
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human lies in the fact that our biology allows us to have these morally 
valuable cognitive features, then it is the cognitive features (ie, it is 
personhood) that are doing the moral work. There is no reason, in that 
case, to suppose that individuals who have the biological features but not 
the cognitive features are morally considerable.  
 
One might, then, want to appeal to the idea that human beings make up a 
‘natural kind’. That personhood is unique to the kind, and thus, being a 
member of that kind is morally salient. But there is an obvious threat of 
regress in this thinking. Why pick out homo sapiens as our ‘kind’? Why 
not adult humans? Why not normally-able adult humans? Why not 
vertebrates? It is unclear how we could choose one ‘natural kind’ rather 
than another, on theoretical grounds.  
 
Peter Singer, of course, argues that attributing moral considerability to all 
and only members of the human species is ‘speciesist’: that attributing 
moral import to species is arbitrary and bigoted in just the same way as 
attributing moral worth to race, or to gender.13 Some have rejected 
Singer’s claim. Most often, the rejection takes the form of an appeal, in 
one form or another, to ‘naturalness’: that it is only natural that we should 
value our own species; even that so valuing is a product of evolution.14 
                                                
13 Singer (1975), (2006). See also LaFollette and Shanks (1996).   
14 See e.g. S. Post, (1993): 294. For a truly bizarre rejection of Singer’s 
challenge, see Steinbock (1978): ‘It is not racist to provide special care to 
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But of course, that it is natural we should do so does not show that it is 
right we should. In general, rejections of Singer’s speciesism claim tend 
to struggle, theoretically.  
 
Many philosophers, then, look for a middle way: an account of moral 
status that fits our intuitions about who counts, but that is theoretically 
plausible. Often times, such a middle way takes the form of an expanded 
personhood-bound account: an account that takes persons as 
paradigmatic, but tacks on additional qualifications to bring marginal 
humans within the moral fold.  
 
In chapter one of this thesis, I will be discussing relational accounts of 
moral considerability. Pure relational accounts—often associated with 
‘care ethics’—pick out membership in communities or implication in care 
relationships as the singular criterion for moral considerability.15 For 
reasons that should become obvious in chapter one, such accounts are 
theoretically unworkable, and thus of little interest. On the other hand, 
mixed relational accounts—accounts that tack implication in care 
relationships onto personhood-bound accounts, thus privileging persons 
and anyone cared for by persons—are prima facie appealing (and also, it 
seems, very popular). These relational accounts seem to have all the 
theoretical plausibility of a personhood-bound account (since they are, at 
                                                                                                                               
members of your own race; it is racist to fall below your moral obligation 
to a person because of his or her race.’  
15 e.g. Kittay (2005)  
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base, just that) and yet can accommodate our intuitions about marginal 
humans. They seem to include marginal humans, exclude non-human 
animals, and yet avoid speciesism. I’ll argue, however, that this success 
is only apparent: in so accommodating, they lose their theoretical 
plausibility.  
 
3. Infants and infanticide    
So, theories of moral status seem stuck. The best we can do theoretically 
cannot accommodate marginal humans; and our attempts to 
accommodate marginal humans scupper theoretical coherence. It seems 
we are faced with a choice between intuitive plausibility and 
theoretical/explanatory plausibility.  The marginal humans problem is the 
problem in need of solution with respect to theories of moral status. 
Solving it would just be to discover the right account of moral status: the 
right account of who counts and why. While this thesis will not offer a 
solution to the problem, the aim is to make progress towards it by taking 
one group of marginal humans—human infants—as a case study.  
 
I have chosen infants because they are a particularly good example of 
the marginal humans problem. First, because most of us have very 
decided and strong intuitions about right-treatment of babies. Not only do 
we think they are morally considerable, but most intuitions lean towards 
the thought that babies deserve more consideration and care than do 
adult human beings. While intuitions vary somewhat about, for example, 
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individuals in a persistent vegetative state, or individuals with acute 
psychiatric disorder, they seem to be quite stable as regards infants.16  
 
Second, because—in marked distinction to the clarity of our intuitions 
about their moral status, and about personhood—they are simply not 
persons. Babies are not rational; they are not self-aware; they do not 
have preferences or an understanding of themselves as persisting 
through time. Unlike individuals with acute mental disorder, for example, 
there is simply no question of whether a theoretically-useful 
conceptualisation of personhood can or ought to include infants. And yet, 
                                                
16 This, of course, may not be historically or cross-culturally accurate. 
There is evidence of widespread practice of, and apparent acceptance of 
infanticide (See e.g. Hrdy (2000)), But there are two points to be made 
about this. First, whether an infant has a right to life, as has been said, is 
a different question to whether an infant has a right to beneficent care. A 
being may have one sort of right without having another; still they are 
rights-bearers. There is no evidence that infanticide-practicing societies 
tend to be societies that deny beneficent care to infants. So, even when 
infanticide is practiced within a society, it is not the case that that society 
is denying all duty towards infants. Second, insofar as moral progress is a 
coherent idea, the fact that others have done or thought otherwise does 
not neutralize or de-legitimise strong intuitions we now have, even if it 
gives us reason to examine our intuitions more closely. And this is 
precisely what I would like to do. 
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the clear intuition is that we have strong obligations towards them, and 
that they probably have rights.17    
 
The question of the moral status of infants appears most prominently in 
discussions of the moral difference between abortion and infanticide. 
Whether birth can be ‘morally significant’ (that is, whether birth can 
change the moral status of the foetus/neonate), and whether newborn 
infants are owed better, or different treatment to foetuses, is the locus of 
discussion of babies and moral considerability. So in part one of this 
thesis, I will explore this issue.  
 
Comparisons between abortion and infanticide are, of course, standard in 
popular discussion of abortion rights. Michael Tooley’s 1972 article 
‘Abortion and Infanticide’ brought the issue to the fore in academic 
philosophical discussion of reproductive rights; and indeed, Tooley’s 
discussion of abortion and infanticide seems to be a particularly striking 
illustration of the tension between personhood-bound accounts and 
intuitions about babies. Tooley argues that since neither foetuses nor 
neonates are capable of desiring continued existence, neither foetuses 
nor neonates have a right to life. And thus, abortion is morally permissible 
and so is infanticide.   
                                                
17 Intuitions about rights are, of course, more murky.—see e.g. Archard 
and Macleod (eds) (2002)—though notice, while there is debate about 
whether children (and by extension, infants) have rights, I suspect few 
people lack the intuition that they have rights to life.   
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He argues, first, that understanding a right to life as simply a right to 
remain biologically alive is wrongheaded. For example, if we 
reprogramme your brain, such that your memories, preferences, etc, now 
bear no resemblance to the memories and preferences that you once 
had, while allowing you to remain biologically alive, we have not 
respected your right to life. Likewise, if you sustain injury that causes you 
to suffer brain death, while your body remains alive, we probably do not 
violate your right to life by ‘pulling the plug’ on you. A right to life, then, 
must be a right to something other than a beating heart. The correct 
understanding of the right, Tooley says, is as ‘the right of a subject of 
experiences and other mental states to continue to exist’.18  
 
He then asks, ‘what properties must something have to be a person, i.e, 
to have a serious right to life?’19 What properties something must have to 
have this right will depend, in the first instance, on what properties 
something must have in order to have any rights at all. Tooley writes that  
 
To ascribe a right to an individual is to assert something about the 
prima facie obligations of other individuals to act, or to refrain from 
acting, in certain ways. However, the obligations in question are 
                                                
18 Op.cit. 46.  
19 Tooley, again, is using ‘person’ in the first way mentioned above—
more particularly, Tooley writes that ‘X is a person’ is synonymous, on his 
use, with ‘X has a serious (moral) right to life’ (p. 40).  
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conditional ones, being dependent upon the existence of certain 
desires of the individual to whom the right is ascribed. Thus if an 
individual asks one to destroy something to which he has a right, 
one does not violate his right to that thing if one proceeds to destroy 
it. This suggests the following analysis: “A has a right to X” is 
roughly synonymous with “If A desires X, then others are under a 
prima facie obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him 
of it.20, 21  
 
This, then, seems to show that in order to be a rights-bearer, one must be 
able to have desires, since if one was unable to desire, the claim that 
others were under a prima facie obligation to honour one’s right to X if 
one desires X would be vacuous. To be under an obligation not to deprive 
an individual of something, however, that individual needn’t actively have 
the desire for it. So, for example, it is (arguably) a violation of a person’s 
rights to steal her car, even if she is asleep and is therefore entertaining 
no desires whatever about her car. The actual desire, then, is not what is 
morally salient: the ability to desire is what motivates the having of rights.   
                                                
20 P. 45. TooIey later expands the conception to include cases where one 
would desire X were it not for (1) being in an emotionally-unbalanced 
state; (2) being temporarily unconscious; or (3) being conditioned to 
desire the absence of X.  
21I take it there has been a terminological shift over recent years, and that 
these days, we would probably want to call this a ‘pro tanto’ obligation, 
rather than a ‘prima facie’ obligation. 
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With regard to particular rights, one is only able to have a desire for X, 
Tooley claims, if one is able to have a concept of X. ‘The desires a thing 
can have,’ Tooley writes, ‘are limited by the concepts it possesses.’ 
Kittens, then, do not have property rights, for example, because kittens 
cannot have a concept of ownership.  
 
In order to have a right to life (i.e. a right to continue to exist and be the 
subject of that existence), one must be capable of desiring life. In order to 
be capable of desiring life, one must have a concept of oneself as a 
subject persisting through time. Thus, persons (as we substantively 
understand them), and only persons, have a right to life, and since neither 
foetuses nor babies are persons, neither babies nor foetuses have a right 
to life. Tooley concludes, then, that not only is abortion permissible for 
any reason, but so is infanticide.  
 
4. What to do with Tooley 
As was said, Tooley’s argument is a striking example of the tension 
between personhood-bound accounts of considerability and intuitions 
about babies. On the face of it, we seem to have four options: reject the 
intuition that infanticide is morally impermissible (bite the bullet); reject 
personhood as the measure of moral considerability; soften the 
personhood approach (take personhood to be a merely sufficient 
condition for considerability); or drive a conceptual wedge between the 
lack of a right to life, and the permissibility of killing.  
The Moral Significance of Birth 
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Taking the first option—bullet-biting on infanticide, and on marginal 
humans more generally—would just be to accept Tooley’s argument. 
Since many of us think that abortion is morally permissible, and since it 
seems implausible that newborns and foetuses have different moral 
statuses, bullet-biting on infanticide may seem a tempting option. 
However, when we consider our intuitions about marginal humans more 
broadly, the temptation is markedly diminished: Tooley’s argument, if 
correct, shows not only that infanticide is permissible, but also that 
involuntary euthanasia of cognitively disabled human beings, elderly 
individuals in the throes of dementia, humans with acute psychiatric 
disorder, etc., is likewise permissible. This is a big bullet, indeed, for one 
easy bite. At least ruling out the other three options before biting, then, 
seems obligatory.  
 
The second option—rejecting personhood—is, we have already seen, a 
difficult one. One does so at the expense of theoretical strength. For 
example, Rosalind Hursthouse argues that ‘only people who already 
agree with [Tooley] about these issues will accept his definition of a 
person or the sort of being who has a right to life’.22 Tooley’s argument is, 
according to Hurshouse, nothing more than a neat reductio on 
personhood-bound accounts. Hursthouse’s argument, however, relies on 
the appeal of her alternative theory of moral status, which runs, in a 
nutshell, as follows: personhood is morally salient; homo sapiens is a 
                                                
22 Hursthouse (1987) 
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‘species of persons’; therefore being a member of homo sapiens is 
morally salient, and in particular, confers moral considerability.23 To avoid 
a charge of speciesism, Hursthouse amends the view to take note of the 
fact that there may be other species of persons: so then, being a member 
of homo sapiens or any other species of persons confers moral 
considerability.  
 
But of course, Hursthouse does not avoid the charge of speciesism at all: 
her account is deeply speciesist. Indeed, the ‘or any other species of 
persons’ amendment brings out the problem with the concept ‘person 
species’. That being a member of our species is not sufficient for 
personhood, in the substantive sense, is a given—the existence of 
marginal humans (just the problem we’re grappling with) shows this—but 
that it is also not necessary for personhood—evidenced by the 
amendment to include non-human persons—means that there simply is 
no viable moral link between personhood and humanness.  
 
While ‘species of persons’ may be something of an accurate 
description—where we mean something like ‘species of which some 
members are persons’—it is doing no moral theoretical work. One might 
as well describe our species as ‘species of featherless bipeds who aren’t 
kangaroos’. That is, what’s driving considerability on Hursthouse’s 
account is species membership, plain and simple. Inclusion of other 
‘person species’ does not save her account from the charge, just as 
                                                
23 (1987): 91-107 
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saying ‘I’m not a white racist; I also like Asian people’ does not save one 
from a charge of racism.    
 
The theoretical implausibility of Hursthouse’s reply illustrates the problem 
already noted: alternatives to personhood-bound accounts tend to 
capture intuitions at the expense of theoretical coherence. So, resolving 
the marginal humans problem is simply not as easy as reading Tooley as 
a reductio. In part one of this thesis, then, I’ll be examining the two 
remaining options: softening personhood; and driving a wedge between 
the lack of a right to life, and the permissibility of killing.  
 
In chapters one and two, I will evaluate two attempts to motivate the 
moral significance of birth: that is, the idea that birth can change the 
moral status of the foetus/neonate. In chapter one, I will discuss Mary 
Anne Warren’s account of the moral significance of birth.24 Warren 
represents an attempt to soften personhood by showing that personhood 
is merely a sufficient criterion for full moral considerability. Social 
community membership, and more specifically, being a party to care 
relationships, is also a sufficient condition on Warren’s account. This 
means then that babies, once they are born and enter into relationships 
with persons, are fully morally considerable. This approach—what I will 
call a ‘relational account of moral considerability’—is rather a popular 
approach to softening personhood-bound accounts. In chapter one, I will 
argue that it simply does not work, and will suggest an alternative 
                                                
24 Warren (1989)  
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conceptualisation of the moral salience of relationships that may be more 
promising.25  
 
In chapter two, I will discuss a variant-relational approach to the moral 
significance of birth. Jose Louis Bermudez argues that being in social 
contact with persons can trigger developmental changes in the neonate 
that render her fully morally considerable. On Bermudez’s account, being 
in the relationships, itself, is not salient; but the relationships are, if you 
will, salient-feature triggers. His account is not susceptible to the 
criticisms I offer against the simple relational account of moral 
considerability, because being a party to care relationships is simply the 
trigger for the development of morally salient features, rather than the 
morally salient feature itself. However, Bermudez’s account also fails, I 
will argue, because, first, he fails to show that foetuses cannot be likewise 
triggered; and second, because the personhood-softening necessary to 
make the account of birth tenable renders the overall picture of moral 
considerability theoretically unworkable. 
 
Since neither the relational, nor the variant-relational approach can 
motivate the claim that babies but not foetuses are fully morally 
considerable, it might look as though we must accept that infanticide is 
morally permissible if abortion is. But I will argue that this does not follow: 
                                                
25 This alternative conceptualisation will foreshadow the argument in 
chapter three, in which I explore the possibility of driving a wedge 
between the lack of a right to life and the permissibility of killing. 
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a wedge can, indeed, be driven between the lack of a right to life, and the 
permissibility of killing. This means that sameness of moral status will not 
imply sameness of moral permissibility of killing.  
 
In chapter three, then, I will defend this claim in the context of considering 
an updated version of Tooley’s basic argument.26 My critique of the 
updated argument relies on a superficial and, I think, uncontentious 
variety of what I will call moral contextualism: the idea that moral context 
bears on the moral rightness of any act. While it seems that a change in 
the moral status of the foetus/neonate is unlikely at birth, I will show that 
we still needn’t conclude that infanticide is permissible if abortion is; and 
that even if a newborn lacks a right to life, this does not show that 
infanticide is morally permissible. By extension, even if we cannot 
generate anything like the possession of a right to life as regards 
marginal persons more generally, this is not a reason to accept the 
conclusion that it is carte blanche permissible to kill marginal humans.  
 
5. Beyond Considerability 
 That there is no prima facie reason to accept the conclusion that it is 
permissible to kill marginal humans—and babies in particular—is a rather 
unsatisfying outcome. Probably we want our broader conception of right 
treatment of babies to go quite a way further. While there might be 
intuitional wiggle room on infanticide (or anyway, one might be persuaded 
to bite the bullet on infanticide), there is surely no such wiggle room when 
                                                
26 Giubilini and Minerva (2012) 
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it comes to right treatment of babies: it seems clear that we have 
beneficent obligations towards them.  
 
However, these beneficent obligations needn’t be described by our theory 
of moral considerability. We may want to say that, while the moral status 
of a baby cannot, on its own, motivate any robust beneficent duty, special 
obligations may be able to plug the intuitional gap.27 To this end, in part 
two of the thesis I will discuss the most basic and intuitive of the possible 
special obligations towards babies: parental obligation.  
 
While parental obligation surely cannot account for all beneficent duty 
towards babies, it is arguably the most central of special obligations 
towards them. The thesis, then, will not offer a thorough account of 
special obligations towards babies, but will rather focus in on parental 
obligation. In chapter four I will look at whether causal accounts of 
parental obligation—according to which, parents are obliged to care for 
their children in virtue of having brought them into being—are tenable. I 
                                                
27 Our account of moral considerability will still need to be the right sort. 
Particularly, it will still need to motivate the claim that babies are the sorts 
of creatures towards whom one could have duties at all. It is implausible, 
for example, to say that we have duties towards rocks; duties towards 
persons, however, seem well-motivated. Some account will still be 
needed of why babies fall on the person side—despite not being 
persons—rather than the rock side. In the introduction to part two I’ll 
address this worry, and argue that we ought to take sentience seriously.  
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will discuss Elizabeth Brake’s objections to causal accounts; and her 
positive, consent account of parental obligation; and I will argue that her 
objections can be answered, and a causal account ought to be preferred 
over a consent account.  
 
In chapter five, I will expand my discussion of causal accounts of parental 
obligation. I will argue that what I call a ‘bifurcated’ causal account—one 
that distinguishes explicitly between progenitors and social parents—is 
the sort of account we ought to accept. I will then look at how this account 
bears on the abortion debate. I will claim that, because progenitors have 
life-long and non-transferrable obligation towards their offspring, adoption 
is not—as is often argued—a viable alternative to access to abortion.  
 
Finally, in chapter six, I will look at further reproductive-ethical 
consequences of the bifurcated causal account of parental obligation. For 
example, I will look at the question of whether the causal account implies 
a duty to gestate, and thus that abortion is immoral. On the face of it, one 
might suppose it does: after all, if one is obliged to one’s children in virtue 
of having created them, this seems to indicate that one is obliged to one’s 
foetus in virtue of having created it. Of course, if we simply say that a 
foetus is not a person, and thus not morally considerable, and thus not 
such that we can have obligations towards it, this causes trouble for 
babies. A theory of parental obligation that can’t account for our 
obligations towards babies is surely not desirable. However, I will argue 
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that causal accounts of parental obligation do not, on their own, imply a 
duty to gestate, for at least a couple of reasons.  
 
First, causal accounts tell us why we are obliged, and not to what we are 
obliged. The obvious reply to this is that, though the details might be up 
for grabs, still we can say, generally, what we as parents are obliged to: 
we are obliged to provide care, of some appropriate sort. Gestating, then, 
might seem like the only way one could care for a foetus.28 But this 
needn’t be so. Given the dearth of theoretical backing for the claim that 
death harms non-persons, it needn’t be the case that keeping the foetus 
alive is the best way to care for it. We might suppose that, for example, 
with adverse social or economic circumstances looming in the future, a 
short and comfortable existence in the womb—or indeed, the wholly 
experienceless existence zygotehood—is preferable to a longer existence 
filled with hardship.  
 
Second, no matter how strong our obligation to our offspring, that 
obligation will always be in competition with other obligations and rights. 
To say that I have a pro tanto duty to x is not to say whether I must x in 
the face of duties also to y and z, and with rights of my own. So, even if 
the causal account of parenthood implies that I have an obligation to care 
for my foetus, it will not (necessarily) follow from this that I have an 
obligation to gestate, since I may be under many obligations—and 
certainly have rights—that may conflict with, and need to be balanced 
                                                
28 Perhaps also eating sensibly, refraining from recreational drug use, etc. 
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against my parental obligation. In order to show, then, that a pregnant 
woman has a duty to gestate, even if we accept the causal account of 
parenthood; and even if we accept that this implies an obligation to care 
for the foetus; and even if caring for the foetus involves keeping it alive; 
we would still have work to do.    

  29 
Chapter One 
YOU’RE NOBODY ’TIL SOMEBODY LOVES YOU, BABY 
 
Introduction 
Many of us share the intuition that abortion is (at least sometimes) 
morally permissible, but infanticide is not. While many have the intuition 
that late abortion is more morally weighty than early abortion, most agree 
that whatever the moral weight of late abortion, it is sometimes 
permissible whereas infanticide never is. But this is puzzling, since 
foetuses and neonates of similar gestational age seem like precisely the 
same creatures with the same intrinsic features. The standard move, 
then, is to craft accounts of abortion that mirror defensible person-killings: 
self-defence, or rightful failure to aid, for example. In other words, the 
standard move is to craft defences of abortion that work even if both 
foetuses and neonates are fully morally considerable.  
 
These approaches are standard because the notion that birth could 
change the moral status of the foetus/neonate is prima facie implausible. 
Neonates just are foetuses outside of wombs. However, on inspection 
these defences of abortion are problematic. According to Judith Jarvis 
Thomson’s account, for example, even if the foetus has a right to life, this 
right to life would not imply a corresponding duty on the part of the 
pregnant woman to provide life-saving aid to the foetus. As such, the 
pregnant woman does not have an obligation (unless she consents to be 
so obliged) to gestate the foetus (Thomson 1971). Thomson assumes 
that gestating, and subsequently birthing the baby constitutes tacit 
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consent to aid the baby.1 But it is not clear why birthing the baby should 
constitute tacit consent, rather than, say, conceiving the embryo, or 
gestating it to the foetal stage, if both babies and foetuses are morally 
considerable. So it’s not clear that Thomson’s defence can work, on the 
assumption that infanticide is impermissible: if infanticide is impermissible 
because the woman has tacitly consented to aid the neonate in having 
brought it into being; and if foetuses have the same moral status as 
neonates; it is unclear why we oughtn’t say that the pregnant woman has 
tacitly consented to aid the foetus in having brought it into being; and as 
such, abortion will be impermissible for the same reason infanticide is. 
 
Jane English offers a defence of abortion modelled on self-defence, on 
which the pregnant woman is justified in causing the death of the foetus if 
it is necessary in order to defend herself against the threat of life-altering 
harm (English 1994). She concedes that ‘thanks to modern technology, 
the cases are rare in which a pregnancy poses as clear a threat to a 
woman’s bodily health as an attacker brandishing a switchblade,’ but she 
argues that the threat of ‘drastic injury to your life prospects’ is enough to 
justify deadly self-defence, even where the source of the threat is 
                                                
1 According to Thomson, one must also not put the baby out for adoption 
in order to be said to have consented to aid. But it’s not clear at what 
point I’ve not put the baby out for adoption. At the moment of birth? 
Within a fortnight? Surely I must have a duty to aid in the interim between 
birthing the baby and declining to adopt it out: I can’t just let it die on 
grounds I intend to adopt it out.  
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innocent. Since unplanned parenthood can constitute such a threat—
whether financially, or by scuppering core autonomous life plans—
abortion is, according to English, permissible on self-defence grounds.  
 
This will also fail as a defence of abortion on the assumption that 
infanticide is impermissible: if a foetus stands to do drastic injury to your 
life prospects, so too does the baby it will become. Indeed, the threat will 
surely be all the clearer once the pregnancy is over and parenthood 
begins. Having an abortion, rather than, say, smothering a newborn, is 
only preferable (qua right treatment of the foetus/neonate) on the 
assumption that the moral status of the foetus is different from, and in 
particular lower than that of the neonate.  
 
It is likely that most defences of abortion will be susceptible to the same 
sort of problem. A reasonable response to this difficulty is to reconsider 
the moral significance of birth: to ask whether there could, after all, be a 
moral difference between a gestationally-advanced foetus and a newborn 
infant. Re-examination of the possibility of birth’s being morally 
significant—despite the implausibility of it—is warranted, given the 
difficulties for defences of abortion in the face of a lack of such an 
account. In this paper, then, I will be examining the possibility that birth 
might change the moral status of the foetus/neonate.  
 
The two most promising philosophical attempts to argue for the moral 
significance of birth in contemporary literature both employ variants on 
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the same strategy (Bermúdez 1996; Warren 1989). The basic strategy is 
to claim that relationships can change one’s moral status: that being in 
relationships with persons can confer on one moral status, even that of a 
person. The more standard employment of this strategy is that of Mary 
Anne Warren. I will argue that her employment of a standard relational 
account of moral status is unsuccessful, because standard relational 
accounts are just unsuccessful. After showing in this chapter why basic 
relational accounts do not work, in the next chapter I will discuss Jose 
Louis Bermúdez’s variant on the basic relational account. His variation is 
not susceptible to the worries I will set out in this chapter, but is likewise 
unsuccessful. First however, I will rehearse and criticise Warren’s 
standard relational account.      
 
Warren claims that both intrinsic and extrinsic features can confer moral 
status, and that baseline moral considerability is derived from intrinsic 
features. Her account of birth, then, is that both foetuses and neonates 
are sentient, and are both therefore minimally considerable; but that, 
since neonates are part of our social community, they are thereby part of 
our moral community, and we must accord to them the rights of a person.  
 
Warren’s account, because it is a relational account of moral 
considerability, simply does not work. However, there is undoubtedly 
something quite right in what she is doing. So, I will first present Warren’s 
account of the moral significance of birth. Then I will discuss why it does 
not work. And finally, I will sketch out a picture of how Warren’s insights 
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might be incorporated into a functioning account of the moral significance 
of birth.   
 
1. Warren’s Account 
Warren (1989) claims that, though nothing changes about the 
foetus/neonate herself at birth, still we must accord to her a different 
status and different rights once she is born. Both foetuses and neonates 
are morally considerable, according to Warren, but not ‘fully’ so. We have 
minimal duties with respect to both—as we do with respect to any 
sentient creature—but neonates, and not foetuses, have rights. We must 
accord the neonate the status of a person when she is born, because 
now she is one of us; she is a part of our (social) community. Being a part 
of our community means that we are obliged to treat the community 
member as if she were a person: we must accord rights to her. But there 
is no such reason to treat the foetus as if she were a person, and there is 
good reason not to, namely, to respect the rights of the pregnant woman. 
 
According to Warren, there are two assumptions lurking in the 
background of most accounts of moral considerability.  
 
1. The Intrinsic Properties Assumption: the only facts that can 
justify the ascription of basic moral rights or moral standing to 
individuals are facts about the intrinsic properties of those 
individuals. 
 
Chapter One 
 34 
2. The Single Criterion Assumption: there is some single property, 
the presence or absence of which divides the world into those 
things which have moral rights or moral standing, and those 
things which do not.  
 
The two most plausible criteria for moral considerability are, on the one 
hand, personhood, and on the other, sentience.2 Warren argues that 
neither of these manages to capture core intuitions about considerability. 
As such, we ought to reject the Single Criterion Assumption. Once we 
reject the Single Criterion Assumption, we ought also to reject the 
Intrinsic Properties Assumption. 
 
The first candidate for a single criterion—personhood—is a clear non-
starter as regards foetuses and babies (and by hypothesis, marginal 
                                                
2 Warren actually talks about self-awareness and sentience. I take it that 
the role self-awareness plays in most personhood accounts is something 
like the following: one must be self-aware in order to act autonomously; 
so one must be self-aware in order to be a moral agent, ie, a person. 
Agency/personhood is the thing, on these accounts, that makes one 
morally considerable. (Think of Kant’s kingdom of ends.) The taxonomy is 
tricky: is the self-awareness the property (ie, the criterion), or is 
personhood? It’s not clear what to say about this. However, Warren’s 
claims about self-awareness work, mutatis mutandis, for personhood, and 
I take it that personhood is the stronger position to attack. So, I’ll present 
Warren as if in opposition to personhood.  
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humans more generally): neither is a person on a technical understanding 
of personhood; on which personhood is not coextensive with being a 
member of the human species.3 Most personhood accounts of moral 
considerability hedge, in the case of ‘healthy normal infants’, by claiming 
that potential persons are also morally considerable, on grounds that the 
person they will become will be morally considerable. But of course, this 
will not give us a moral difference between foetuses and babies, since 
foetuses are also potential persons. What’s more, it is arguably the case 
that the aggregate of sperm and egg that has the possibility to become a 
foetus, and later a person, has the potential for personhood. So, hedging 
                                                
3 The philosophical use of the term ‘person’ is different to both the 
common use—on which ‘person’ picks out all and only members of the 
human species—and the common use within the abortion debate—on 
which ‘person’ picks out fully morally considerable members of the human 
species. ‘Person’, in the present discussion, is used in a broadly Lockean 
way. On this use, personhood is characterized by a constellation of 
(apparently morally-salient) features, such as moral agency, self-
awareness, and rationality. Possession of these features is both 
necessary and sufficient for personhood. It is usually taken that 
possession of this constellation of features renders one fully morally 
considerable, setting normal adult human beings apart, for example, from 
non-human animals. However, full moral considerability is not built in to 
the concept personhood: it is a substantive moral claim that having the 
constellation of features that make one a person makes one fully morally 
considerable.  
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in this way will not help motivate a moral difference between a foetus and 
a neonate, and will, further, generate unintuitive consequences. 
Personhood is not apt as a criterion for moral considerability if we take it 
that babies are morally considerable and possible pairs of gametes are 
not.  
 
Sentience, the second candidate for a single criterion, does not fare much 
better. Warren argues that whether we understand sentience as a 
threshold criterion or as a scalar criterion, the results speak strongly 
against core intuitions. If sentience is a threshold criterion, such that all 
minimally sentient beings have equal moral standing—that is, if mere, 
weak sentience makes one fully morally considerable—then we will be 
forced to say that what happens to any minimally sentient creature is as 
weighty as if it happened to you or me: swatting a bee would be as 
morally weighty as knocking down a child with your car; killing a mouse 
would be murder. Our everyday moral judgments seem very strongly to 
indicate that we give different moral weight to the death of a person and 
that of a mouse. So, sentience as a threshold criterion simply doesn’t 
wash with our broader, pretheoretical views on moral value.   
 
On the other hand, if sentience is a scalar criterion, such that the more 
sentient you are, the higher your moral status, then killing a person will 
rightly be taken as more serious than killing a mouse. However, the 
broader picture of moral value will still be deeply at odds with our every-
day judgments. Human babies will not have anything like a right to life, 
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since they are nothing like ‘fully’ sentient, in the way that you and I are. 
On the other hand, housecats might have a right to life, or are anyway 
more likely to, since housecats are more sentient than human babies.4  
This again is deeply at odds with our every-day judgments about value. 
So, whether sentience is a threshold or a scalar criterion, Warren says, it 
cannot work as a single criterion for moral considerability. It would be too 
big a bullet to bite.  
 
Since neither of the two most plausible criteria captures core intuitions 
about moral considerability, Warren thinks we ought to reject the single 
criterion assumption, and look instead to a pluralist account of moral 
considerability (1997). On the pluralist account that she advocates, 
sentience acts as a ‘baseline’. Merely sentient creatures are minimally 
morally considerable; sentient creatures who are (in morally-salient ways) 
more than merely sentient are more than minimally morally considerable.  
 
                                                
4 It should be noted that the sentience view Warren is attacking is very 
different to the best-known sentience account—Peter Singer’s. On 
Singer’s account, sentience isn’t a value-maker; it drives equality of 
consideration in the utilitarian calculus. So, on the gold-standard 
sentience account, it isn’t the case either that ‘more sentient’ creatures 
are more valuable, or that killing a mouse is as weighty as killing a 
person. (See Singer (1975).) However, this clarification simply shifts the 
burden from sentience to utilitarianism. Exploring the aptness of the latter 
is obviously out of the scope of this essay.  
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So, sentience is a baseline for moral considerability. According to 
Warren, we are obliged to avoid unnecessary harm to sentient beings. 
However, merely sentient beings are not fully morally considerable: they 
are not full rights-bearers. Importantly, they do not have a right to life. But 
some sentient creatures who have morally-salient features in addition to 
sentience do have a right to life. Personhood is one feature that is rights-
conferring. Another rights-conferring feature, according to Warren, is 
being a party to social, care relationships. Sentient beings who are part of 
our social community, according to Warren, are fully morally 
considerable. They have rights. Newborn infants, then, though they are 
not persons, and have no intrinsic properties other than sentience that 
can ground moral status, are none the less fully morally considerable, 
and have a right to life. She writes  
 
The infant at birth enters the human social world, 
where, if it lives, it becomes involved in social 
relationships with others, of kinds that can only be 
dimly foreshadowed before birth. It begins to be known 
and cared for, not just as a potential member of the 
family or community, but as a socially-present and 
responsive individual.  
Thus, although the human newborn may have no 
intrinsic properties that can ground a moral right to 
life stronger than that of a foetus just before birth, its 
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emergence into the social world makes it appropriate 
to treat it as if it had such a stronger right. (1989: 56) 
 
Because the neonate, once born, is known and cared for by us, it is 
appropriate to attribute to it a right to life. Thus, newborn babies have a 
right to life (infanticide is impermissible), and foetuses do not (abortion is 
permissible). 
 
 
2. Relational Accounts of Moral Considerability  
In this section, I will consider whether Warren’s account can motivate a 
change in moral status, and I will argue that it cannot.5 Warren’s account 
is an instance of a relational account of moral considerability (henceforth 
RAMC). RAMCs, I will argue, are defective. Since it is an instance of this 
sort of account, Warren’s argument is likewise defective.  
 
An RAMC is a standard move in moral philosophy. According to RAMCs, 
you’re nobody ‘til somebody loves you. That is, being a party to social 
(especially care) relationships confers moral considerability. RAMCs are 
a standard way of accounting for the moral considerability of marginal 
humans. An RAMC attributes full moral status (and importantly, a right to 
life) to a being or group of beings in virtue of those beings being (in fact) 
                                                
5 A prior worry is that Warren’s account can’t actually motivate the moral 
significance of birth, since birth could, in theory, happen in the absence of 
socialising. But I’ll set this worry aside. 
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the objects of the love, care, concern, etc. of otherwise morally 
considerable beings. So, being the object of the care or concern of 
morally considerable creatures renders one, according to RAMCs, 
morally considerable. Social community membership confers moral 
community membership.  
 
RAMCs occur in the context of personhood-bound theories of moral 
considerability. If personhood is the standard measure of full moral 
considerability (or rights-bearing), then so-called ‘marginal humans’ 
(babies; the severely cognitively disabled; comatose individuals; etc) will 
not count as fully morally considerable. At best, we will have to say that 
they matter the way that sentient non-human animals do. Most of us will 
find this unsavoury. After all, most of us feel that it’s permissible to do 
things like eat non-human animals. Surely marginal humans must not be, 
morally, like non-human animals. But on the assumption that species 
membership—a bare biological fact—is not morally salient (any more 
than skin colour or sex are), it falls to the personhood theorist to explain 
how these humans can still have full moral status. An account must be 
given that includes them, even though they’re not persons, and without 
appeal to their ‘humanness’. And this is precisely what RAMCs promise 
to do: to bring marginal humans within our moral circle on non-speciesist 
grounds.6 
                                                
6 For the classic presentation of the speciesism argument, see Singer 
(1999). Singer’s positive theory of moral considerability is not widely 
accepted, but I take it there is (near) consensus that his speciesism 
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According to Michael Fox, for example, marginal humans are members of 
our ‘human family’, and in virtue of our quasi-familial love/care ties with 
them, we have special obligations—something like familial obligations—
towards them beyond what their intrinsic properties would warrant (2002). 
Bonnie Steinbock claims that the feelings of special obligation we 
experience towards members of our own species are morally relevant, 
and because we have these feelings, we owe marginal humans more 
than we owe comparably endowed non-humans (1978). Martha 
Nussbaum argues that, though animal wellbeing is a proper matter of 
justice, humans and even humans who haven’t—will never have, cannot 
have—‘the capabilities’ (ie, marginal humans) are owed as a matter of 
justice moral priority over non-human animals because they live in our 
human societies (2006).7 Kittay writes that ‘[i]dentities that we acquire are 
                                                                                                                               
argument is a genuine hurdle to be overcome for any proposed account 
of moral considerability. Whether this is right or not is, however, not a 
worry for my criticism. The RAMC just is a response to the speciesism 
worry; it assumes the moral irrelevance of species membership. Further, 
rejecting the speciesism worry does not help motivate a moral different 
between foetuses and neonates.  
7 Nussbaum’s argument could be understood as something like this: 
‘marginal humans are human, and thus their wellbeing must be measured 
with respect to human capabilities; thus, justice demands greater care 
towards them, than if their wellbeing were measured with respect to the 
capabilities of species for whom, as it were, less could be expected.’ This, 
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ones in which social relations play a constitutive role, conferring moral 
status and moral duty’ (2005; emphasis added).  
 
So, the thrust of the RAMC is that, if you are a human being in social, 
care relationships with persons, you thereby have the moral status of a 
person, whether your being in a care relationship is part of who you are 
(as Kittay would have it), or simply an extrinsic but morally-relevant fact 
about your being. Being cared for by persons means having the status of 
a person.    
 
Warren’s account of the moral significance of birth, reliant as it is on 
social belongingness and care, is an RAMC. Thus, Warren’s argument 
suffers the flaws that the RAMC suffers. And the problem with RAMCs is 
that, read one way, they are circular; read another, they rely on is 
implying ought; and read yet another way, they simply can’t do what 
they’re meant to do. There is no reading of RAMCs on which they work.  
 
                                                                                                                               
though, leaves Nussbaum vulnerable to the charge of speciesism, since 
there is no reason, other than species membership, to judge their 
wellbeing thusly. But Nussbaum is aware of this vulnerability, and wants 
to avoid it by pointing to the fact that humans, even non-agentive 
humans, live (and ‘must’ live) in human communities; and thus cannot, 
practically speaking, be judged on anything but human criteria. Therein 
lies the RAMC.  
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The circular RAMC reading  
The circular reading of a RAMC looks something like the following.  
 
Circular RAMC: any creature whose wellbeing matters to morally 
considerable creatures is such that it is part of the moral community; 
i.e. its wellbeing matters to us (morally considerable creatures) as 
much as that of any morally considerable creature.  
 
So, what motivates mattering is mattering. It could be non-vicious: 
RAMCs could simply be constitutionally conservative. They may, for 
example, describe folk morality as it is, and affirm the veridicality of it. But 
this lacks explanatory power; and furthermore, conservatism of this sort 
won’t do when we’re talking about marginal humans. We don’t, as it 
happens, always care for marginal humans as if they were fully morally 
considerable—indeed sometimes we treat them abominably, and with 
abandon. Simply describing our pretheoretical morality or moral practice 
will give mixed results. We might think that qualifying the ‘mattering’ will 
help: what motivates mattering (morally) is mattering (socially). But what 
would this mattering socially amount to, in the case of marginal humans? 
We could make sense of persons mattering socially: persons engage in a 
social give-and-take; they play an active role in the functioning and 
structuring of our societies. Even ‘do nothing’ persons help shape our 
social world by their (autonomously) doing nothing. But it isn’t clear how a 
non-person could so shape our social world in a morally salient way. We 
could perhaps say that babies, for example, play an integral role in our 
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customs and habits. The birth of a baby is an event of social importance; 
caring for babies is a highly socially-salient activity. But, since babies 
aren’t actively doing anything, other than existing and being alive, to 
generate this social salience, it’s not clear why we should say that babies 
‘matter socially’ in a way that, say, houses do not. After all, buying or 
building a house is an event of social importance. It seems like, if 
‘mattering socially’ can motivate mattering morally, the social ‘mattering’ 
needs to amount to something like being an active shaper of events. In 
other words, being a person. So, qualifying ‘mattering’ does not seem to 
alleviate the circularity; or anyway, it does not seem to do so in a way that 
will help the RAMC.    
 
The is-begets-ought reading  
The RAMC, however, is probably worse than circular. It probably trades 
on an ambiguity. ‘Matters to us’ in the antecedent, even unqualified, 
means something like ‘we actively care about it’; whereas ‘matters to us’ 
in the consequent means ‘is something that we ought to care about’. 
Which brings us to the is-begets-ought reading: 
 
Is-begets-ought RAMC: any creature about whom we (morally 
considerable creatures) care is such that it is part of the moral 
community; that is, we ought to care about it as much as we care 
about each other.  
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Read this way, RAMCs are non-starters. We all know someone who 
loves his car. He oughtn’t love his car, but he does. In general, that 
someone in fact loves x does not show that he ought to love x, 
particularly when x is not a person. Indeed, when x is not a person, there 
is reason to suppose that, if anything, the lover ought not love x on a 
personhood-bound account. After all, we are all of us finite in our capacity 
to care for our fellow creatures; surely, as in the case of the car-lover, 
there is room for censure when love is given to morally-inconsiderate, or 
weakly-considerable entities when it could be given to fully considerable 
creatures.  
 
One might want to claim that the ambiguity is not one that magics a value 
out of a fact. One might suppose that what I have called the ‘is-begets-
ought’ reading is actually an evidentiary claim. If this is right, then 
‘matters’ in the antecedent means something like ‘we in fact care about 
it’; whereas ‘matters’ in the consequent means something like ‘is in fact 
important/valuable, such that it deserves our care’. So, it would amount to 
the claim that our caring is evidence for hitherto undiscovered high moral 
status: that we actually care indicates that there is something there to 
care about.8  
 
But this interpretation is doubly problematic. First, if the RAMC is an 
evidentiary claim, then we can ask ‘what is this hitherto undiscovered 
quality that cared-for beings possess, such that they are valuable?’ And it 
                                                
8 This may be something like what Steinbock has in mind.  
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would seem that that quality will form the basis of our account of moral 
considerability. If we have no answer, then we have no account of moral 
considerability at all; the RAMC just dissolves into a reasonably-
implausible epistemological claim. Second, the car-lover will still speak 
against the RAMC on this reading: that some people love their cars 
counts strongly against the claim that caring for something is evidence of 
its being morally valuable.  
 
The special reading  
This leaves a third, more sophisticated reading of the RAMC. 
 
Special RAMC: any creature who is in a care relationship with us 
(morally considerable creatures) is such that it is part of the moral 
community, on grounds that we have special obligations to it that 
equal or surpass the general obligations we have to elsewise 
morally considerable creatures.    
 
Michael Fox’s ‘human family’ is a good representation of the Special 
RAMC. According to this account, obligations to marginal humans are like 
familial obligations, though ones that in theory can be generated from the 
ground up. That is, the creature to whom we are specially obliged can be 
so even in the absence of pre-existing general claims on us. Indeed, in 
theory, the creature’s rights could be fully described by reference to these 
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quasi-familial obligations.9 So, on this sort of account, we have robust 
obligations to all human beings. Obligations to persons will be general 
obligations, whilst obligations to marginal humans will be special, but the 
end result will be the same: we are obliged to treat all human beings with 
the same respect and care.10 
 
The first thing to worry about Special RAMC is that cars that we love 
might still slip into our moral community. (Perhaps we love them ‘like 
family’.) Or more plausibly, baby dolls or vegetable gardens or hamsters 
might be fully morally considerable. We love them, we care for them, so 
they are part of our family. On pain of speciesism, we can’t exclude them 
simply for failing to be human: we would need an account of how it 
happens that our ‘family’ consists of all and only human beings. And the 
account would need to be one that doesn’t award moral status to 
                                                
9 This gets one round charges of speciesism, since the morally relevant 
fact isn’t that marginal humans are human; but rather that (in virtue of 
being human) they’re parties to special relationships.  
 
10 Indeed, it seems like an advocate of the Special reading of RAMC will 
need to say that we have ‘special’ obligations to all human beings—not 
just non-persons—since all human beings are in the ‘human family’. So, 
perhaps the Special RAMC will want to say that our general obligations 
are to all creatures (or all things?), while we have a wide class of special 
obligations to human beings in particular. It is not clear, in this case, 
whether personhood will play any role at all.  
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humanness itself. Shy of this account (and of course, this account is 
exactly what the RAMC is meant to establish), we have no reason to 
exclude the hamster and the tomatoes.  
 
If, like Warren, we suppose that sentience is a baseline for 
considerability, then the tomatoes are out, but the hamster stays in the 
family. That is, without an account of how marginal humans play the right 
role in the family, but hamsters do not, we will still not have managed to 
elevate marginal humans above non-human animals in our value 
attributions, because we will be forced to suppose that we have special 
obligations to both marginal humans and non-human animals about 
whom we care.  
 
The RAMC is intended to place marginal humans above non-human 
animals on the considerability totem pole. If hamsters qualify, the RAMC 
has lost its raison d’etre: at best, it will simply collapse into a sentience 
account of considerability; at worst, it will be no account at all.11  
                                                
11 One might think to claim that it’s simply an empirical fact that we care 
about humans in the right sort of way; that the quasi-familial love we feel 
happens always to point to human beings, and so human beings happen 
to make up our ‘families’. But, as in the circular reading, this will be 
problematic both because it is a non-account, and because our actual 
care practices are surely not like this: many of us love our cats and dogs 
more than any human; and one can think of a huge variety of historical, if 
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In the face of this, the Special RAMC advocate will surely want to appeal 
to some particular quality or other that these care relationships must have 
in order to be the right sort of care relationship to generate the special 
obligations. As a first attempt, one might suppose that the relationships 
will need to be reciprocal. Potatoes and baby dolls, then, won’t have it in 
them to be the right sort of relata. However, many animals will: Fido may 
even bring me my slippers in the evening, in addition to caring about me.  
 
Again, the purpose of the RAMC is to include marginal humans, exclude 
non-human animals, but avoid speciesism—or at least to place marginal 
humans in a class above animals, morally speaking. So, we will need to 
exclude the sort of reciprocity we can experience with non-human 
animals like dogs. We will need, then, to make the claim that slipper-
bringing isn’t the right sort of reciprocity. Maybe we will say that the 
internal states (for example, love) simply aren’t there. Even if your dog 
‘loves’ you very much, we will say, this is not the special, valuable sort of 
love that is evident in relationships that generate special obligations: love 
between humans is qualitatively different to the love one feels for (and 
especially from) one’s pet.  
 
But this begs the question. Whether humans have special capacities or 
qualities other than mere species membership that can motivate 
                                                                                                                               
not contemporary, examples of total disregard for the rights or wellbeing 
of marginal humans.  
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considerability is just what we’re trying to show. Appealing to 
‘humanness’ is a non-starter. The obvious alternative is to appeal to the 
sort of love/care that persons can show to each other. And it seems 
plausible to suppose that this sort of care is indeed of a different quality to 
that of a loyal dog. But then, this sort of care requires persons.  
 
The problem with Warren’s account of the moral significance of birth, 
then, is not a problem with Warren’s account in particular. It is a problem 
with the whole species of account of which hers is a member. Relational 
accounts of moral considerability simply do not work.  
 
 
3. Considerations for a workable account  
RAMCs are phantom solutions to the problem of marginal humans. Since 
Warren’s account just is an RAMC, it is defective; it cannot motivate the 
claim that birth is morally significant. Relationships just can’t drive moral 
status changes. At the same time, it seems as though there is something 
quite right about the idea that relationships matter morally. In this section, 
I’ll suggest a way to conceptualise the moral importance of relationships 
in the context of abortion and infanticide in a non-defective way.  
 
I will argue that relationships form a part of the wider moral context in 
which infanticide occurs, and that this means that the moral context of 
typical cases of infanticide is saliently different to that of typical cases of 
abortion, such that we cannot simply generalise across the two acts. In 
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chapter three, I will give a more thorough argument for the idea that we 
ought to understand the difference between abortion and infanticide as a 
contextual difference. In this section, I will focus on fleshing out Warren’s 
relationships insight as a contextual claim. This does not, on its own, give 
us a fully-fledged account of the moral difference between abortion and 
infanticide. Other differences in moral context—for example, that the 
foetus but not the neonate is contained within and dependent upon 
another human being’s body; that that other human beings has rights that 
are in conflict with those of the foetus (if indeed it has rights); and so on—
would need to be fleshed out in order to give such a fully-fledged account.  
 
Conceptualising relationships as moral-contextual features means, at the 
least, that there is morally salient dissimilarity between infanticide and 
abortion, and that this difference is there even if the moral status of the 
foetus/neonate does not change at birth. Thus, it shows that we needn’t 
say that abortion is permissible if and only if infanticide is; and it may, 
indeed, form a key aspect of a fully-fledged account of the moral 
difference between the two acts.12          
 
Moral Contextualism  
The moral quality of an act is context-dependent. We cannot understand 
the moral quality of a particular act in isolation. Surrounding (though of 
course, they are not merely surrounding) moral facts feed into, or form a 
part of the moral facts about a particular act. It is only in looking at an act 
                                                
12 Again, I will be discussing this idea at length in Chapter Three.  
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situated in a moral context—who else stands to be helped/harmed? 
whose interests will be served? why act so? are there other ways I could 
act?—that we can accurately assess the moral quality of an act. Social 
relatedness cannot change what we owe to an individual; it cannot 
change the moral weight of harm to that individual; what it can do is 
change the moral quality of acts involving her, and it can do so because, 
since she is so related, the wellbeing and rights of persons become 
salient. That the act can harm them forms a part of the complete moral 
picture. 
 
What I have in mind is not a virtue-ethics account of infanticide. The point 
is not that the actor’s motives make her virtuous or vicious. Rather, the 
point is that the moral quality of a particular act is context-sensitive. 
Further, taking context into account does not simply amount to a 
utilitarian calculation: the utilitarian calculus happens to have 
contextualism built into it, but there is nothing essentially utilitarian about 
moral contextualism itself. Moral contextualism does not boil down to a 
relativist claim, since our judgments about acts can be context-sensitive, 
while socioculturally-insensitive—that is, they can be context-sensitive, 
though theoretically fully-specifiable. It isn’t even (necessarily) a 
particularist claim: to say that moral quality is context-sensitive is not to 
pass judgment on whether or how that quality is grounded in natural fact. 
Context-sensitive moral quality may follow logically from salient general 
rules in a given context, or it may be ineffably composed, particular to the 
case at hand. The observation that the moral quality of an act is context 
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sensitive does not bear on our choice of moral framework; it is more 
superficial than that. The observation is simply that, whatever we pick out 
as right-making or wrong-making moral features, these features are 
interdependent within a moral context. 
 
Rachels (1975) makes this same superficial contextualist claim in the 
course of looking at the moral difference between active and passive 
euthanasia. It is often claimed that allowing a patient to die (passive 
euthanasia) is less morally problematic than actively causing a patient’s 
death (active euthanasia; a ‘doing’ rather than an ‘allowing’). Rachels 
argues that active euthanasia is—contrary to standard doctrine—less 
morally problematic, as it results in less suffering while serving the same 
end, and should be practiced in those cases in which we consider 
passive euthanasia appropriate. Crucial to his argument is the claim that 
abstracting away from context in our moral reasoning will often result in a 
wrong judgment. 
 
Rachels imagines the case of Smith, who is second in line to inherit the 
family fortune, behind his young cousin. One evening, the young cousin is 
in the bath. The cousin slips, hits her head, and is knocked unconscious 
and will drown if not saved. Smith sees his chance. He does not save her, 
she dies, and Smith inherits the family fortune. Rachels asks us to 
compare this to a similar scenario. In the similar scenario, the young 
cousin is in the bath, perfectly well, and Smith seizes the opportunity to 
murder her and make it look like an accident, by sneaking into the 
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bathroom and drowning her. She dies, and Smith inherits the family 
fortune.  
 
In the first scenario, Smith merely allows his cousin to die. In the second, 
he kills her. But it is clear that we should make the same moral judgment 
in each scenario. Reading the moral facts off the difference (if we assume 
there is one) between killing and letting-die in abstraction would lead us 
astray. Rachels writes that 
it is very easy to conflate the question of whether killing is, in itself, 
worse than letting die with the very different question of whether 
most actual cases of killing are more reprehensible than most actual 
cases of letting die. Most actual cases of killing are terrible!and 
one hears of such cases every day. On the other hand, one hardly 
ever hears of a case of letting die, except for the actions of doctors 
who are motivated by humanitarian reasons. So one learns to think 
of killing in a much worse light than letting die. But this does not 
mean that there is something about killing that makes it in itself 
worse than letting die, for it is not the bare difference between killing 
and letting die that makes the difference in these cases. 
 
The claim, then, is that the contexts in which most killings occur are 
saliently different to the contexts in which most lettings-die occur; and that 
our moral assessment of particular cases of killing, on the one hand, and 
letting-die on the other, are crucially (and rightly) influenced by the moral 
context in which they occur. Our intuitions about the moral difference 
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between killing and letting die in abstraction are thus influenced by the 
moral effects of their typical contexts. When killings or lettings-die occur 
in atypical moral contexts (such as in the case where Smith lets his 
cousin die), the effect of context comes to the fore. So, in the case of 
Smith, it’s clear that it doesn’t much matter whether he simply failed to 
rescue his cousin, or actively drown her; his actions either way were 
reprehensible, and this is so on account of the moral context of the 
actions.   
 
The context of infanticide  
Rachels’s primary claim is that there is no pro tanto moral difference 
between killing and letting die. Whether we ought to accept that claim is 
out of the scope of this essay. But the supporting claim—that context 
matters to the permissibility of a given instance of an act—is surely right.  
That an act is permissible or impermissible pro tanto is only one part of 
the moral story. Applying Rachels’s insight to the question of the 
difference between abortion and infanticide, what we’ll say is that the 
moral status of the foetus and of the neonate is but one part of the moral 
story; the other part is context. Context is where care relationships fit in: 
that a being is loved or cared for by persons forms a part of the moral 
context of any act involving that being. Relationships matter morally to 
particular acts because context matters morally to particular acts.  
 
So, in applying this contextualist observation to an account of birth, what 
we will say is something like this: the moral status of the foetus/neonate 
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does not change. The extent to which death harms the foetus/neonate 
does not change. The extent to which we must take the foetus/neonate 
into account does not change. The foetus/neonate’s rights do not change. 
Nothing about the foetus/neonate qua moral patient changes; there is no 
change in moral facts about it. What changes is the (situated) moral 
quality of the act of killing it.  
 
Though the moral status of foetuses and neonates is the same, the 
typical moral contexts in which their deaths occur (in the case of abortion, 
on the one hand; and infanticide, on the other) are saliently different. In 
particular, as Warren rightly points out, the neonate is situated in care 
relationships with people whose interests and wellbeing are salient. 
Because of these care relationships—because they open up the 
possibility of harm to the people who are in them—the act of killing the 
neonate is just (morally) different to the act of killing the foetus. The moral 
importance of relationships is probably not enough, on its own, to show 
that abortion is permissible while infanticide is impermissible; but it is 
enough to show that the permissibility of the one is a separate question to 
the permissibility of the other, even if birth can’t change moral status.   
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Chapter Two 
A MODIFIED RELATIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF BIRTH 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, we saw that the RAMC cannot motivate the claim that 
birth changes the moral status of the foetus/neonate. A creature’s social 
situatedness (an extrinsic fact about it) simply cannot change what we 
owe it for its own sake. In this chapter, I’ll look at a clever modification to 
the RAMC. José Luis Bermúdez argues that social-situatedness can 
change a creature’s intrinsic features.1 Being born, Bermúdez argues, 
exposes the neonate to persons, and being so exposed allows them to 
exercise a morally relevant capacity. This exercise of capacity is 
considerability-generating, where mere potential for exercise is not. Thus, 
the neonate is morally considerable, where the foetus is not.  
 
Bermúdez’s modified RAMC is intriguing, because it seems unsusceptible 
to the criticisms rehearsed in the previous chapter against the simple 
RAMC: if social-situatedness actually changes something intrinsic and 
morally significant about the neonate, then the neonate’s resultant moral 
status is not contingent and tenuous: the neonate will be morally 
considerable even if we fail to care about it. However, I will argue that 
Bermúdez has not shown that birth changes something intrinsic and 
morally significant about the neonate. Even if we accept the claim that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Bermúdez, JL.  (1996) 
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behaviour in question is dependent on contact with persons, and thus that 
it cannot occur in the womb; and even if we accept the claim that the 
capacity mentioned is a morally relevant one; it does not follow that the 
moral status of the foetus/neonate has thereby changed, because the 
behaviour that Bermúdez discusses does not exhaust the possible 
exercise of the capacity that he picks out as morally significant: it is but 
one way in which the capacity could be exercised.  
 
Bermúdez cites empirical research that shows that neonates as young as 
forty-two minutes old can imitate facial gestures. This, he argues, is an 
exercise of a ‘primitive’ capacity for self-awareness. Since self-awareness 
is morally significant, Bermúdez argues, so is primitive self-awareness. 
Following Tooley,2 Bermúdez argues that mere possession of a capacity 
like self-awareness is not morally significant, only exercise of the capacity 
is. Since neonates, but not foetuses, can imitate facial gestures, 
neonates, but not foetuses, can exercise this morally relevant capacity. 
Thus, Bermúdez concludes, neonates, but not foetuses, are morally 
considerable.  
 
However, even if foetuses cannot imitate facial gestures, this does not 
show that foetuses cannot exercise primitive self-awareness. After all, 
imitation of facial gestures is not obviously the only way in which one can 
exercise primitive self-awareness. Indeed, on the assumption that self-
awareness is at least primitive self-awareness, it surely is not, since you !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Tooley (1983)  
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and I exercise self-awareness at every waking moment, but only 
sometimes imitate facial gestures. Bermúdez gives us no reason to 
suppose that there mightn’t be other ways to exercise primitive self-
awareness that would be open to the foetus. Thus, he does not succeed 
in showing that exercise of this morally-relevant capacity is impossible for 
foetuses: simply that facial imitation is. Since it is self-awareness, and not 
facial imitation, that is morally relevant, Bermúdez’s argument does not 
show that there is a difference between foetuses and neonates with 
respect to exercise of this capacity. And thus, he has not shown that birth 
changes the moral status of the foetus/neonate.  
 
Bermúdez’s modified RAMC is not defective in the way that the simple 
RAMC is. If it could be shown that contact with persons changes a 
creature’s intrinsic features in morally-relevant ways, it would follow that 
social-situatedness can generate moral considerability. However, 
because Bermúdez has merely shown that this one way of exercising a 
morally-relevant capacity relies on social-situatedness, he has not 
succeeded in showing that social-situatedness changes intrinsic features. 
Thus he has not shown that social-situatedness can generate moral 
considerability.    
 
In section one of this chapter, I will rehearse Bermúdez’s account of the 
moral significance of birth. In section two, I will argue that this account 
does not work; that facial imitation is sufficient but not necessary to show 
self-awareness. In section three, I will argue that Bermúdez’s Principle of 
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Derived Moral Significance generates a regress, that this principle is a 
core problem with his account, and that the account falls apart without it.  
 
1. Bermúdez’s Argument  
 
Bermúdez, contra Warren, accepts the standard conception of moral 
considerability on which one’s considerability is dependent only on 
intrinsic features, and where one feature or set of features can be 
decisive. But he claims that empirical evidence shows us that the intrinsic 
properties of neonates can be different from those of foetuses. His claim, 
in essence, is that neonates do things that foetuses cannot do, and that 
doing these things is enough to render the neonate morally considerable 
where even a foetus of the same age is not. Using Meltzoff and Moore’s 
(1977) research into neonatal facial imitation, Bermúdez claims to show 
that, in virtue of coming into contact with persons, neonates are able to 
exercise a morally relevant capacity that foetuses cannot. His claim is 
that the exercise of these capacities renders the neonate morally 
considerable to a greater degree than the foetus, even if the neonate and 
foetus are of identical gestational age and development.  
 
Bermúdez claims that the standard argument against the moral 
significance of birth relies on what he calls ‘the Continuity Thesis’: 
 
The Continuity Thesis: Birth cannot be a morally relevant fact 
in the transition from zygote to person; there can be no morally 
relevant difference between a foetus inside the womb and 
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about to be born and the same foetus just after it has been 
born.3 
 
He picks out three claims commonly cited in defence of the continuity 
thesis: first, that the difference between neonate and foetus is one of 
spatial location; second, the claim that foetuses and neonates are alike in 
morally relevant features; and third, the claim that some late foetuses 
may even be more developed (in morally relevant ways) than some early 
neonates. All of these, if Bermúdez is correct, are mistaken.  
 
Bermúdez’s argument can be divided into two parts. First, he argues that, 
given the empirical evidence from Meltzoff and Moore, it is clear that 
neonates are morally considerable. Second, he argues that, given the 
moral primacy of exercise of capacities (over simple possession of 
capacity, or potential for exercise), and given the physical facts of 
gestation, a foetus—even of the same age and development as the 
neonate—cannot be considerable, though a neonate is.  
 
a. Neonates are Morally Considerable 
Bermúdez claims that neonates, in virtue of coming into contact with 
persons, can exercise morally-relevant features that foetuses in the 
womb cannot, and thus are morally considerable to a greater degree than 
are foetuses. First, he argues that self-consciousness is morally salient, 
because self-consciousness is necessary for the capacity to value one’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 op. cit. 386.  
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own life. Second, he says that self-consciousness that fails to generate 
the capacity to value one’s own life is status-conferring, though to a 
lesser degree that that which allows a creature to value its life. And third, 
he argues that neonates, but not foetuses, exercise this lesser (or 
‘primitive’) self-consciousness. Thus, neonates are morally considerable 
to a greater degree than are foetuses, in virtue of simply being born.   
 
First, following Harris (1984), Bermúdez maintains that beings that value 
their own lives are fully morally considerable (are persons and have a 
right to life). He rejects Harris’s assumption that only beings that value 
their own lives are fully considerable—and in particular, that only beings 
that value their own lives have a right to life—but takes it as a starting 
point that at least such beings are. (That is, that life-valuing is sufficient to 
confer moral considerability.)  
 
Second, again following Harris, Bermúdez notes that self-consciousness 
is needed in order to value one’s own life: 
 
There are, furthermore, certain cognitive capacities 
that must hold for an individual to value her own life 
in this morally relevant way. She must be capable of 
envisaging her own future and, furthermore, of 
wanting to experience that future. To be capable of 
this she must be at least minimally self-conscious 
and aware of herself as existing over time. (381) 
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According to this picture, those who are capable of valuing their own lives 
are fully morally considerable. While sentient creatures are minimally 
morally considerable, insofar as harming them matters morally, only 
those creatures who value their own lives are harmed by death. Thus, 
only those creatures who have the capacity to value their own lives are 
fully morally considerable (are persons; have a right to life). Only those 
who are self-conscious are capable of valuing their own lives. Self-
consciousness, then, is a status-conferring feature—self-conscious 
creatures are of a higher moral status than merely sentient creatures—on 
grounds that the capacity to value one’s own life depends on self-
consciousness.   
 
So, the picture so far is that sentience is minimally status-conferring, and 
life-valuing confers full moral status. Bermúdez rejects Harris’s 
assumption that humans and other animals can be divided into those who 
are simply sentient (are basically morally considerable), and those who 
are persons (who are self-conscious and thus have a right to life). Rather, 
he takes it that there can be varying degrees of moral significance as 
properties like self-consciousness vary within the human species. For 
example he points out that  
 
!most people (however wholeheartedly they approve 
of abortion) would, I think, feel that the decision to abort 
at the end of the second trimester is more morally 
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serious than the decision to abort at the end of the first 
trimester! The six month old foetus has in some 
sense more to lose than the three month old foetus, 
and that is why killing the older foetus has certain moral 
dimensions absent in the younger case.4 
 
He suggests that the way to make sense of this gradation is to recognise 
that morally salient features can vary in intensity and moral significance 
along a continuum from absence to fully-fledged moral significance, and 
thus, that possessors of these features may lie along a moral-status 
continuum, just as the features do. So for example, in the case of self-
consciousness, though it’s clear that only conscious creatures are 
capable of valuing their own lives, it is not the case that all conscious 
creatures can. And yet, Bermúdez suggests, consciousness should be 
taken to be morally significant, even if it is not sufficient to allow the 
creature to value its own life; consciousness should be taken as 
significant in proportion to the fullness with which a possessor possesses 
it. He thus introduces ‘the principle of derived moral significance’.  
 
The Principle of Derived Moral Significance: If a 
particular feature or property is deemed to confer moral 
significance, then any ‘primitive’ form of that property 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Op. cit 381-82. Warren’s worries about sentience as a scalar criterion, 
from chapter one pp. 9-10, will apply.  
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will also confer moral significance, although not 
necessarily to the same degree. (383) 
 
In other words, if some property P is status-conferring because (say) P is 
necessary for V (where V is some value that justifies the P claim), then 
instances of P  that are not sufficient for V will be status-conferring, 
though to a lesser degree. So in this case, if self-consciousness is 
deemed to confer full moral considerability because self-consciousness is 
necessary for having the capacity to value life, then a ‘primitive’ form of 
self-consciousness—one that is not sufficient for the capacity to value 
life—will also confer moral considerability, though not fully so. What he 
has in mind, it seems, is a moral status that does not imply a right to life, 
but does imply that death is morally weighty—vastly more so than for a 
creature who isn’t self-conscious at all. The principle is not, he says, 
susceptible to the usual worries about arguments from potential: the 
primitive form of the property will confer status even if it never will develop 
into its more robust form. A primitive form of self-consciousness is, says 
Bermúdez, evident in and available to neonatal infants, but not to late-
term foetuses.  
 
There is reason to worry about the Principle of Derived Moral Significance 
(PDMS). But I want to set the worry aside for now and look at how 
Bermúdez’s account works on the assumption that the principle is a good 
one. I’ll return to the PDMS in section 3, and argue that it itself is 
problematic.   
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Since ‘primitive’ self-consciousness is status-conferring, if neonates 
exhibit such self-consciousness, then their status is elevated above 
creatures who do not. Bermúdez thinks that neonates do. Citing Meltzoff 
and Moore’s finding that ‘infants between twelve and twenty-one days old 
could successfully imitate three distinct facial acts—lip protrusion, mouth 
opening and tongue protrusion—and one manual act (sequential finger 
movements)’, Bermúdez claims that neonatal infants are capable of 
exhibiting a ‘primitive’ form of self-awareness: ‘a primitive form of body 
image, of a single representational framework coded in an amodal 
manner allowing the integration of perceptions and motor commands’.5  
The same findings have been extended to infants as young as forty-two 
minutes old.  
 
The facial imitation study demonstrates, says Bermúdez, that these 
infants are minimally aware of themselves as selves, and as certain sorts 
of selves. He rejects the idea that the findings could be attributable to 
automatic or reflex actions on the part of the babies. They had dummies 
in their mouths while watching the researchers make faces, and their 
acumen at mimicry was judged by their facial gesture after the 
researcher’s face-making was complete.6 Since the babies had to watch 
the facial gestures, remember them, and then mimic them, cognitive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 (1996) 389-390. 
6 The dummy was removed after the face had been made at them; the 
babies then made faces. 
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processing was clearly involved. (If this is unconvincing, it isn’t a worry. 
For our purposes it is sufficient to assume for the moment that neonatal 
facial imitation is indeed evidence of primitive self-awareness.) 
 
Because neonates can exercise primitive self-awareness (by imitating 
facial gestures), by the Principle of Derived Significance, neonates are 
more than minimally morally significant, though to a lesser degree than 
are those who possess full-blown self-awareness capable of allowing one 
to value one’s own life. Among other things, killing neonates is more (and 
probably much more) morally weighty than killing a merely sentient 
creature. The second half of Bermúdez’s argument, then, will need to 
establish that foetuses are not likewise more-than-minimally morally 
significant.  
 
b. Foetuses Cannot be Likewise Morally Considerable 
 Late-term foetuses are not capable of exercising a capacity to imitate 
faces, as are neonates, because foetuses are in the womb: there are no 
faces in the womb to imitate. Bermúdez considers the possibility that 
other sorts of imitation could be preformed in the womb: a researcher 
could tap at the pregnant woman’s abdomen, and the foetus could tap 
back, for example. But this, he says, will not give the same result. It is 
precisely in imitating something like themselves, and thus exhibiting an 
understanding of what sorts of selves they are, that neonates use their 
primitive self-awareness.  
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The counter to this objection is to stress that not every 
form of imitation should be taken to imply a degree of 
self-awareness. The form of imitation that is manifested 
by the Meltzoff and Moore experiment is, I have 
suggested, interesting because it involves a complex of 
abilities, including a primitive form of self-other 
differentiation and a capacity to recognise that the 
person being imitated is the same sort of being as 
oneself. [!] It is precisely because what one is 
imitating is something like oneself that one’s imitative 
behaviour reveals a form of awareness of oneself. If 
this is so, however, it seems to imply that interesting 
types of imitation are intersubjective. And this, surely, 
makes it in principle impossible for them to take place 
inside the womb.7  
 
So, Bermúdez allows that it may be the case that full-term foetuses could 
imitate something like tapping from outside the womb. But this would not 
show the same sort of self-awareness, because it would not be a case of 
it recognising the gesture as a gesture preformed by a being like itself. It 
would not, then, be imitation of a morally-relevant sort.  
 
The second objection that Bermúdez considers is that the foetus, even if 
it isn’t in a position to imitate a face, still has the same capacity to do so:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 (1996): 395. 
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physiologically and neurophysiologically, the full-term foetus 
has every intrinsic property and feature possessed by the 
neonate. [!] The fact of birth does admittedly make possible 
the exercise of these capacities, but they were in existence 
before birth.8  
 
The idea then, is that given it has the same capacity, it must then have 
the same moral status as the imitating neonate. He rejects this claim, 
arguing instead that the possession of a capacity is not morally relevant: 
only the exercise of it is. Following Tooley, Bermúdez claims that an 
unexercised capacity cannot confer moral status.9 Though the foetus may !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 (1996): 396 
9 Michael Tooley (1983) introduces what he calls the Moral Symmetry 
Principle. It says, in a nutshell, that if something (or set of things) C is 
morally considerable because of its capacity to produce E, then 
preventing its production of E is on a par with preventing C. So, if a 
capacity is morally significant, then preventing its exercise is same—
morally-speaking—as preventing the capacity from arising at all. In the 
case of human-making, the Moral Symmetry Principle would mean that, if 
foetal capacities are morally significant, then preventing their exercise 
(say, by having an abortion) is impermissible; and furthermore, preventing 
their very being (say, by not copulating) is equally impermissible. Since 
refraining from copulation is clearly not impermissible, then it follows that 
preventing the exercise of foetal capacities by aborting is likewise not 
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have the very same capacities as the neonate, it is nonetheless not 
morally considerable,10 because mere possession of capacities does not 
cut it: only exercise of capacities confers moral status, and foetuses 
cannot imitate facial gestures.  
 
2. The Problem with Bermúdez’s Modified RAMC 
Bermúdez argues that 
(a) neonates imitate facial gestures but foetuses 
cannot;  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
impermissible. From this, Tooley concludes that simple possession of 
(unexercised) capacities cannot make a being morally significant; rather, 
exercise of morally relevant capacities is what confers moral 
considerability.  Bermúdez thinks that Tooley’s argument doesn’t work, 
though he thinks the conclusion is right. He offers his own argument for 
the salience of exercise. I’m going to leave this aside, though, because 
it’s not crucial to the discussion—the problem with his argument lies 
elsewhere.  
10 Or anyway, not to the same degree, one assumes. Bermúdez actually 
seems to imply—in establishing that a two-tiered approach to moral 
considerability amongst biological humans runs counter to intuition (381-
382)—that late-term foetuses are morally considerable. Further, he 
doesn’t give us any indication of what, exactly, the difference is in foetus’s 
& neonate’s considerability, even if he is right that neonates are morally 
significant. But reading charitably, one must clearly assume that there is 
some difference or other that Bermúdez could spell out.  
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(b)  only exercise of a morally relevant capacity 
can confer moral status, not mere possession 
of it; 
(c) so only neonates (not foetuses) can be fully 
morally considerable. 
The first thing to note, of course, is that just like Warren, Bermúdez hasn’t 
shown that birth is morally significant, even if everything he says works. 
Birth makes contact with persons possible, and thus makes facial 
imitation possible, but it is not the same thing as facial imitation. Contact 
with persons, and in particular, imitative contact, is what changes moral 
status, according to this story. This might happen soon after, but isn’t the 
same as, birth.  
 
Setting that aside, there is the question of whether Bermúdez’s modified 
RAMC is successful in motivating the moral significance of birth (or, soon-
after-birth, as it were), and I think it is clearly not. The account is not 
susceptible to the simple RAMC worries mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Exercise of a capacity is not an extrinsic feature. That I have 
exercised my capacity for self-awareness is a fact about me, and not a 
fact about my circumstances. And attribution of moral status on the basis 
of self-consciousness is motivated to the extent that a personhood 
account of status is motivated. This modified RAMC, in other words, is 
potentially as theoretically stable as is the basic personhood account.  
So, Bermúdez’s account should have all the strength of a standard 
personhood (intrinsic-properties) account of moral status, but still 
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incorporates the thought that social-situatedness makes a moral 
difference. It should be a Successful RAMC. 
 
But Bermúdez’s account simply does not motivate the moral significance 
of birth. That it appears to do so is probably because the account shifts its 
focus somewhere midway through. What the Principle of Derived 
Significance and Tooley’s exercise/capacity claim come together to 
motivate is the claim that exercising the capacity for primitive self-
consciousness is status conferring. What Bermúdez has shown is that 
neonates, but not foetuses, exercise the capacity for facial imitation. If 
Bermúdez is correction about imitation—that is, if he is correct that the 
imitative behaviours of neonates are not simple reflexes, say—then facial 
imitation involves primitive self-consciousness. Neonates, then, in so far 
as they imitate faces11 will be morally considerable on this picture. But the 
matching claim that foetuses will not be hasn’t been adequately argued 
for. The problem is that facial imitation is not the same as self-
consciousness, or even primitive self-consciousness, even if it requires 
primitive self-consciousness. The account trades on a capacity slight-of-
hand.     
 
According to Bermúdez’s account, facial imitation is significant either 
because facial imitation is an instance of exercise of primitive self-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Assuming they all do. Though of course, some babies are visually 
impaired, or have neurological issues that would prevent them from 
making these faces, and so on.  
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consciousness, or because facial imitation causes such consciousness to 
‘emerge’ (399). It is not clear which he intends. If facial imitation causes 
primitive self-consciousness to ‘emerge’—that is, if it triggers 
development of primitive self-consciousness—then there must be 
alternative events or actions that can cause primitive self-consciousness 
to emerge: else people with congenital blindness, or cranio-facial 
neurological deficit will never achieve primitive self-consciousness. This is 
implausible: blind persons are persons. 
 
If there are other ways in which primitive self-consciousness could 
emerge, we need some story about why it’s implausible to suppose that 
these ways couldn’t happen in the womb. Bermúdez considers the 
objection that some other sort of relevant imitative behaviour could occur 
in the womb, and rejects the possibility (as discussed above); but he does 
not even consider the possibility that some behaviour other than imitation 
might both be capable of causing primitive self-consciousness to emerge, 
and be possible in the womb. So, he hasn’t given us any reason to 
suppose that primitive self-consciousness couldn’t be triggered or emerge 
in the womb. 
 
On the other hand, if facial imitation is itself an instance of exercise of 
primitive self-consciousness, then the objection is even simpler: imitating 
facial gestures is categorically not the only way to exercise primitive self-
consciousness. I am, at this very moment, exercising my capacity for 
primitive self-consciousness. But I am not imitating anyone’s face. 
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Indeed, I often exercise my capacity for self-consciousness (primitive and 
otherwise) even when there isn’t anyone else around. Reacting to, and 
interacting with other creatures in certain ways and not in others is one 
way in which I often exercise my capacity for primitive self-
consciousness. But so is scratching an itch on my elbow; so is hearing a 
noise and understanding its source as spatially located in some certain 
direction and distance from my body; so is feeling content.  
 
None of these ways—scratching, feeling content—would be so 
compelling as proof of primitive self-awareness to outside observers as 
facial imitation. In fact, aliens from outer space might not be at all 
convinced by my elbow-scratching. But I am. I know that when I scratch 
an itch on my elbow, I do so because I have a certain sensation that I 
locate in my own body, and not because my body is simply moving in a 
reflexive way. Whether anyone else can tell that I am primitively self-
aware is not the morally salient fact. The morally salient fact is that I am. 
So too for babies. And indeed, insofar as facial imitation constitutes proof, 
for us, that neonates are exercising primitive self-consciousness, it seems 
right that we should also take it as proof that foetuses of similar 
development are exercising primitive self-consciousness, even though we 
cannot stick our tongues out at them to test.  
 
If facial imitation is an exercise of the capacity for primitive self-
consciousness (even if it’s an easily identifiable one), it very clearly isn’t 
the exercise of the capacity for primitive self-consciousness. There are 
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lots of ways in which a creature can exercise this capacity. Nothing in 
Bermúdez’s argument supports the idea that there is no alternate way 
available to the foetus to so exercise. What needs to be shown is that 
neonates, but not foetuses, can exercise self-awareness; what is instead 
shown is that neonates, but not foetuses, can exercise facial-imitative 
capacity. Facial-imitative capacity might be sufficient reason to make a 
moral considerability attribution, but it is obviously not necessary for doing 
so.  
 
3. Worries about the Principle of Derived Moral Significance  
Facial imitation isn’t itself morally salient; and Bermúdez hasn’t shown 
that foetuses aren’t able to exercise primitive self-consciousness. So, as 
a defence of the moral significance of birth, Bermúdez’s account is clearly 
unsuccessful. But it seems there is a bigger problem with the account, 
qua theory of moral status. His Principle of Derived Moral Significance 
(PDMS), combined with his use of features necessary, rather than 
sufficient for morally salient valuing, is cause itself for real worry.  
 
As was said in section one, Bermúdez assumes that self-consciousness 
is morally significant (and status-conferring) because self-consciousness 
is necessary for the capacity to value life. Valuing life, again, makes 
death a harm. Any creature who can be harmed by death has a right to 
life. Thus, Bermúdez concludes that self-consciousness is a status-
conferring feature. But surely, any status-conferring feature needs to be 
sufficient to generate the right; not merely necessary. Bermúdez’s PDMS 
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flags the fact that self-consciousness is merely necessary—as indeed, 
does his entire argument—by flagging the fact that not all self-conscious 
beings have the capacity to value their lives.12 Neonates, even Bermúdez 
concedes, do not have the capacity to value their lives. The fact that 
Bermúdez  calls self-consciousness that doesn’t allow one to value one’s 
life ‘primitive’ self-consciousness belies the fact that it is self-
consciousness, full-stop: it is just not, on its own, sufficient for the 
capacity to value life.  
 
‘Primitive’ self-consciousness is not some other feature that’s somehow 
related to the one that allows for life-valuing: it is the very feature. And 
what this shows is that some other feature (or features) will need to be 
added to self-consciousness in order to make it such that the creature is 
able to value its own life. So, why would self-consciousness be status-
conferring at all? And if it is status-conferring at all, why would some self-
consciousness only be derivatively so? Surely this mystery additional 
feature that one needs, in addition to self-consciousness in order to value 
life is the property that will confer moral considerability. Else, if self-
consciousness confers because it is necessary for life-valuing, then so 
does consciousness, because it is also necessary; if consciousness 
does, then so does biological life, for it too is necessary. It seems like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 If self-consciousness were sufficient for life-valuing, or for the capacity 
to value life, then there would be no place for the PDMS, since all self-
consciousness would imply life-valuing: all self-consciousness would 
have immediate, rather than derived moral significance.  
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there will be a regress. It seems like the embryo will have an elevated 
moral status, if the PDMS is correct. 
 
It is open to Bermúdez to respond as follows: in some sense, a regress is 
just right. What we want to build is a picture of moral status on which 
there are multiple tiers, just as intuition tells us there are such tiers. It is 
consistent with this aim that biological life should confer a little; 
consciousness a little more; and self-consciousness a little more.  
 
In the end, there is just a real problem with the claim that a feature can be 
status-conferring in virtue of being merely necessary for life-valuing: 
being a multi-cellular organism is necessary for life-valuing, after all. That 
the PDMS move is available on such an account shows this. If valuing 
one’s life is justificatory, then valuing one’s life is what will confer moral 
status. If the capacity to value one’s own life (as is more intuitive) is 
justificatory, then that, or those features in conjunction that are jointly 
sufficient for that—and not some feature merely necessary for it—must 
be status conferring.  
 
Picking out features that are merely necessary for status-conferring 
capacities as themselves status-conferring casts the net too widely. 
Necessity is transitive: if C is necessary for B and B is necessary for A, 
then C is necessary for A. Self-consciousness is necessary for the 
capacity to value life, but so is having a circulatory system, since having a 
circulatory system is necessary for having self-consciousness. The 
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introduction of the concept of ‘primitive’ features is simply an ad hoc 
device for disguising this fact.  
 
Calling non-life-value-capacity-conferring self-consciousness ‘primitive 
self-consciousness’ surreptitiously adds something to the concept ‘self-
consciousness’. If self-consciousness plus this added something are 
jointly sufficient for the capacity to value life, it is just not clear why self-
consciousness on its own ought to confer status, since a whole host of 
other features we could pick out (like having a circulatory system; like 
being a three-dimensional object) are also part of this joint sufficiency, but 
are clearly not morally salient on their own. Unless we are willing to 
accept that being biologically alive (as ferns, for example, are) is 
derivatively morally significant, there is no reason we should accept the 
PDMS.    
         
Conclusion 
Bermúdez’s account of the moral significance of birth is unsuccessful for 
two reasons. First—most immediately—because it fails to establish that 
neonates, but not foetuses, can exercise morally salient capacities. The 
argument succeeds in establishing that neonates, but not foetuses can 
imitate faces; but facial imitation is not itself morally salient. Further, facial 
imitation is but one way to exercise self-awareness. And, since Bermúdez 
has not ruled out foetal exercise of self-awareness in other forms, he has 
not shown that neonates can exercise a morally salient capacity while 
foetuses cannot.  
A Modified Relational Account 
! 79 
 
The second, less-immediate but far more troubling way in which 
Bermúdez’s argument is unsuccessful is that it presents us with a flatly 
unworkable account of moral status more generally. The Principle of 
Derived Moral Significance cannot tell us why we have a right to life but 
potted ferns do not, since potted ferns are biologically alive and biological 
life is necessary for valuing life.   
Bermúdez’s account is a modification to the relational account of moral 
significance, and one that ought to have got round the worries outlined in 
Chapter One: the moral status of the neonate, in the end, is meant to rest 
on its intrinsic features, though they are triggered by extrinsic features 
(namely, by contact with persons). But Bermúdez is not successful in 
showing that a morally salient intrinsic feature can be so triggered, and 
can be triggered after, but not before birth.  
 
So, it appears that neither the RAMC, nor Bermúdez’s modified RAMC 
can motivate the claim that babies, but not foetuses, are fully morally 
considerable. Neither can they motivate the claim that birth is morally 
significant. In the next chapter, I’ll explore what this means for moral 
judgments about abortion and infanticide. I will present and criticise 
Giubilini and Minerva’s recent article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the 
baby live?’, in which the authors argue that, since neither foetuses nor 
neonates have a right to life, infanticide is permissible whenever abortion 
would have been permissible.13 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Giubilini and Minerva (2012)  
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Chapter Three 
ABORTION, INFANTICIDE, AND MORAL CONTEXT 
 
Introduction 
In Chapters One and Two, I argued that neither a relational, nor a 
modified-relational account of moral considerability can motivate the 
claim that babies, but not foetuses are fully morally considerable. Since 
these sorts of account are the most promising way to account for the full 
moral considerability of babies on a personhood-bound account of moral 
status, we are left, it seems, with a picture on which neither babies nor 
foetuses is fully morally considerable. That is: neither babies nor foetuses 
have a right to life.  
 
A standard way of accounting for the permissibility of abortion is to claim 
that abortion is morally permissible because foetuses are not fully morally 
considerable, and thus do not have a right to life.1 This account of the 
permissibility of abortion, however, seems to imply that infanticide is also 
morally permissible, since there is no principled reason to suppose that 
neonates have a right to life if foetuses do not. This implication has been 
                                                
1 Warren (1989), (1996), (1997); Tooley (1972), (1983); Steinbock (1992) 
(Though Steinbock makes this claim only for foetuses in the first 
trimester). I call this a ‘standard’ way; in fact, very few philosophers 
publish such claims these days. However, I think it is still the case that 
many philosophers (and people more generally) assume such an 
argument, though they mayn’t put it in writing.     
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a particular sticking point for defences of abortion at least since Tooley’s 
‘Abortion and Infanticide’.2 I have already argued that, even if we cannot 
motivate the claim that birth changes the status of the foetus/neonate, we 
might still claim that there are morally salient differences between 
abortion and infanticide. In this chapter, I will reply to a new version of 
Tooley’s argument that, indeed, the lack of a right to life explains the 
permissibility of abortion, and also shows that infanticide is morally 
permissible. I will make the negative claim that such arguments are 
simply invalid.  
 
In ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Giubilini and Minerva 
join Tooley (1972) in arguing that infanticide (or, ‘after-birth abortion’, as 
they call it) is morally permissible for the same reasons that would have 
made abortion permissible. They argue that, since both foetuses and 
newborns lack a right to life, killing a newborn is morally on a par with 
killing a foetus, and thus,  
 
If criteria such as costs (social, psychological, economic) 
for the potential parents are good enough reasons for 
having an abortion even when the foetus is healthy!then 
the same reasons!should also justify the killing of a 
potential person when it is at the stage of a newborn.3 
 
                                                
2 Tooley (1972) 
3 p. 3 
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The authors argue that the foetus’s lack of a right to life is what makes 
abortion permissible; that foetuses lack a right to life because foetuses 
are not persons, and only persons have a right to life; that newborns are 
also not persons; therefore newborns also lack a right to life; and that 
therefore, infanticide is permissible just so far as abortion is permissible. 
(The authors prefer the term ‘after-birth abortion’. However, this term has 
the moral parity of abortion and infanticide built into it. I will stick to 
‘infanticide’, so as not to beg the question.) 
 
I will show that their argument is invalid. The permissibility of killing an 
individual does not follow of necessity from its lacking a right to life—just 
as the impermissibility of killing an individual does not follow of necessity 
from its possessing a right to life. Furthermore, insofar as it is true that 
killing a foetus and killing a newborn each require like justification, it is 
only vacuously true. If the authors are correct about personhood and 
rights to life, the two sorts of killings are pro tanto morally alike—in other 
words, have identical moral value in identical moral contexts—but these 
killings will simply never occur (or have the possibility of occurring) in 
identical moral contexts. Thus, while infanticide might be like abortion in 
theory, in practice one cannot generalise across the two acts. 
 
1. ‘After-birth abortion’ 
Giubilini and Minerva argue that infanticide should be permitted for the 
same reasons abortion would’ve been permissible. It is already the case, 
the authors point out, that neonatal euthanasia is permitted in many 
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countries—either explicitly or tacitly—in cases of severe abnormality or 
illness that was not detected in utero. Thus, in cases of severe disability, 
abnormality, or illness that would render the infant’s life not worth living, 
we already allow that infants can sometimes be allowed to die, or even 
assisted in dying. But, the authors point out, the reasons that make 
abortion permissible are much wider than this. Thus, a woman may 
choose to abort if the birth of a child would mean serious economic or 
emotional hardships for her, even if doing so is not in the best interest, or 
future best interest of the foetus.  Giubilini and Minerva argue that, if 
abortion is permissible on such grounds, then infanticide ought also to be 
so on such grounds. More broadly, they argue that abortion and 
infanticide ought to have identical justificatory requirements.   
 
Their argument looks like this:  
 
1. Foetuses are not persons. 
2. Non-persons cannot be harmed by death. 
3. A right to life requires to potential for being harmed by death. 
4. Non-persons lack a right to life. (2,3) 
5. Foetuses lack a right to life. (1, 4) 
6. Newborn babies are not persons. 
7. Newborn babies lack a right to life. (4, 6) 
8. Infanticide is permissible for the same reason(s) abortion is or 
would have been permissible. (5, 7)  
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Giubilini and Minerva state that some non-persons are morally 
considerable—that is, what we do to some non-persons matters morally.4 
They are not, then, claiming that foetuses and newborns are morally 
irrelevant: that we are permitted in doing whatsoever we like with them. 
They are only making the narrow claim that foetuses and newborns (and 
indeed all non-persons) lack a right to life.  
 
The authors argue that all and only persons have a right to life, because 
all and only persons are such that they can be harmed by death. Persons 
are the only creatures who can be so harmed because all and only 
persons can be ‘prevented from accomplishing [their] aims by being 
killed’, since all and only persons can have aims and be aware of having 
them.5 Foetuses and newborns cannot have aims or be aware of (not) 
having them; thus foetuses and newborns are not persons. Foetuses and 
babies, then, lack a right to life, because death is not a harm to foetuses 
or to newborns.     
 
That the foetus lacks a right to life, according to this argument, explains 
the breadth of justifications for abortion: since death is not a harm to the 
foetus, harms to persons (in particular, harms that threaten the pregnant 
woman) that fall far short of loss of life can justify abortion. Thus for 
example, abortion is permissible when a child, or an additional child, 
would constitute a financial hardship for the would-be mother.  
                                                
4 p. 2 
5 p. 2 
Abortion, Infanticide, and Moral Context 
 86 
 
Since the foetus’s lack of a right to life explains the breadth of 
justifications for abortion, the authors infer that infanticide must also have 
the same breadth, since newborns also lack a right to life. So, the authors 
conclude that infanticide is permissible for all those reasons abortion is 
(or would be or would’ve been) permissible. I will argue that the authors’ 
argument is invalid: that is, that the conclusion does not follow, even if the 
premises are all true. So, my claim is that even if neither foetuses nor 
newborns have a right to life, it does not follow that infanticide is 
permissible for the same reasons that abortion is or would have been 
permissible.   
 
Giubilini and Minerva’s argument is very similar to Michael Tooley’s well-
known infanticide thesis.6 The general form of the argument, in each, is 
that babies aren’t persons, thus don’t have a right to life, and are thus on 
a par with foetuses. However, the two arguments are not the same. 
Giubilini and Minerva allow that non-persons can be rights bearers. For 
example, they claim that creatures who are capable of experiencing pain 
have a right not to have pain inflicted upon them. But they argue that only 
persons can be harmed by death, so only persons have a right to life. 
Tooley, on the other hand, relies on the claim that only persons can be 
rights-bearers, and thus only persons can have a right to life. Giubilini and 
Minerva’s argument is an improvement on Tooley’s: the contentiousness 
of the claim that no non-persons have rights is a weakness for Tooley 
                                                
6 Tooley (1972) and Tooley (1983)  
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that Giubilini and Minerva have avoided.  My criticisms are applicable, 
however, to both forms of the argument. 
 
2. Rights to life 
The contemporary academic abortion debate is divided into three camps: 
those who think the foetus has a right to life so abortion is impermissible; 
those who think the foetus has a right to life yet abortion is permissible; 
and those who think the foetus lacks a right to life so abortion is 
permissible. The first of these—that abortion is impermissible because 
the foetus has a right to life—is clearly invalid. A right to life does not 
guarantee that killing a creature is impermissible in any circumstance. For 
example, I probably have a right to defend myself against an attacker, 
even to the death, if my life is threatened. My attacker is a person, and 
thus has a right to life, but it is permissible to kill her in self-defense. An 
obvious way to reply to this is to suppose that the attacker has ‘forfeited’ 
her right to life in attacking me. But many of us think that even an 
innocent threat can sometimes be killed in self-defense. So, right-to-life 
forfeiture cannot explain these cases away: we must conclude that a right 
to life on its own is indecisive. (It is still coherent to hold that abortion is 
impermissible and the foetus has a right to life; it just does not work to 
claim that abortion is impermissible because the foetus has a right to life.)   
 
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s highly influential defense of abortion showed us, 
at minimum, that the anti-abortion argument given by the first camp, 
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above, is invalid.7 Her argument rests on the conceptual space between a 
right to life and the impermissibility of killing its possessor. Thomson 
argued that, even if the foetus has a right to life, it doesn’t follow from this 
that the pregnant woman has a duty to sustain that life; so it doesn’t 
follow that the woman has a duty to gestate. Her argument, then, is that 
even granting an innate right to life, there are circumstances in which it is 
nonetheless permissible to abort. A right to life, then, is not decisive.   
 
To see the problem with the claim that conclusions about abortion follow 
cleanly from claims about rights to life, one needn’t even agree with 
Thomson: one could think that Thomson is wrong, and that pregnant 
women have a duty to gestate. Still, there is simply no denying the 
conceptual space between a right to life and the impermissibility of killing, 
even if one thinks that there is a duty to gestate. In the next section I will 
argue that there is also a gap at the other end: there is conceptual space 
between a lack of a right to life, and permissible killing.   
 
3. Tree Lobsters 
The Lord Howe stick insect (Dryococelus australis)—commonly known as 
the ‘tree lobster’ for its enormous size, crustacean-like exoskeleton, and 
arboreal habitat—was formerly abundant on Lord Howe Island off the 
coast of Australia.8 In the 1920s, invader-species rats from a nearby 
shipwreck began to populate Lord Howe Island, and within two years the 
                                                
7 Thomson (1971) 
8 Krulwich (2012) and Priddle, Carlile, Humphrey et. al. (2003) 
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rats had munched the tree lobster into apparent extinction. However, in 
the 1960s, climbers discovered what appeared to be recently dead tree 
lobsters on the nearby small rocky island of Ball’s Pyramid. Recent 
scientific investigation has revealed that, indeed, a tiny population of tree 
lobsters had managed to migrate to this rocky outcrop and clung on there 
for most of a century, in vanishingly small numbers. (Researchers 
counted 24 tree lobsters in all.) After some deliberation, two pair of tree 
lobsters were removed from Ball’s Pyramid and taken to the mainland, 
where one pair died, but the second went on to form the beginning of a 
successful breeding programme at the Melbourne Zoo.  Today they 
number in the hundreds.  
 
Tree lobsters, being nothing more than impressively-sized primitive 
insects, do not have a right to life; but you ought not kill them.  
 
Tree lobsters are near to extinction even now. Killing even one tree 
lobster could have serious consequences for the population as a whole, 
and thus for global biodiversity. It is not the case that this makes tree 
lobsters morally considerable: we’re not saving them for their sake. Still, 
whatever their moral status, since we care about biodiversity, we have 
strong reasons not to kill them, and acting in accordance with those 
reasons is morally non-optional. Killing tree lobsters is impermissible. 
 
Judith Thomson’s argument shows, at minimum, that the claim that 
abortion is impermissible because the foetus possesses a right to life is 
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mistaken. The tree lobster, on the other hand, shows that the claim that 
abortion is permissible because the foetus lacks a right to life is likewise 
mistaken. Rights to life just aren’t on their own decisive. Notice that even 
if one disagrees—even if one rejects the claim that killing tree lobsters is 
impermissible—the claim that it is impermissible is still a coherent one. 
This shows that there is conceptual space, and conceptual space is all 
that’s needed to show that the permissibility of killing does not follow of 
necessity from the lack of a right to life.  
 
4. Moral Context  
It is impermissible to kill a tree lobster, but this is not because tree 
lobsters have a right to life. If they were abundant, rather than 
endangered, it might be just fine to kill them. Facts external to tree 
lobsters, and to tree lobsters’ rights (or lack of) bear on the permissibility 
of killing them. Neither newborns nor foetuses are an endangered 
species, but just like tree lobsters, there are non-intrinsic facts about them 
that are relevant to moral claims about them. In theorising about 
permissible treatment of foetuses and newborns, we can’t simply look at 
their intrinsic features—we can’t consider foetuses and newborns in a 
vacuum. Context matters.  
 
However, the authors are not arguing that the newborn’s lack of a right to 
life gives us carte blanche to kill babies. Their general claim is narrower. 
They write that ‘!we claim that killing a newborn could be ethically 
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permissible in all circumstances where abortion would be’.9 What they 
seem to mean by this is that all the reasons a woman might have to abort 
that we would find acceptable, we ought also to find acceptable as 
reasons for infanticide. For example, if a woman may choose to abort 
because she cannot afford to raise a child, then she may choose to ‘after-
birth abort’ (ie, she may choose infanticide) for the same reason. But 
even this narrow conclusion does not follow from the moral parity of the 
foetus and the newborn.  
 
Reasons, when they are justificatory, are justificatory within a context. 
Claims about the justificatory power of any given reason do not 
generalise across saliently dissimilar moral contexts. So for example, at 
first blush we might think that I am permitted in killing a tree lobster if it 
has crawled onto me in my bed in the dark of night, because I am afraid it 
will sting me. After all, if it were some other insect that also lacked a right 
to life—a wasp, say—my killing it for this reason would probably be 
permissible. But since it is a tree lobster, since it is endangered, I am 
probably obliged to take greater care: pluck up courage and endeavour to 
remove the tree lobster from my bed without harming it. So, even given 
the same moral status and the same primary justificatory reason, identical 
moral judgment about killing does not follow.  
 
Even if both foetuses and neonates lack a right to life, then, it does not 
follow that a woman’s (permissible, justified) reason(s) for abortion will 
                                                
9 p. 2 
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suffice to justify infanticide. So, even if the threat of financial hardship, 
say, justifies killing a foetus, we cannot thereby conclude that the threat of 
financial hardship justifies killing a newborn. However, on the assumption 
that the authors are right about the moral parity of foetuses and 
newborns, a different reading of their general claim does follow from their 
premises. It does follow that given identical moral contexts, we must 
make identical judgements with respect to killing foetuses and newborns. 
But the claim that the same moral context results in the same judgment is 
trivial, since foetuses and newborns will never be in the same moral 
context.  
 
One important difference between the sorts of contexts in which abortion 
occurs and the sorts in which infanticide might occur (though by no 
means the only difference) is brought out by the authors’ choice of 
wording. They write, for example, that ‘!after-birth abortion should be 
considered a permissible option for women who would be damaged by 
giving up their newborns for adoption’.10 The choice of whether to ‘after-
birth abort’, according to the authors, is the woman’s choice. While this is 
a reasonable claim to make about abortion, it surely isn’t about 
infanticide.  
 
The choice of infanticide would almost never be a choice just for the 
woman. Where, when pregnant, the woman is in a unique and singular 
sort of a relation to the foetus, such that it makes perfect sense to say 
                                                
10 p. 3; emphasis added.  
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that the choice is hers, this is simply not so once the newborn is outside 
of her body. The baby is then—almost always—in various sorts of 
relationships with several or even many people. And where two 
progenitors are involved with a birth, the relationship between the woman 
and the baby is not even unique: the would-be father stands in the same 
potential-care-relation to the newborn that the would-be mother does. So, 
while it makes sense to talk about abortion being a pregnant woman’s 
choice, and hers alone, the moral context of possible infanticide will 
almost never be one in which the choice is hers alone. (Even when it is, 
the overall context will still not be the same as in abortion.)  
 
The point of this is not, in particular, that infanticide can’t be a woman’s 
singular choice. The point is that the moral context surrounding decisions 
about abortion will always be different—and probably saliently different—
from that surrounding decisions about infanticide. More interests will be at 
stake; more choices than just the woman’s will matter; the neonate will be 
implicated in more and richer relationships; the neonate will not be 
impinging of necessity on the physical integrity of any one person in 
particular; and so on. This does not show that infanticide is impermissible 
while abortion is permissible. What it shows is that you can’t generalise 
from one to the other. Moral context matters, and the contexts will never 
be the same. 
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Conclusion 
Giubilini and Minerva argue that the same reasons that justify abortion 
would justify infanticide. They claim that the foetus’s lack of a right to life 
means that abortion is permissible even when abortion does not primarily 
serve the interests (or would-be interests) of the foetus; that babies also 
lack a right to life; and that therefore infanticide is permissible for the 
same set of reasons abortion is, and in particular, is permissible even 
when it is not primarily in the interest (or would-be interest) of the 
newborn. I have argued that the possession or lack of a right to life is not 
decisive: sometimes killing creatures with a right to life is permissible, and 
sometimes killing creatures who lack a right to life is impermissible. Moral 
status does not function in isolation—it functions in a moral context—and 
the moral context of infanticide will never be sufficiently like that of 
abortion such that we could generalise across the two.  
 
Even granting Giubilini and Minerva’s claims about personhood and its 
implications for a right to life, the authors have not proved that 
infanticide—or ‘after-birth abortion’—is permissible for the same reasons 
abortion is. It is, of course, still open to the authors to claim that there are 
no morally salient contextual differences between possible instances of 
abortion and possible instances of infanticide, but intuition pushes heavily 
against such a claim. The burden would be theirs to prove that there are 
no such differences. Without doing so, their argument simply does not 
work.   
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This conclusion is a negative one. I have not given a positive account of 
the moral difference (if there is one) between abortion and infanticide. I 
have merely shown that the moral quality of one does not follow from the 
moral quality of the other. As I argued in Chapter One, it seems likely that 
there are morally salient contextual differences between abortion and 
infanticide that can motivate the claim that abortion is permissible where 
infanticide is not. I suggested that relationships are one such contextual 
difference. Surely bodily autonomy rights are another: that the foetus is in 
and reliant upon the body of a person with the right to autonomous 
decision-making about her body would quite clearly make a difference to 
what we say about abortion on the assumption that the foetus does not 
have a right to life, and very plausibly does even if it possess a right to 
life.11 Since the neonate is not in another’s body, no such right will be part 
of the moral context. In some ways, however, the question of just what 
contextual features will come into play is premature, on the assumption 
that we have not arrived at an account of the moral status of foetuses or 
babies. In the introduction to Part Two of the thesis, I will what we ought 
to say about the moral status of foetuses and babies, and will use that as 
a jumping-off point for broader discussion of how we ought to understand 
our obligations to them.  
 
 
                                                
11 Thomson (1971) 

  
 
 
 
 
 
Part Two  
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS TO BABIES 
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Introduction  
In part one, I explored the moral status of babies. In chapters one and two, I 
looked at whether we can give an account of the moral significance of birth: 
the claim that birth can change the moral status of the foetus/neonate. I 
concluded that neither a relational, nor a modified-relational account of moral 
status can motivate the claim that birth changes the moral status of the 
foetus/neonate. Since relational accounts are the most promising way to 
account for the moral considerability of babies on a personhood-bound theory, 
it seems unlikely that we can either defend the moral significance of birth, or 
that we can give an adequate account of the moral status of babies: even if 
we accept the conclusion that there can be no difference in moral status 
between late foetus and newborn baby, we still have no account of the moral 
status of babies—or foetuses or indeed of marginal humans more generally—
on the assumption that personhood is central to moral considerability.   
 
1. Potential Persons 
A common way, of course, to attribute moral considerability to babies and 
foetuses—though it does nothing for other marginal humans—is to appeal to 
potential: babies and foetuses are morally considerable because they will one 
day be persons; or because they have the potential to become persons; or 
because they are potential persons.1 This strategy has wide popular appeal, 
but it should be immediately obvious that it faces difficulties. A potential x is 
not an x, after all.  
                                                
1 See e.g. Finnis (1994). For an argument that aborted foetuses are not 
potential  persons, see Harman (2003).  
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The usual metaphors are apt: an acorn is not an oak tree; an egg is not a 
chicken; and so on. These metaphors make clear that there is a problem with 
assigning the moral value of x to something in virtue of its being a potential-x. 
One might worry, though, that even if we cannot attribute the same value to it, 
still its being a potential-x might mean that it has the same desert, or the same 
rights. To simply assert that a chicken has certain rights (if indeed chickens 
have rights) but an egg does not is question-begging in the context of 
discussing the moral status of the foetus. However, when we consider what 
rights it might make sense to attribute to a chicken, and why, it becomes clear 
that our reasons for attributing rights to an x will at least not always suffice for 
attributing rights to a potential-x. So for example, we might say that a chicken 
has a right not to be tortured; and if we say this, we will probably say that it 
has this right on grounds that (say) everything that can suffer has a right 
against suffering. But it makes no sense to say that an egg has a right against 
torture, and this is because an egg cannot suffer. The chicken, in short, has 
very different properties to the egg. On pain of speciesism, it must be the case 
that properties—and not biological kinship—are what ground moral status.  
 
Still, one might want to argue that having the property of being a potential 
person is itself morally salient. We might point out that a fertilised egg is 
valuable in that if we handle it correctly, we will get a chicken from it. So 
perhaps we might say that having the potential to be a person is itself morally 
valuable. This, however, will only show that an egg is instrumentally valuable, 
and not morally valuable. What the defender of potentiality will want to show is 
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not that babies and foetuses are valuable the way that gold is valuable; they 
want to show that babies and foetuses are valuable in the way that you and I 
are valuable.  
 
Tooley argues that the sort of ‘potential’ that foetuses possess is just not the 
sort of potential that could count as intrinsically morally valuable. He 
distinguishes between three sorts of potential: active potential, latent potential, 
and passive potential.2 He argues that foetuses have, if anything, passive 
potential to become persons—given that foetuses must be gestated and so on 
in order to become persons—and that passive potential cannot drive moral 
value: passive potential simply ‘covers too many possibilities’. 
 
Active Potential: an entity may be said to have an active potentiality 
for acquiring some property P if there are within it all of the positive 
causal factors needed to bring it about that it will acquire property P.  
Latent Potential: an entity has latent potential if all of the positive 
factors are present within it, but there is some feature of it that will 
block the action of those factors.  
Passive Potential: an entity has passive potentiality for acquiring 
property P if other things could act upon it in such a way as to bring it 
about that it acquires property P.3   
 
                                                
2 (1983): 167-169. 
3 (1983): 167. 
Special Obligations to Babies 
 102 
Foetuses cannot be said to have active potential to become persons, since 
there are many positive causal factors needed for the foetus to become a 
person that are not at all ‘within’ it: if it is not gestated, for example, it will not 
become a person. Babies, too, will fail the test for active potential, since 
babies are not even able to nourish themselves. Left to their own devices, 
babies simply would not develop into persons.  
 
We might think that foetuses and babies will have latent potential to become 
persons, since their helplessness seems to be what’s ‘blocking’ them from 
developing on their own. We would say, then, that a foetal or infant body is 
perfectly equipped to develop into a body that could sustain personhood if not 
for the ‘block’ of its helplessness. But this belies the intense amounts of care 
and nurturing required by a foetus or baby to develop. Babies and foetuses 
simply don’t have ‘all the positive causal factors’ present within them: they 
need care, and that need is not a block on their potential, but rather a fact 
about what sort of potential they have.  
 
So, it seems that we are forced to say that, insofar as babies and foetuses are 
potential persons, they are passive potential persons. And this seems simply 
not enough to generate moral considerability. A zygote has the (passive) 
potential to become a person—if gestated, and then subsequently nurtured to 
maturity—but so does a carrot: if consumed, digested, used to grow 
reproductive cells that are then fertilised and gestated and so on. Passive 
potential captures too much.  
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2. Futures Like Ours 
It seems, then, that potential personhood cannot ground full moral status. One 
further possible way of grounding full moral status for babies and foetuses 
worth considering is Don Marquis’s ‘valuable future like ours’ account.4 
Marquis argues that foetuses and babies have a right to life because they 
possess a future like ours (henceforth, FLO). FLOs, Marquis argues, are 
highly valuable, such that taking an FLO away from anyone who possesses 
one is ‘prima facie seriously wrong’.5 He argues that what grounds the 
badness of killing a person is that killing a person robs them of their FLO; and 
that, since foetuses and babies have the same sorts of valuable futures that 
persons have, killing foetuses and babies is likewise bad. Thus, foetuses and 
babies have a right to life.6  
                                                
4 Marquis (1989) 
5 (1989): 190.  
6 I am altering Marquis’s account in two ways here. First, Marquis does not 
discuss babies, except as an aside (e.g. p.192)—but I take it that what he 
says about foetuses clearly applies to babies mutatis mutandis—and second, 
Marquis’s primary claim is that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong, or 
presumptively seriously wrong; that ‘it could be justified only by the most 
compelling reasons’; that it is ‘at least as great a loss as the loss of the future 
of a standard adult human being who is killed’, etc (194). I am not, here 
concerned with the abortion claim. The claim that abortion is prima facie 
seriously wrong, as the discussion in Chapter Three should make clear, would 
not follow even if Marquis’s FLO account of the harm of death were accepted: 
rights to life are not decisive. (However it should be noted that Marquis 
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There is something nice about Marquis’s account of the harm of death. It gets 
it right in a whole host of non-standard death cases: it implies that death might 
not be a harm to someone whose future is filled with suffering because of 
incurable disease; it implies that the death of a child is more serious than the 
death of an adult because they have more future to lose; and so on. In short, 
it’s a nice account of why death is a harm. But I think, first, it certainly cannot 
generate the sort of rounded picture of the moral status of babies that we 
want. It cannot, for example, generate the claim that babies are such that we 
can have beneficent duties towards them; and second, it’s not clear that FLO 
even can generate a right to life.  
 
It cannot generate the rounded picture of moral status that we want, quite 
obviously, because we want to be able to say much more than simply that we 
ought not kill babies. Our obligations to babies are surely much stronger than 
simply an obligation not to actively end their lives: we are obliged to care for 
them, and to attend to their interests in a much more than minimal way. A 
right to life, in the absence of something like personhood, cannot generate 
any such obligations. Indeed, simply abandoning a baby to its fate—leaving it 
in the woods, say, to fend for itself, might be consistent with a right to life, 
since a right to life arguably only implies a prohibition on active killing.7 But 
                                                                                                                                      
explicitly states that his argument shows that if rights to life are decisive, then 
abortion is seriously wrong (202). So, it isn’t clear that Marquis is actually 
claiming that abortion is seriously wrong.)   
7 c.f. Thomson (1971). 
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even setting this worry aside, it is not clear that FLO can, indeed, generate a 
right to life. 
 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that grounding a right to life in FLO is 
circular: its being seriously wrong to take an FLO from someone relies on that 
someone having a right to their FLO.8 His argument relies on the claim that a 
loss is only a moral loss if the loser has a right to the thing lost. He 
distinguishes, then, between what he calls a neutral or non-moral loss (NL) 
and a moral loss (ML), characterising them thusly:  
 
(NL) An agent’s act causes the neutral loss of something valuable to a 
loser iff (i) the agent does the act, and (ii) the loser does not gain 
or keep the valuable thing, but (iii) the loser would gain or keep 
the valuable thing if the agent did not act.  
 
(ML) An agent’s act causes the moral loss of something valuable to a 
loser iff (i) the agent does the act, (ii) the loser does not gain or 
keep the valuable thing, (iii) the loser would gain or keep the 
valuable thing if the agent did not do the act, (iv) the loser has a 
moral right to the means necessary for gaining or keeping that 
valuable thing, and (v) the agent does not have a moral right to 
those means.9 
 
                                                
8 Sinnott-Armstrong (1997)  
9 (1997): 62. 
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Sinnott-Armstrong points out, first, that valuable futures are not something 
that we have in the way that we have material possessions or friends or etc: 
they are something that we will, given the right circumstances, have. Because 
of this, the clear story we have of why taking one’s money, for example, is 
wrong is absent. Taking something that one currently has (ie, owns) is wrong 
if and when that someone has a right to what she has.  
 
Sinnott-Armstrong asks us to imagine by analogy a foot race, where the prize 
for the winner will be a very valuable trophy. If runner Kristin wins the race, 
and runner Lee does not, Kristin will have taken the trophy from Lee: Lee will 
have lost the trophy. However, since there is no sense in which Lee had a 
prior right to the trophy, it seems clear that Kristin has not wronged Lee in 
winning the race. That is, Kristin’s taking the trophy from Lee constitutes a 
loss for Lee, but only a Neutral Loss. It is morally O.K. for Kristin to win the 
race. 
 
If Marquis’s FLO account of the harm of death is right, then foetuses who are 
aborted suffer at least a Neutral Loss in being killed, but an argument is still 
needed to show that the loss is also a Moral Loss, since Neutral Losses are 
not the sort of losses that can make an action seriously morally wrong, as the 
foot race example shows. So Sinnott-Armstrong then asks, what would have 
to change about the foot race example in order for Lee’s loss to count as a 
Moral Loss—that is, in order for Kristin’s taking the trophy to be wrong. He 
suggests that, if Kristin had won the race because she stole Lee’s running 
shoes before the race began, then Kristin’s taking the trophy, and Lee’s losing 
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the trophy, would seem to be a Moral Loss, rather than simply a Neutral Loss. 
That is, Kristin’s having won the race by taking Lee’s shoes would be wrong.  
 
It seems that we can explain this by noting that Lee has a right to his shoes—
they are his—and Kristin does not have a right to take them. This suggests 
that taking a possible future valuable possession from someone is wrong just 
in case that someone has a right to the means to acquire that future thing. 
Applying this to foetuses, then, it seems as though we need to say that taking 
a valuable FLO from a foetus is morally wrong on the assumption that the 
foetus owns or has a right to the means of achieving that valuable future. In 
other words, only if the foetus either possesses the means to progress to that 
future, or otherwise has a right to those means. Foetuses, of course, do not 
possess the means to progress to their own valuable futures—and nor do 
babies—so, it seems that taking an FLO from a foetus is wrong on the 
assumption that foetuses have a right to the means to progress to their own 
futures. That is, it seems that taking an FLO from a foetus is wrong 
(constitutes a Moral Loss) on the assumption that the foetus has a right to be 
gestated—since gestation is, in the first instance, what the foetus needs in 
order to progress towards her valuable future. A right to be gestated, as 
should be clear from previous discussion, is surely a broader right than a right 
to life: it is both a negative right to life (not to be killed), and a positive right to 
be kept alive by a specified individual. FLO, then, cannot ground a right to life: 
it relies on one.10   
                                                
10 The same argument can be run for babies, since babies need complex, 
positive care in order to progress to their valuable futures.  
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If Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of morally salient loss is correct, then a right to 
life—and thus, a key component of full moral status—cannot be grounded in 
valuable FLOs. So, neither potential, nor valuable futures can generate the 
claim that foetuses and babies are fully morally considerable. They cannot 
even generate the claim that babies and foetuses are minimally morally 
considerable. It is not obvious what to do in the face of this. In the introduction 
to Part One, I argued that, in the face of the marginal humans problem for 
personhood-bound accounts of moral status, and in particular, questions over 
the permissibility of infanticide, there seemed to be four possible responses: 
 
(1) Reject the intuition that infanticide is morally impermissible (bite the 
bullet); 
(2)  reject personhood as the measure of moral considerability;  
(3) soften the personhood approach (take personhood to be a merely 
sufficient condition for considerability); or  
(4) drive a conceptual wedge between the lack of a right to life, and the 
permissibility of killing.  
 
It seems that both (1) and (2) ought to be resisted. Since we want an account 
that both works, theoretically, and that speaks to our most core moral 
intuitions, what we ideally want is an account that can explain the 
impermissibility of  infanticide, and that utilises the personhood framework. If 
either (3) or (4) can be achieved, then it is at least possible that we can resist 
both (1) and (2). In Part One, then, I argued in Chapters One and Two that (3) 
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is not possible on the most promising version of a ‘softened’ personhood 
account (a relational account). Above I have rehearsed two less-promising, 
but more common approaches to (3): potential, and FLO. These, as well, 
seem not to work. In Chapter Three, I argued that (4) is a live possibility: I 
argued that the lack of a right to life does not imply permissibility of killing.     
 
However, (4) on its own does not tell us anything about the moral status of 
babies. That it is not clear that we may kill them doesn’t tell us very much 
about their moral status. If we resist (1) and (2), and secure (4) in the absence 
of (3), it suggests the following picture: persons, and probably only persons, 
are fully morally considerable. Babies are not fully morally considerable, and 
probably don’t have rights to life, but that does not mean it’s permissible to kill 
them. It may still turn out that it is; all I have shown, so far, is that we cannot, 
from moral status alone, conclude that it is permissible. However—more 
worryingly—we also cannot conclude that it’s not.  
 
3. Moral Status Underdescribes 
It seems, then, that moral status is not telling the whole of the story we want 
told; it seems as though moral status underdescribes. In Part Two, then, I’ll 
take a different approach. I’ll be looking at special obligations. I’ll assume that 
general obligations roughly track moral status: that is, that our general duties 
to one another can be read off moral status, more or less. So, I’ll take the 
claim that moral status underdescribes as either coextensive with, or as 
implying that general obligations underdescribe. While we may yet have some 
general obligations to babies, even if they are not fully morally considerable, 
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still it is clear that we must discuss special obligations if we are to understand 
the full moral picture as regards babies.  
 
Fully delineating all special obligations towards babies would, I suspect, be a 
mammoth task; one too large for a single thesis. If special obligations can fill 
out our account of what we owe to babies in the absence of full moral 
considerability, they will have to be voluminous. After all, there are surely a 
multitude of people that stand in a multitude of distinct relations to babies 
each owing each baby something a bit different: parents, teachers, strangers, 
distant relatives, neighbours, and so on.  
 
However, the idea that there are a multitude of special obligations we can 
describe towards babies seems perfectly plausible even in the absence of a 
full account. So, as a start, I’ll be focussing on what I take to be the most 
immediate, and probably primary special obligation one can have towards a 
baby: parental obligation. My claim is not that parental obligation can fully 
describe morality with respect to babies; merely that it is an important piece of 
the puzzle that warrants a careful treatment. I do not think that what we say 
about parental obligation can generalise to other special obligations we might 
have to babies. In fact, as shall be seen, I think exactly the opposite: parental 
obligation is utterly unique, and unlike any other obligatory relationship we can 
be in. Whatever we say about special obligations that persons other than 
parents and progenitors can have towards babies will be different and 
additional to what we say about parental obligations. However, since parental 
obligation will be so central to understand right treatment of babies, and since 
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a full account of special obligations to babies would be well out of the scope of 
a mere thesis, I have chosen to focus on parental obligation.         
 
Before we can even discuss parental obligations to babies, however, there 
are two concerns that will need to be addressed. First, even if we are content 
to conclude that babies are not fully morally considerable, or that we are not 
warranted in claiming that they are,11 and that right treatment of them must be 
described by delineation of special obligations, we must still give an account 
of the grounds on which they are the right sorts of creatures towards whom 
one could have special obligations. In other words, we have to say something 
about the moral status of babies in order even to claim that we can be obliged 
to them. Second, the broader account of special obligations will need to be 
the right sort of account. It is often held that special obligations are 
necessarily voluntary—that none of us has special obligations we did not ‘sign 
up to’.12 If this is right, the claim that special obligations can fill out the moral 
picture with respect to babies, in the absence of an account of full moral 
considerability, seems shaky: the sorts of oughts that seem to attach to 
babies don’t seem like the sort we can decline. We will need to give a non-
voluntarist account of special obligations. In the next two sections, then, I will 
                                                
11 I do not want to commit to the claim that babies are not fully morally 
considerable. Rather, I am making the modest claim that there is no account 
of why they would be to hand: we don’t have theoretical warrant to claim that 
they are.  
12 See Hardimon (1994), Jeske (1998), Thomson (1971) 
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look first at what we ought to say about the moral status of babies; and 
second, at the nature of special obligations.  
 
4. Babies and sentience  
If we suppose that babies are simply not morally considerable, then the claim 
that we have obligations towards them makes little sense. Things like rocks 
and turnips fully lack moral considerability. We cannot have special 
obligations towards them, or indeed any obligations towards them, because 
they are simply not the sorts of things towards which one can be obliged. 
Their treatment lies outside the scope of morality.13 It seems clear that babies 
are not like this. We can have obligations to babies, for their own sake. Some 
account, then, will need to be given of why we can have obligations towards 
babies, while we cannot towards rocks, even granting that babies aren’t (or at 
least, for all we know aren’t) fully morally considerable.  
 
This means, then, that if we give a personhood-bound account of moral 
status, it will need to be the sort of ‘two-tiered’ account discussed in the 
introduction to Part One—that is, we will need to do something like (3): soften 
the personhood account. It seems clear from the foregone discussion that 
softening personhood to allow for fully-morally-considerable babies holds little 
promise. But softening it to allow for less-than-fully morally considerable 
                                                
13 Of course, sometimes what we do with rocks and turnips is a moral issue. 
But not for the sake of the rocks and turnips. I am interested to do justice to 
the intuition that when we owe things to babies, we owe it to them; the 
rightness of their right treatment is not (primarily) instrumental.  
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entities seems relatively unproblematic. On such a softened, two-tiered 
account, persons will be fully morally considerable, and some non-persons 
will be at least minimally morally considerable, where ‘at least minimally 
morally considerable’ will need to mean something like ‘are within the scope 
of morality, and are such that we have obligations towards them’.  
 
I propose that we ought to accept a theory of moral status on which 
sentience—just as Warren proposed—confers moral considerability, though 
not full moral considerability.14 To the extent that Warren’s overall pluralist 
account is meant to motivate full moral considerability for babies, as I argued 
in Chapter One, it is theoretically unworkable: relationships simply cannot 
confer full moral considerability. However, as I’ve argued, what we owe to 
babies can plausibly be described by special obligations. If this is so, and 
given that moral status underdescribes, all we need theoretically speaking is 
to show that babies are a minimally morally considerable: that our treatment 
of babies is a proper subject of morality. Warren’s claim that sentience 
confers minimally, setting her broader theory aside, seems perfectly 
unproblematic—and seems so whatever broader normative framework we 
adopt.  
 
Sentient creatures can experience suffering because they can be the subjects 
of experience. To pick this capacity out as morally relevant is not to take sides 
on what sort of broader moral theory we ought to adopt. Usually, when we talk 
about sentience as morally relevant, we think of consequentialist conceptions 
                                                
14 Warren (1997)  
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of morality: the capacity to suffer is morally relevant because suffering is basic 
to moral concern; because suffering figures negatively into our moral 
calculations; etc.15 But there is no reason one would need to adopt a 
consequentialist perspective. A deontologist, for example, might easily say 
that the moral status of sentient creatures follows from a duty of non-
malevolence: if we have a duty not to harm, then all those capable of being so 
harmed fall within the scope of morality, in other words, will be morally 
considerable.16  
 
The claim that suffering is bad, and matters morally is relatively 
uncontentious. So, the supposition that sentient creatures are at least 
minimally morally considerable seems likewise relatively uncontentious. If one 
insists on an account of moral status based around moral value—that is, if 
what one wants out of a moral theory is an account of how much you and I 
are worth, as individuals—then this defence of sentience will probably not 
satisfy. However, even those who worry about ‘moral worth’ might still make 
room in their moral thinking for simpler questions about what acts morality 
ranges over. It might still be the case that, even if persons, say, and persons 
alone have moral worth or moral value in and of themselves, still we can have 
a coherent discussion about creatures that are such that actions directed 
towards them are within the purview of morality.  
 
                                                
15 Singer (1975), (2006) 
16 See, e.g. Ross (1930) especially Appendix I: Rights.  
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If we accept this two-tiered theory of moral status, then we will say that all 
sentient creatures are such that we have (general) obligations towards them. 
We will probably say that persons are such that we have obligations to them 
in addition to the ones we have to merely sentient creatures.17 This picture will 
not be adequate, as regards intuitions about babies, for two reasons.  
 
First, while we might all agree that we have negative, non-malevolence sorts 
of obligations towards nonhuman animals, it seems that we have positive, 
care obligations towards babies. ‘Leaving them to their own devices’ often 
seems a perfectly appropriate way to fulfil our obligations towards nonhuman 
animals, but surely doesn’t seem so for babies. Notice that, even if it’s the 
case that ‘leaving them to their own devices’ might result in the death of a 
nonhuman animal, we often think it a morally appropriate thing to do. So the 
difference cannot simply be that, while most nonhuman animals are capable 
of looking after themselves, human babies require active care. The obligation 
really seems to be qualitatively different. If sentience is what drives our 
general obligations towards nonpersons, and the particular needs of the 
                                                
17 Whether we say that general obligations to persons are stronger or more 
stringent than those we have to merely sentient creatures is a separate 
question. I think the usual intuition will be that obligations to persons matter 
more than those to nonhuman animals. Things are more complicated, again, 
when it comes to human nonpersons. I will remain neutral on whether our 
obligations to persons matter more that those to nonpersons, and simply 
claim that we have more or different general obligations to persons than we 
have to nonpersons.  
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creature in question cannot motivate differences in how our sentience-
motivated obligations are realised, positing special obligations towards babies 
is necessary to explain the difference.18         
 
The second reason we cannot simply note that we have general obligations to 
sentient creatures and leave it at that is that is that the obligations we feel 
ourselves to have towards babies often outstrip the obligations we feel 
ourselves to have towards persons. Where we feel we must attend to the 
wellbeing of persons, we feel we must give extra attention to the wellbeing of 
babies. Where we must be kind to persons, we must be positively loving to 
babies, often even towards babies unrelated to us. To some extent, this 
feature of our obligations to babies does seem to be driven by the difference 
in what persons and babies need to be well. Persons can usually care for 
themselves, more or less, while babies cannot. But it is easy to see that this 
does not tell the whole story.  
 
For example, if we imagine a situation in which an adult person and a baby 
are both suffering from identical physical injuries, and both need medical 
attention and cannot simply attend to themselves, we will probably judge that 
we ought to help the baby first. We might want to explain this in terms of how 
                                                
18 Oftentimes, what we owe to babies and other vulnerable humans who are 
not closely related to us is cashed out in terms of a general ‘duty of rescue’. I 
think this approach does not work, on pain of speciesism, for roughly the 
reasons just outlined. I will discuss general duties of rescue directly in the 
conclusion to the thesis.    
Introduction to Part Two 
 117 
the capacities of the adult, on the one hand, and the baby, on the other will 
colour the experience of pain for each of them: the adult can understand why 
she must suffer longer, and can bravely endure, where the baby has no such 
understanding. But then, even if both the adult and the baby are positively 
beyond rationality with pain, such that the adult is not in a position to 
understand the wait, we would probably still help the baby first. It might seem 
that this can be explained by the fact that the adult will later be able to 
understand being passed up; but then, the baby mightn’t even remember the 
event later. The adult seems far more likely, despite her ability to understand 
the situation, to be troubled by the memory of it.  
 
On a two-tiered personhood-bound account of moral considerability, the 
obligations we have towards babies cannot be adequately explained via 
appeal to general obligations towards sentient creatures, because the 
obligations we have towards babies are both different to those we have 
towards nonhuman animals, and stronger than those we have towards 
persons.19 Special obligations, then, are a promising avenue of inquiry. 
However, as I noted earlier, explaining what we owe to babies in terms of 
special obligations is only a plausible strategy if special obligations, as a 
species of obligation, are sufficiently robust. Standard accounts of special 
                                                
19 They are also different to those we have towards persons. For example, it 
is unlikely we have an obligation to show respect to babies; it makes no sense 
to complain of paternalism towards babies. This is another reason to favour 
an account on which our obligations to babies have a different explanation 
from that of our obligations to persons.  
Special Obligations to Babies 
 118 
obligations—on which special obligations are voluntary or consent-driven— 
simply will not do.  
 
5. Non-Voluntary Special Obligations 
The standard account of special obligations is that they are in some sense 
voluntary. If I have a special obligation, I have it because in one way or 
another I agreed to have it: I volunteered or consented either explicitly or 
tacitly; I placed myself under the obligation contractually either explicitly or 
tacitly; I promised; I enjoyed the benefits of a role or institution that generated 
it; or something like this.20 In other words, whether I have a special obligation 
is in some real sense up to me—a matter of choice.  
 
This is the standard view for at least two reasons. First, it is theoretically tidy: 
on this sort of account of special obligations, special obligations fall out of 
general duty. On this sort of account, the obligations we have can be fully 
specified in general terms. We have general obligations, one of which is to do 
the things we said we would do. In other words, on this sort of account, there 
is nothing morally special about special obligations. Our general account of 
moral duty, then, is simpler and tidier than an account on which there are 
obligations that apply to everyone, and then different sorts of obligations that 
only apply to some people in some circumstance.  
 
                                                
20 See Rawls (1971) esp. pp.113-114; Jeske (1998); Thomson (1971); Ross 
(1930) esp. p. 27; Hardimon (1994).  
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The second reason why the voluntarist account of special obligations is 
standard is that there is something satisfyingly fair about such an account: we 
are all obliged equally; morality doesn’t fall more heavily on any particular 
person than it does on everyone else. On such an account, we are all equal in 
the eyes of The Right. The account strikes us as fair, just, equitable.  
 
However, such an account sits uneasily with the notion that we can explain 
our obligations to babies by talking about special obligations. Volunteer is 
simply too weak. What we owe to babies is just not a matter of choice. This 
might incline one towards abandoning special obligations as a strategy for 
explaining our obligations to babies. But before we do, it is worth noting that 
there is a more general problem with the voluntarist account of special 
obligations. The more general problem speaks in favour of abandoning the 
standard account of special obligations.  
 
6. Hardimon on Role Obligations 
Not only do voluntary obligations seem too weak to account for what we owe 
to babies, they also seem too weak (and really, just wrong) to account for a 
whole class of what are commonly called ‘role obligations’—special 
obligations we have in virtue of fulfilling certain institutional roles. Michael 
Hardimon (1994) picks out familial obligations and civic obligations, in 
particular, as role obligations that do not seem amenable to a voluntarist 
account. That these sorts of obligations are non-voluntary, Hardimon argues, 
is simply too central to our moral intuitions to abandon, even if the end 
theoretical product is made tidy by doing so. He writes that ‘the idea that we 
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have [nonvolutary] familial obligations is one of the most salient moral beliefs 
we have’.21 In other words, it is not an appropriate bullet to bite lightly.   
 
Hardimon argues, instead, that familial and civic obligations are generated by 
non-voluntary role occupation—such as being a sibling or a daughter or a 
citizen—and that these roles have the moral weight that they do because we 
are born into them; they are, in a way, part of who we are, we identify with 
them, and they are reflectively acceptable. He writes that  
 
Determining that a given social role is reflectively acceptable involves 
judging that it is (in some sense) meaningful, rational, or good. [!] To 
say that a role is reflectively acceptable is to say that one would find it 
acceptable were one to reflect upon it in suitably specified 
circumstances. In contrast to the volunteer principle, which calls for a 
form of choice that is actual, the ideal of reflective acceptability calls for 
a form of acceptance that is hypothetical. (348) 
 
So, familial and civic role obligations are morally binding if and when they are 
reflectively acceptable; and this is unproblematic because we are born into 
them, and thus are not impressed into them—that is, our rights are not 
violated; we are not unfairly done by the obligations these roles generate.  
 
                                                
21 (1994) 342. Hardimon uses the term ‘noncontractual’, rather than 
‘nonvoluntary’; the difference is immaterial in the context of this discussion, so 
I have changed it to avoid confusion.   
Introduction to Part Two 
 121 
Hardimon responds to the worry over special obligations being unfairly forced 
upon us (‘impressment’, as he calls it) by appealing to the fact that we are 
born into familial and civic roles. Because of this, they are just part of who we 
are, rather than something that’s been thrust upon us.22 However, it should be 
clear that this response only works for a certain subclass of familial roles. 
Spouses, for example, are not born into their spousal roles, and importantly 
for my discussion, nor are parents. The defender of the standard view of 
special obligations might rightly object that, even if filial obligation, and the 
obligations of (some) citizens can be made acceptable in this way, parental 
obligations surely cannot.  
 
One way that Hardimon might respond to this objection is simply to say that 
indeed only some familial and civic obligations are nonvoluntary; others are 
acquired by consent. In the case of civic obligations, for example, it is clear 
that some citizens are citizens because they were born into citizenship, while 
others take it on voluntarily through naturalisation. And this seems perfectly 
unproblematic. Likewise with familial obligations, some familial obligations 
have their force through identification—because we are born into roles such 
as sibling and child—while others, like parental and spousal obligations, have 
moral force through consent.  
 
As I shall discuss further in Chapter Four, the idea that parental obligation is 
voluntary is clearly not beyond defence. However, as I’ve already noted, 
parental obligation having its moral force through consent doesn’t seem to gel 
                                                
22 (1994): 347 
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with intuitions about what we owe to babies. Parental obligations, on this 
account, are simply too weak to fill in gaps left by moral considerability. A 
better way to respond to the worry over familial obligations into which we have 
not been born—and more generally, to the worry over ‘impressment’—is to 
note, first, that impressment needs an agent, and second, that impressment 
might simply be too weak a worry, in the case of parental obligation, to 
warrant acceptance of a voluntarist view of parenthood.23  
 
7. Impressment 
The motivation against abandoning the standard view of role obligations, 
Hardimon writes, is driven by ‘our horror at the thought of being impressed—
like the seamen of old—into social roles and burdened with their attendant 
obligations against our will.’24 Hardimon does not think we ought to reject the 
idea that some role obligations are voluntary: clearly some are. But argues 
that we ought not think of the choice as one between volunteering and being 
impressed. When role obligations are non-voluntary, they are not, Hardimon 
argues, thereby instances of impressment; they are simply part of who we 
are. But as I’ve said, this account does not seem to work, if the claim is that 
parental obligations are non-voluntary. A similar, and functionally-equivalent 
reply, however, will.  
 
                                                
23 I take it that is quite obvious that spousal obligations just do not fit the non-
voluntarist mould. This seems unproblematic. To say that some special 
obligations are non-voluntary is not to say that all are.  
24 (1994) 347 
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What is wrong with impressment is that it is something like a rights violation, 
or an autonomy violation. It is a taking away of my free choice. But a loss of 
choice is only a violation of this worrying sort if it is caused by another agent. 
So for example, being electrocuted is horrible no matter; but if I am 
electrocuted by my neighbour holding a bare wire to my head, this is a rights 
violation, whereas if I am struck by lightning no right of mine has been violated 
even though I am harmed. Impressment (of a morally-worrying sort) requires 
rights violation; it requires an agent. So, even if I am a parent involuntarily, 
and thus have non-voluntary parental obligations, even though I have not 
chosen it (and have not been born into it), my rights are not thereby violated. 
Nature and luck simply cannot wrong me in that way.  
 
One might, of course, object that in some cases of involuntary parenthood, an 
agent is the cause: ‘unwilling’ fathers seem to be a case in point. This is a 
central worry driving Elizabeth Brake’s voluntarist account of parenthood, and 
I will discuss it at length in Chapters Four and Five.25 For now I will simply 
note that, even if unwilling fathers are impressed into their roles, and even if 
this impressment is a rights violation, it is not clear that (or why) this should 
absolve such fathers of obligation. After all, it is not the child herself who has 
so wronged the father; so, it is not clear why the child is the one towards 
whom obligation should no longer hold.  
 
In the chapters ahead, I will be exploring the nature of parental obligation, and 
I will defend a non-volutarist account. I will begin in Chapter Four by 
                                                
25 Brake (2005), (2010). 
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defending such an account against Elizabeth Brake’s objections to non-
voluntarism about parental obligation.26 
 
Chapter Five will further explore the nature of parental obligation by exploring 
the intersection between a causal account of parental obligation and 
reproductive liberty—a mirror to Part One’s focus on the contrast between 
foetuses and neonates. In that chapter, I will say more about how we ought to 
understand the nature of causation in the context of parenthood, and will 
argue that Brake’s worries over unwilling fathers ought to compel us to give a 
more robust account of parental obligation, rather than a more lenient one. In 
particular, I will argue that Brake rightly picks out a mismatch between fathers 
being compelled to pay child support, and mothers having the freedom to put 
their babies up for adoption, but that she grasps the wrong horn of the 
dilemma: rather than concluding that unwilling fathers mustn’t be obliged, we 
ought to conclude that unwilling mothers are not, after all, free to absolve 
themselves of obligation towards their offspring.  
 
I will conclude Part Two by exploring further reproductive-ethical 
consequences of the account of parental obligation that I defend in Chapters 
Four and Five. Chapter Six, then, will look at whether men have a ‘right to 
choose’; whether the right to abort depends critically on the physicality of 
pregnancy; and whether a causal account of parental obligation implies a duty 
to gestate.   
  
                                                
26 (2010) in particular 
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Chapter Four 
WHY AND HOW TO PREFER A CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF 
PARENTHOOD 
 
Introduction 
Elizabeth Brake argues that a voluntarist account of parental obligation 
should be preferred over other competing conceptions of parenthood. 
Importantly, she argues that a voluntarist account is preferable to a (non-
voluntarist) causal account. Causal accounts, Brake argues, suffer (at 
least) two conceptual weaknesses: there is an explanatory gap between 
being the metaphysical cause of someone’s existence and owing that 
someone care; and causal accounts belie the socially-constructed nature 
of parenthood itself. 
 
I will argue that the explanatory gap between causing and obligation can 
be filled on a more plausible conception of the nature of the obligation; 
and that, while a simple causal account cannot answer Brake’s concerns 
about the scope and nature of parenthood, there are easy and intuitive 
modifications available to a causal account, such that a modified causal 
account can be consistent with recognition of social construction.  
 
In section one, I will rehearse Brake’s arguments against a causal 
account. In section two, I will present her positive account, and give some 
reasons for thinking we ought not bite the voluntarist bullet. In section 
three, I will discuss David Archard’s modified causal account of parental 
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obligation, and show how it (at least partly) answers Brake’s concern over 
the contingent nature of parenthood. In section four, I will argue that 
modification stronger than what Archard suggests is needed to 
successfully get round Brake’s worry over social construction. And in 
section five, I will present an alternative to Brake’s libellous causing 
account of the moral power of causing: a broadly Kantian account of 
causing existence as choosing for.  
 
1. Why Brake wants volunteers 
On the face of it, causal accounts of parental obligation have much to 
recommend them. According to a causal account, parents are obliged to 
care for their children in virtue of having caused their children to exist. On 
this picture, then, we have an apparently coherent account of why 
parents are obliged, that fits with other accounts of obligation: parental 
obligation is a sort of liability; it is acquired in virtue of the morally weighty 
action (causing existence) of the parents.  
 
Causal accounts, at first blush seem promising accounts of parental 
obligation. A causal account is more plausible than, say, a biological 
account—on which parents are obliged because they are uniquely 
biologically related to the child—since they don’t pick out people who are 
biologically related but, we think, morally unrelated: for example, persons 
whose gametes have been stolen and used to create an embryo; or 
identical twins. Further, since causal accounts hinge on something the 
parent has done, rather than a simple biological fact about the parent’s 
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body, the connection between the relationship and the obligation seems 
much clearer and more plausible.  
 
Causal accounts, importantly, have teeth. One doesn’t have to be willing 
to be held to account. The parent who says ‘I don’t want to’ has failed, on 
a causal account, in her moral duty. Consent accounts, on the other 
hand, appear to be unable to hold ‘dead-beat’ parents, feckless 
neglecters, and the like, to account. So, causal accounts clearly have a 
lot going for them. But, Brake argues, they have (at least) two serious 
problems, serious enough that we ought to reject them.  
 
a. Libellous Causing 
Brake’s first worry about causal accounts is that the connection between 
causing and being obliged is not so clear as it may first appear. A first 
worry about causing as an obligation-motivator is that it is unclear who 
should count as a cause: are obstetricians causes? Are gamete donors? 
Are the parents’ match-makers? A causal account of parental obligation 
needs a solid account of causation, on pain of picking out the wrong 
people as parents, and the account must be non-circular. In section three 
I’ll discuss this worry further, and argue that an appropriate 
conceptualisation of causation is available to the causal theorist. 
However, the larger worry, according to Brake, is with the very 
conceptualisation of parental obligations as compensatory obligations: 
how do we get from causing human existence to owing care?  
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First, Brake points out that only some acts of wronging an individual 
oblige us to compensate them for that harm. For example, if I hurt your 
feelings, I am presumably not obliged to compensate you for this hurt; 
however, if I damage your car, I probably am. So, an account is needed 
of why causing someone to exist is the sort of harm that generates 
compensatory obligations. Brake argues that such an account is 
unavailable.  
 
The first step in explaining the link between causing existence and being 
obliged to compensate is to motivate the claim that causing someone to 
exist results in the right sort of harm. Brake points out that compensatory 
obligations are rectificatory. They are obligations to fix bad states of 
affairs for which one is morally responsible; to ‘make the victim whole 
again’. The harm that generates them, then, must be either a rights-
violation, or a ‘serious boundary-crossing harm’ (159). So, we will need 
an account of why (or in what sense) causing someone to exist is either a 
rights-violation, or a serious boundary-crossing harm.  
 
Some theorists have supposed that the child’s neediness is the relevant 
harm. Making it such that someone is needy is, plausibly, a harm that 
would generate compensatory obligation. When one causes a child to 
exist, one causes an individual to be needy, since babies and children 
just are needy. The compensatory obligation, then, is the obligation to 
rectify the child’s neediness. Causing neediness, then, would count as a 
serious boundary-crossing harm.  
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Alternately, we might suppose that causing existence generates rights 
that must not be violated. Brake considers Feinberg’s claim that children 
have a ‘right to a reasonable assurance of a minimally decent life’ (159). 
On this account, causing a child to exist would be a rights violation in the 
absence of care. For the sake of argument, Brake assumes that both of 
these claims are correct: that causing neediness is a harm that demands 
compensation; and that failure to provide reasonable assurance of a 
minimally decent life would constitute a rights-violation. The harm and the 
potential rights-violation together, then, would generate what Brake calls 
‘procreative costs’: what one owes to the child in virtue of the harm done 
and of the child’s rights.  
 
On this picture, one would have compensatory obligations towards one’s 
offspring in virtue of having caused the child to exist. However, Brake 
points out, parental obligation far outstrips procreative costs. If neediness 
is the bad state of affairs that must be rectified, then the compensation 
ought to consist of making the child non-needy. Clearly, children cannot 
be made non-needy; at best, their neediness can only be minimised. 
Minimising neediness, it seems, would require the parent to enable the 
child to meet her own needs as far as is possible. If a reasonable 
assurance of a minimally decent life is the right that mustn’t be violated, 
then the obligation is just to provide reasonable assurance of a minimally 
decent life.  
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But parents surely owe their children more (and different) than simply 
enabling of self-sufficiency, and opportunities for minimal decency. 
Importantly, we think that parents owe their children love, interpersonal 
warmth, and close involvement in their lives for at least many years. So, 
even if it is right to suppose that children are harmed by being brought 
into existence; and that children are put in danger of having their rights 
violated by being brought into existence, it seems that the compensatory 
obligations generated by this harm and this right cannot fully describe 
parental obligation.  
 
Furthermore, the extent to which parents must provide for the wellbeing 
of their children is significantly dependent upon social circumstances. A 
child raised in a society that lacks basic sanitation, educational 
opportunities, etc., is by default further off the ‘minimally decent’ mark 
than is a child raised in a society that offers robust social care. This 
means that what parents are obliged to, on this compensatory model, will 
vary with social circumstance. In this sense, the child’s ‘neediness’ is 
simply not caused by the causal parents alone.  
 
So there is a gap. I will argue that this gap can be bridged by 
reconceptualising the connection between causing existence and 
parental obligation: compensation is just not the appropriate model. In 
section three, I’ll present an alternative account of the connection 
between causing existence and incurring obligation—one that is not 
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rectificatory in nature. But first, I will discuss Brake’s second objection to 
causal accounts, and present her positive, voluntarist account.   
 
  
b. Parenthood as a Social Construct 
Brake’s weightiest worry about the causal account is a worry over the 
social, or institutional nature of parenthood. Who we take to be parents 
depends upon how our societies are structured. Likewise, what parental 
obligation consists in is, in Brake’s words, ‘institutional, not natural’: both 
what children need, and what parents are expected to provide them with, 
are delineated by our social practices. Parenthood, then, is socially 
constructed. This seems to make two different sorts of problems for a 
causal account. First, it seems like it simply can’t be the case that certain 
people (biological progenitors, for example) belong to the category 
‘parent’ of necessity, or ‘naturally’. And second, it seems like it can’t be 
the case that parents, of necessity, have the obligations we intuitively 
assign to parents.   
 
Parental obligations are role obligations; that is, they are obligations one 
has only in virtue of being a parent. (They are a species of special 
obligation.) So, parental obligations will apply to anyone who fulfils the 
role. It is a challenge for any theory of parenthood to get this right: any 
good theory needs to explain why parents—that is, the people we 
(pretheoretically) pick out as parents—are obliged.  
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As a point of clarification, Brake differentiates between three sorts of 
parenthood: moral parenthood, social parenthood, and legal parenthood. 
Legal parents are just those who the law holds accountable for the care 
of children. Social parents are those who fill the social, care role of parent 
for the child. Moral parents are those who we take to be morally 
responsible for the care of the child. These three sorts of parenthood 
come apart. For example, an absent father may be a legal parent—
obliged by law to pay child support, say—while having never even met a 
child, and thus not fulfilling the social role of parent. Grandparents who 
take on the full-time care of their grandchildren might be social parents, 
though we mightn’t think them morally obliged to provide such care. And 
so on.   
 
The primary concern of a (moral) theory of parenthood is to fix moral 
parenthood; that is, to assign obligations to all and only those people who 
are moral parents. And this task is not straightforward. For example, a 
simple biological account of parenthood will not pick out all and only 
those we take to be parents, since we usually think that gamete donors 
are not parents, despite being biological progenitors. A simple causal 
account will not do, since adoptive parents—who probably we ought to 
take to be proper parents—do not cause their children to exist.1 So, 
                                                
1 This is not an insurmountable obstacle for a simple causal account, 
since assigning obligations only to causal parents on causal grounds 
does not rule out non-causal parents having obligations on other grounds. 
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properly delineating the role of parent is a challenge for any theory of 
parenthood.  
 
Brake’s worry, however, goes one step further: the worry is that there is 
no correct delineation of parenthood; or rather, that because ‘parent’ 
varies so greatly in its meaning across history and cultures, we must 
conclude that there is no real moral category to be delineated. It seems 
like parents are just those who parent.  If this is right, then it is difficult to 
see how we can get from a natural fact—like biology, or causation—to the 
social fact of parenthood.  
 
One might be tempted to reply as follows: ‘even if we use “parent” in lots 
of ways, still we can talk about parents; that is, even if someone, say, 
acts as a parent, and we call him “a parent”, still we can separate him, in 
our theory, from a real parent. And it’s the real parents who have the 
obligations.’ But who might these real parents be? We can’t say that the 
source of the sperm and the source of the ovum are the ‘real’ parents, 
since sperm donors aren’t parents. We can’t say that either the biological 
parents, or the adoptive parents are the parents, since adoption just 
happens to be the legal convention by which we in the west in this day 
and age formalise familial arrangements centred round children. In 
matrilineal societies, Brake points out, children are traditionally raised by 
their mothers and their mothers’ families; primarily by mother and 
                                                                                                                               
But it does mean the causal theorist needs to do more work, else her 
account is incomplete.    
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maternal uncle. In most societies until relatively recently, children were 
cared for by larger extended families. Nuclear mother/father families are 
our paradigm setting for childrearing by social convention, and social 
convention surely cannot drive moral fact.  
 
One might be tempted, still, to say that, while the extended family may 
have cared for the child, still the extended family is not the parents. But it 
isn’t clear how we can make sense of this stance. In the case of 
matrilineal communities, for example, where mother and uncle 
traditionally raise a child, the male progenitor is in the same relationship 
to the child as is a sperm donor in 21st century Western society.  If the 
sperm donor is not a parent, it seems unlikely the ‘father’ in the matrilineal 
society is. If the non-biological ‘father’ in cases of sperm donation is the 
father (and surely he is), then it seems like the mother’s brother is the 
father in matrilineal societies. And there are examples much closer to 
home: many grandparents, for example, raise their grandchildren. It 
doesn’t do to point to the fact that the children don’t call them ‘parents’: 
children in China don’t call their parents ‘parents’ either; and yet they are.  
 
Fixing parenthood seems a serious difficulty for a consent account of 
parenthood. On the one hand, if we understand cause narrowly—such 
that, for example, only those immediately responsible for conceiving and 
gestating the embryo that becomes the child are taken to be causes of 
the child’s existence—then our conception of parenthood is tethered to 
our narrow social understanding. As Brake puts it, it would seem simply 
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to ‘reflect the heterosexual nuclear-family practices common in 
contemporary western society’, rather than to rightly pick out moral 
parents (167).  
 
On the other hand, if we understand cause in a way that takes social 
practice into account, then the moral force of causing seems to melt 
away. For example, we might say that maternal uncles in matrilineal 
societies are causes of a child’s existence: the child is conceived, 
gestated, and birthed on the understanding that the uncle will be a 
primary carer to the child, and has responsibility for the child’s wellbeing. 
The social understanding that he will fulfil this role is part of the 
circumstances in which the child is brought into being, and he has 
actively played this role. Therefore, he is a cause.  
 
But if we understand cause in this way, causal parenthood becomes 
impossibly large and indefinite, and the causal account loses its ‘teeth’. 
Fixing moral parenthood will depend on contingent social facts, rather 
than anything metaphysical; most plausibly, it will also depend on the 
intentions of prospective moral parents. This will mean, in effect, that one 
is cause of a child’s existence only if she intends to parent. Causation will 
drop out entirely. The account will collapse into voluntarism: parents will 
be those who choose to be so, and causing will lose its explanatory 
power altogether. Brake, then, concludes that the causal account ought to 
be abandoned, and a straight-forwardly voluntarist account given.  
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2. Brake’s Strong Voluntarist Account  
Because causal accounts seem to fall down with respect to motivating 
compensatory obligation, and fixing moral parenthood, Brake argues that 
a voluntarist account of parenthood is, after all, the most plausible 
account we can give. In Brake’s terminology, moral parenthood springs 
from social parenthood; and whether one is a social parent depends upon 
whether one has consented to occupy the social role parent.  
 
a. Strong voluntarism  
On this account, one acquires parental obligation by consenting—either 
explicitly or tacitly—to parent, and by being in the appropriate rights 
position with respect to the child. (That is, by having a legitimate claim to 
parent the child.) On standard consent accounts of parenthood, consent 
to parent is sufficient, but not necessary for parental obligation.2 This sort 
of account makes sense of the obligations adoptive parents, and de facto 
(non-biological) parents are under with respect to their children, but 
leaves open the question of how such obligation can be elsewise 
acquired. Brake defends a stronger version of a consent account, on 
which consent is necessary, but not sufficient for parental obligation. (It is 
not sufficient because, again, one must be in the appropriate rights 
position with respect to the child: simply declaring oneself the parent of a 
child will not generate parental obligation if the child is, for example, 
someone else’s child.)  
 
                                                
2 Cf. O’Neill (1979)  
Why and how 
 137 
The plausibility of this view, Brake writes, ‘derives from the thought that 
obligations limit liberty, and liberty can only be limited through choice or 
as a result of wrong-doing’ (156). Because, as we have seen, conceiving 
of parental obligation as compensatory obligation fails, the curtailment of 
liberty that parental obligation constitutes must be voluntary. Brake 
considers the objection that many special obligations—for example, filial 
obligations—seem to be non-voluntary: it seems as though we have 
duties to family members that we did not choose. In that case, it is 
unclear why we should need to choose to have parental obligations; why 
parental obligations should not be like other sorts of familial duties. She 
suggests that these non-voluntary obligations may be ‘duties of virtue’—
rather than duties of justice—that do not correlate to moral rights (156). In 
other words, whilst I may have filial duties towards my parents, even 
though I have never consented to have such duties, my parents do not 
have a right that those duties be fulfilled. I fulfill my duties towards my 
family as a matter of virtue; if I do not, I am perhaps vicious, but I have 
not violated anyone’s rights. In contrast, if I fail in my parental obligations, 
I have exactly violated my child’s rights; I have perpetrated an injustice 
against my child.       
 
b. Broad consent  
That parental obligation requires consent does not, at first blush, square 
with the realities of becoming a parent. Many parents become so either 
under pressure from family, partners, society, and so on; or simply 
accidentally, or even fecklessly, carried along by fate. One may even 
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become a parent through need arising by chance: do to the sudden death 
of a child’s birth parents, for example. The notion that parents become so 
by careful reasoned intentional action is implausible. Brake acknowledges 
this, and utilises a broad understanding of consent, on which it might be 
careful and intentional; or it might simply be ‘tacit voluntary acceptance’ of 
the role—one may choose it, actively, or one may simply not decline to 
enter into it (157). Echoing Thomson,3 she writes that  
‘!once someone has chosen not to abort, undergone prenatal 
medical care, bought some baby clothes, and taken an infant home, 
the role of parent has been tacitly accepted. In our society, taking a 
child home as one’s own counts as assuming the role of parent—
there is no other way to describe this activity, except as baby-
snatching. If abortion is an option, then choosing to continue a 
                                                
3 Thomson (1971) writes that ‘Surely we do not have any such "special 
responsibility" for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or 
implicitly. If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain 
an abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it out for 
adoption, but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed 
responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot now 
withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because they now find it 
difficult to go on providing for it. But if they have taken all reasonable 
precautions against having a child, they do not simply by virtue of their 
biological relationship to the child who comes into existence have a 
special responsibility for it.’ (65) 
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pregnancy without making plans for adoption constitutes accepting 
the role of parent.’ (171) 
 
In other words, one consents to parent, basically, by doing it; by 
parenting. And once one has done so—once one has taken up the 
(social) role—one is thereby (morally) obliged. There is no other way, 
according to Brake’s account, to acquire parental obligation. All parental 
obligation is (broadly) voluntary.  
 
c. Deadbeat dads 
Voluntarist accounts are vulnerable to an objection that Brake has 
dubbed ‘the ‘deadbeat dads’ objection. Indeed, this objection seems to be 
the strongest objection to a voluntarist account. Brake argues that the 
worry is only apparent: that the intuitions we have about ‘deadbeat dads’ 
can be adequately handled by broader moral considerations in a way 
consistent with the voluntarist account.  
 
 According to the deadbeat dads objection, a voluntarist account is 
implausible because so-called deadbeat dads cannot be held to account: 
fathers who abandon their children and fail to provide support cannot be 
said to have violated their child’s rights; nor are they subject to moral 
scrutiny for having declined to support them. Voluntarist accounts seem 
to be unable to attribute blameworthiness in the face of global parental 
failing.  
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Brake argues that the intuition that biological fathers who abandon their 
children are blameworthy is not apt as a criticism of the voluntarist 
account. To the extent that ‘deadbeat dads’ ought to be held to account, 
she argues, they are not so obliged on parental grounds. Thus, though 
the voluntarist account cannot, on its own, explain why abandoning one’s 
offspring is morally reprehensible; or why fathers ought to, for example, 
be obliged to pay child support; this does not tell against the account, 
because we can explain these judgments on other grounds.  
 
First, Brake writes, fathers ‘owe general duties of rescue to the infant’ 
(174). Just like everyone else, fathers have a general duty not to 
knowingly abandon a child to its death. Arguably, biological parents are in 
a particularly good position to aid their biological children. And anyone in 
a good position to save a helpless child from imminent death or danger 
has a (general) duty to do so. So, since biological fathers are often 
uniquely situated to rescue their children, they have a general (non-
parental) duty to do so if need arises.  
 
Second, there are strong social-justice reasons in favour of assigning 
legal parenthood to biological fathers, even if we cannot assign moral 
parenthood to them. Most notably: single mothers and their children are 
amongst the most vulnerable in our society. Assigning legal support 
duties to biological fathers is in keeping, then, with maintaining social 
justice by alleviating the vulnerability of both the child and the mother.  
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And finally, ‘reckless procreators’ can be held to moral account on non-
parental grounds. Brake points out that ‘”deadbeat dads” usually 
describes men who accept obligations and then abandon their families’ 
(175)—social (and thus moral) dads who walk out on their children. In 
these cases, a voluntarist account is perfectly able to attribute 
wrongdoing, since these ‘deadbeat dads’ are parents with parental 
obligation on a voluntarist account.  
 
On the other hand, some people we might want to describe as ‘deadbeat 
dads’ are not social parents who have abandoned their children. They are 
what Brake calls ‘reckless procreators’: men who do not take precaution 
against procreation, but do not subsequently take up the parenthood role. 
These deadbeat dads cannot be held to account qua parents on a 
voluntarist account, but the blameworthiness of their behaviour can be 
otherwise explained. This variety of deadbeat dad, according to Brake, 
has harmed the mother: ‘Pregnancy has life-altering, sometimes 
devastating, social, economic, and physical effects on women, and 
reckless male procreators may be rightly blamed for subjecting them to 
these’ (175). So, while reckless procreators have not failed in any 
parental obligation—since they have none—still they can be rightly 
criticised for harming the mothers of their children.4       
                                                
4 Brake also notes that ‘intuitions about “deadbeat dads” draw on cultural 
readiness to blame such men’, and draws comparison with what she calls 
‘the “altruistic stud”—a man who provides sperm to single women who 
want impregnation’ (175).  
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But, while this reply to the deadbeat dads worry can account for 
blameworthiness, it doesn’t seem to get the right sort of blame in. What 
seems blameworthy about the deadbeat dad’s behaviour is that he has 
harmed the child; not the child’s mother--though of course, he has 
probably done that also. And the intuition is that he owes the child (at 
least) rescue because he bears a unique relation to the child, and not 
simply because he is like anyone able to rescue.  
 
To describe the deadbeat dad as violating a general duty does not seem 
to capture the intuition about what is wrong with the abandonment. After 
all, doctors and nurses in hospital are probably in a better position to 
provide aid to the baby in the first instance, but we do not have the 
intuition that they must provide rescue.5 Indeed, if the baby is left in peril 
by all around her, we would attribute blame to the parents first, and not to 
the other persons within reach; so, the intuition is distinctly not one about 
general duties. An account that could preserve, specifically, this feature of 
the intuition ought to be preferred.  
 
                                                
5 Where ‘rescue’ means something financial, hospital staff may not be in 
a good position at all to aid. Surely they are not paid enough to support 
every baby that is born in their hospital. But then, the father may be of 
limited means himself. We have the intuition that he ought to make 
sacrifices nonetheless, where we have no such intuition about the 
nursery nurses who tend to the newborn.  
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Furthermore, in the absence of a motivation for picking out the biological 
father as being in a particular obligation-relation to the child, it is unclear 
why it would serve justice to assign legal parenthood to him, even given 
what justice demands for the mother. Why not tax all males of sexual 
maturity? Why not assign legal parenthood to the mother’s nearest male 
kin—brother or father, say?6 It seems unlikely that a purely practical 
reason for holding the father to account could justify compelling him to 
provide care if we cannot attribute moral parenthood to him.  
 
The problem with Brake’s reply to the deadbeat dads objection is just that 
voluntarism about parenthood is implausible. More broadly, the idea that 
morality cannot curtail our liberty without our consent is just implausible. 
The relationships we find ourselves in with other persons—whether we 
enter them purposively and voluntarily (as with friendships or promises), 
or simply find ourselves in them (as in familial relationships, or even as 
bystanders or neighbours or fellow citizens)— plainly do generate moral 
obligations. We do have special obligations that we do not choose, and 
this is borne out in a great many of our every-day moral intuitions.  
 
However, Brake is right that an insistence on the deadbeat dad’s having 
violated a special obligation to the child is question-begging in the 
absence of a plausible alternative account of such special obligation: after 
all, feckless procreators, anyway, are not social parents. In the next 
                                                
6 Of course, it seems like we want to justify the choice of the father as 
legal parent on grounds that he caused the child to come into being.  
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section, I’ll present David Archard’s causal account of parental obligation, 
and discuss how he addresses Brake’s worries about the socially-
constructed nature of parenthood. In section four, I’ll argue that a stronger 
version of Archard’s modification is more preferable, and discuss how 
that stronger modification will look. And in the final section of the paper, I 
will present an alternative to the ‘liability’ understanding of causal 
parenthood: a Kantian conceptualisation of causing to exist as morally 
meaningful ‘choosing for’.    
 
3. ‘Obligation’ and ‘Responsibility’ 
A causal account of parenthood meets the challenge of the deadbeat 
dads objection: it has teeth. Procreators can be held to account for not 
caring for their children. It is more flexible than a biological account, since 
non-genetic procreators can still be causes. It is a very promising 
account, indeed. However, a simple causal account is not without 
difficulties. As Brake points out, it is hard to make sense of a causal 
account in the face of the social-constructedness of parenthood. Social 
parenthood and moral parenthood don’t match up on a simple causal 
account in non-hetero/nuclear parenting cultures and families. Further, it 
is difficult to know what to say about gamete donors (amongst others) on 
a causal account. It seems like gamete donors are causes; but we tend to 
think that gamete donors do not have parental obligation. And if we 
include non-genetic procreators7 as causes, it is difficult to exclude others 
involved in the conception—IVF doctors, for example. (They are a 
                                                
7 Procreators who procreate using donated gametes.  
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particular worry when donated gametes are used, since the doctors are 
the ones who actually bring sperm and egg together.) However, contra 
Brake, these worries needn’t doom the causal account: they simply show 
that modification is needed. Archard’s account (2010) presents such 
modification.  
 
According to Archard, there is an important distinction to be made 
between ‘the obligation to ensure that someone acts as a parent to the 
child’ and ‘the responsibilities of acting as a parent’ (104). This distinction 
can make sense of the social-constructedness of parenthood.  
 
Causing a child to exist, on Archard’s terminology, generates parental 
‘obligation’: the duty to the child, to ensure its proper care. Being a parent 
generates parental ‘responsibility’: the duty to actively care for the child. 
Archard writes that  
!if someone does incur a parental obligation to make provision for 
a child they have caused to exist then he or she is not under a duty 
to provide that care themselves. !a simple causal theory of 
parental obligation is not defensible if it holds that causing a child to 
exist is sufficient to incur [parental responsibility]. (114)  
So, on Archard’s account, causing a child to exist does not make one a 
parent, and it does not generate parental responsibility—duties to 
(actively) care for the child. What it does is generate a duty to ensure that 
the child is well parented; and this duty can be discharged either by 
parenting, or by securing parents for the child other than oneself.  
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Making this distinction between obligation and responsibility answers 
Brake’s second objection to the causal account—the worry that causal 
accounts belie the social-constructedness of parenthood. If the claim is 
simply that causers are obliged (but not responsible), then we needn’t say 
that biological mother and father are the ones who must care for the child. 
Our account, then, is not heteronormative. Who takes on the role of 
parent can be decided (as it actually is) by custom and circumstance, and 
there is no judgment against non-hetero/nuclear family structures. 
Whoever takes on the role of parent has parental responsibility: has a 
duty to care for and love the child actively throughout its life. Those 
responsible for causing the child to exist simply have an obligation to see 
that someone parents the child well.  
 
The amendment addresses worries over gamete donation and assisted 
reproduction as well. Gamete donors, etc., if they are causes, will be 
obliged to ensure that the child is cared for, but will not have a duty to 
care for the child themselves—will not be parents. So, the amendment 
neutralises Brake’s social-construction objection to a causal account. 
And, since a causal account can better meet the ‘deadbeat dads’ 
challenge, we ought to prefer the amended causal account.  
 
However, there are still adjustments that need to be made to the causal 
account in order for it to both live up to its potential as a toothy theory of 
parenthood, and still dissolve Brake’s worries. First, I will argue that in 
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order to retain the prima facie strength of the causal account, causally-
generated ‘obligation’ (in Archard’s terminology) must imply a pro tanto 
duty to parent. Second, I will argue that Archard’s account should be 
modified to take account of the full conceptual and moral distinctness of 
the roles of causer of a new person, on the one hand; and parent of that 
person, on the other. I will present these arguments in the next section.  
 
Finally, Archard’s amended account does not speak to Brake’s first worry 
over libellous causing: his account is agnostic with respect to how we 
characterise the connection between causing someone to exist and being 
obliged to them, neither accepting nor rejecting Brake’s libellous causing 
account. In the final section of the paper, I will present an alternative 
account of how causing obliges, based on Kant’s characterisation of 
parental obligation. On this alternative account, one is obliged through 
causing, not because the causing was libellous, but because the causing 
was an act of choosing for. On this account, the connection between 
causing and being obliged is simply that making choices on behalf of 
others obliges one to make it such that one has chosen well.    
 
4. A Stronger Modification to the Causal Account  
Archard’s modified causal account of parenthood gets round Brake’s 
worry about the social construction of parenthood. However, separating 
out parental obligation and parental responsibility might unacceptably 
weaken the causal account. The best reason to prefer a causal account, 
again, is that it has teeth: it can hold negligent parents to account. But if 
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parental obligation is too weak; and if the connection between obligation 
and responsibility is too tentative, it seems the causal account may lose 
those teeth.  
 
In particular, it seems like we want to say that children have a right to be 
cared for. And it seems that, in order for saying so to mean anything, we 
need to say that children have this right against someone. That is, there 
needs to be some particular person (or persons) from whom the child has 
a right to care.8 If the causal account can provide no such person, then its 
strength is significantly diminished. On Archard’s modified account, it 
seems like there is no such person. The people who caused the child to 
exist do not have a duty to care for the child; only to see that someone 
does.  
 
                                                
8 Even if, as Brake’s account appears to suppose, our obligations to our 
children outstrip their rights against us, it is still the case that they have 
rights against us if and only if we have at least corresponding obligations 
towards them. It is implausible to suppose that we all have, say, some 
general duty of parent, such that children might have a right against 
society to be parented by whoever is in a position to do so. So, if we 
cannot say that some particular person has an obligation to parent a 
child, it seems that we cannot say that the child has a right to be 
parented. For discussion of how children’s rights match up with our 
obligations towards children, see O’Neill (1988).  
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We might want to say that having a duty to see that someone cares for 
the child can adequately motivate a rights claim on behalf of the child. We 
might say that the child’s right is that she be parented; and the causer’s 
obligation is to make it the case that she be parented. But on inspection, 
it is not so simple as this. According to Archard, parental obligation (the 
duty to make it the case that the child is parented), is fully separable from 
parental responsibility (the duty to care for the child). In the usual run of 
things, the child’s right to be cared for or parented is met, and there is no 
worry over who the right is against. But one must simply imagine a 
situation in which no one, including the causal parent, wants to parent a 
given child in order to see the problem.  
 
If the birth parent tries his best to find a parent for the child, but, because 
no one (including himself) is willing to volunteer, fails to find one, the 
causal parent seems to have fulfilled his duty on Archard’s account—or 
anyway, the child has no strong claim against him. The causal parent has 
tried his best; no one is willing; and since the causal parent has 
obligation, but not responsibility, there is no reason to say that the causal 
parent, more so than anyone else, ought to care for the child if unwilling. 
And yet as we have said, the child’s right to be cared for will have been 
violated. This shows that on Archard’s account there is an asymmetry 
between the causal parent’s obligation, and the child’s right. That is, the 
child’s right can’t be paired with the causal parent’s obligation. The right 
cannot be against the birth parent on this account. It is unclear, then, 
against whom we can say the child has a claim.  
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We might think to say that the child’s right is against the (social) parent if 
and when one is acquired. But then, in a case where no willing parent is 
found we would be forced to say that the child has no right to be cared 
for. Surely, if any child has a right to be cared for, all children do, 
regardless of who is keen to parent them. So, if parental obligation is 
simply the duty to make sure someone cares for the child, and does not 
imply a duty to do the caring, we’ll have to say that children do not have a 
right to be cared for. And this seems wrong.  
 
In order for a modified causal account to retain the plausibility and 
theoretical strength that makes a causal account attractive in the first 
place, it appears that the connection between obligation and 
responsibility needs to be stronger. In particular, we need to say that 
causing a child to exist generates a pro tanto duty to parent. Parental 
obligation, then, will be to make it the case that the child is cared for, and 
this will imply a pro tanto duty to do the caring oneself.  
 
On such an additionally-modified causal account, the child’s primary right 
to be cared for will be against those people who caused her existence.9 If 
the right is met by others, then the right is met. If no other parents are 
available to the child, the causal parents are obliged to parent. However, 
if the right is not met—if the child is not cared for by anyone—then even if 
                                                
9 The child will also presumably have rights against the social parents, if 
they are different to the causal parents.  
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the causal parent and the social parent are different people, the child will 
still have a claim against the causal parents, since regardless of what 
duties the social parents have in virtue of taking up the role, the child has 
a right against the causal parents.    
 
This strengthened causal account may seem to lose the advantage 
meant to be gained by Archard’s modification. It may seem to lose 
plausibility with respect to gamete donors, etc. If the child has a right 
against the causal parent, then it seems that children created with the use 
of donated gametes will have care rights against their willing biological 
progenitors: against the sperm or egg donor(s). After all, the donation of 
the gamete, when a donated gamete is used, is a crucial component in 
the causal chain that brought the child into being. It would seem, then, 
that gamete donors are moral parents. And this may seem too big a bullet 
to bite. However, upon inspection it will be found to be a small, and even 
intuitive bullet. A modification to the terminology brings this out.  
 
Rather than attributing ‘parental obligation’ to ‘causal parents’, and 
‘parental responsibility’ to ‘social parents’, we ought instead to say that 
‘Makers’ (ie, those who caused the child to exist) have ‘Maker obligation’ 
towards the child, whereas ‘Parents’ have ‘Parental obligation’ (or 
‘parental responsibility’) towards the child. In other words, we ought to 
use language that makes explicit the difference between someone who 
causes a child to exist, and someone who is a parent. These two moral 
roles are distinct, and saliently morally different.  
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In these terms, the implications for gamete donors are more palatable. 
Gamete donors are categorically not parents. But they are makers. The 
child created with their gamete has a right against them. Though gamete 
donors have a pro tanto obligation to parent the child in virtue of having 
caused the child to exist, this obligation will be, under normal 
circumstance of gamete donation, outdone by the rights and 
commitments of the gamete recipients. That the recipients of the donated 
gametes have instigated the creation of the child with the express 
intention of parenting it, coupled with the Maker obligation of those 
recipients, will mean that the gamete recipients are more strongly obliged 
(much more strongly, one suspects) to parent the child; and even, much 
more strongly obliged to ensure that the child is parented. However, it will 
still be the case that if the child who is created is not cared for, and her 
rights are violated, then the gamete donor’s having brought about this 
state of affairs will be a rights violation: she or he will have failed in 
his/her obligation to the child. Gamete donors, then, will not count as 
parents on this account; but they will, along with the gamete recipients 
(and indeed perhaps the IVF doctors who have conceived the embryo) 
count as ‘makers’, and will have ‘maker obligation’.   
 
In some sense, this modification to Archard’s proposal is simply 
linguistic—‘maker’ and ‘parental’ obligation rather than ‘parental 
obligation’ and ‘parental responsibility’. But in another sense, it is 
substantive: if we conceptualise the obligations as attaching to two 
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distinct moral roles, we both dissolve Brake’s worry over the social 
constructedness of parenthood, and retain both the moral-revisionary 
strength and intuitive plausibility of the causal account. We can say that 
causing generates an obligation to the child and that children have a right 
to be parented and that not all causers are parents.  
 
5. Causing as Choosing For 
I have argued that a modified causal account of parental obligation, on 
which ‘makers’ have a duty to ensure the care of the child they cause to 
exist, and a pro tanto obligation to parent the child, can meet the 
challenge set by Brake’s social-construction objection to causal accounts, 
while still retaining the core attractiveness of a causal account. However, 
there remains a worry over how causing someone to exist can generate 
care obligations towards them.  
 
Brake’s claim is that Parental obligation cannot be construed as 
rectificatory, and thus the moral link between causing and being obliged 
is mysterious. In this section I will argue that the rectificatory conception 
of causal obligation is not the appropriate way to conceive of the 
connection between causing and being obliged. Rather, the obligation 
should be understood as moral constraints on making choices on others’ 
behalf. I will first look at another instance of choosing for, in order to 
better pinpoint the concept and draw analogy. Then, I will discuss Kant’s 
reflections on parental obligation as a formal invocation of this choosing 
for conception of causal obligation.  
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Choosing For 
Imagine that Susan and I are dining in a restaurant, in advance of an 
important train journey. We have very little time, and will need to order 
straight away if we are to eat before it is time to go. While we wait for the 
waiter to arrive to take our order, Susan receives an urgent telephone call 
on her mobile. She excuses herself from the table. Predictably, the waiter 
appears to take our order just after Susan has gone. Since we are in a 
hurry, such that Susan will otherwise have no chance of eating, I decide 
to order a meal for Susan. She has not told me what she would like to 
eat. However, I do my best to make a good guess at what she would like.  
 
When I order for Susan, I am choosing for her. In some sense, I am 
taking the decision away from her; but in the circumstances, this is 
probably not the right way to think of what I am doing. I am not acting 
paternalistically. I am not making the judgment that Susan is unfit to 
choose for herself. I am not choosing for Susan when I know that she 
would rather choose for herself. There simply is no opportunity for Susan 
to make the choice herself. So, it seems likely that my choosing for her is 
permissible.  
 
However, what is important to notice is that how I choose for her will 
make the difference to whether my choosing for her is permissible. For 
example, if I know that Susan is allergic to shellfish, ordering the lobster 
is impermissible; if I know that she is a vegetarian, ordering the foie gras 
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is impermissible. My choosing for Susan is permissible if I do it right. That 
is, if I do my best to choose well for her. More generally, choosing for, 
under the right circumstances, is permissible only if the chooser does her 
best to choose well.   
 
In most cases, choosing for others when one hasn’t been asked to do so 
is at best not very nice, and at worst impermissibly paternalistic. For 
example, if Susan were sitting at the table when the waiter arrived, and I 
decide to choose for her despite her wishes, this would be wrong. 
Likewise, if Susan had simply walked a few feet away from the table to 
admire the artwork on the wall, choosing for her, rather than calling her 
back to the table to order for herself would be impermissible. But given 
that there is no opportunity for Susan to choose for herself, and given that 
she will not otherwise eat, choosing well for her—or anyway, doing my 
best to choose well for her—is permissible.  
 
My claim is that causing existence is an instance of (potentially morally 
permissible) choosing for. When I make it the case that someone comes 
into existence, I am choosing existence for them. Because there is no 
opportunity for a non-existent person to make her own choice, we can 
assume that this choosing for is, like choosing food for Susan, 
permissible if I do my best to choose well. In the restaurant example, 
choosing well begins and ends at the choosing. But in the case of 
causing someone to exit, whether the choice was a good one or not 
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depends on my on-going actions; it depends on what I do to make that 
chosen existence a good one once it is underway.   
 
Whether someone has a good existence or not is, as Brake points out, 
heavily dependent upon circumstances out of the control of the chooser. 
So in that sense, the causal parent cannot singly make it the case that 
the choice was a good one. But likewise, in the case of the restaurant 
chooser, whether the meal is good depends heavily on what happens in 
the kitchen. Still, the restaurant chooser is obliged to do her best insofar 
as her actions can make the choice good—and so is the causal parent 
(the maker), because choosing for someone obliges one thusly. There is 
nothing rectificatory in it; it is just what morally permissible choosing for 
requires.  
 
Kant’s causal account of parental obligation seems to rest on just such an 
understanding of causal obligation. In the Metaphysics of Morals, he 
writes that  
 
! it is a quite correct and even necessary Idea to regard the act of 
procreation as one by which we have brought a person into the 
world without his consent and on our own initiative, for which deed 
the parents incur an obligation to make the child content with his 
condition so far as they can. (§28)  
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So, what is key, then, is not that one has caused harm, or that one has 
caused the potential for harm; but rather, that one has acted without the 
child’s consent. The makers of the child choose, for the child, that it 
exists. And this obliges them to make existence, as best they can, a good 
choice.   
 
Summary  
We ought to prefer a causal account of parental obligation—but we must 
do it in the right way. Causal accounts are strong accounts: on the 
appropriate conceptualisation of causing existence (choosing for), the 
moral force of causing is clear, easily understood, and generalizable; 
choosing for generates obligation. However, simple a causal account 
seems to be tethered to contingent social facts. It cannot account for the 
moral role of gamete donors; for biological parents who are not taken to 
be parents in their ‘home’ societies; for non-hetero-nuclear families; and 
so on.  
 
On the correct account of parental obligation, I have argued, causing a 
child to exist generates maker obligation, and does so because causing a 
child to exist is an instance of morally weighty choosing for. Maker 
obligation is the obligation to do one’s best to make the child’s existence 
a good one, and implies a pro tanto obligation to take on the role of 
parent. Parents, on this account, have parental obligation: the duty to 
actively care for the child. Parental obligation is fulfilled by adequately 
parenting the child. Maker obligation is fulfilled by making it the case that 
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the child is adequately parented, either by so parenting, or by securing 
parents for the child. This account, then, retains the strength and 
plausibility of the simple causal account, while dissolving Brake’s reasons 
for rejecting such an account.       
 
In the next chapter, I will expand on the ideas I have developed in this 
chapter. I will explore what this ‘bifurcated’ causal account of parental 
obligation implies about adoption, and how this bears on the abortion 
debate. Along the way, I will discuss how we ought to understand the 
metaphysical concept of a cause in this context.  
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Chapter Five 
ADOPTION IS NOT ABORTION-LITE 
Introduction*  
Understood as a substantive claim about procreative options, the claim 
“she could give the baby up for adoption instead” is false in virtually all 
contexts.1 That is, the claim that adoption is a suitable alternative to 
abortion—one that does what one primarily seeks to do in aborting—is 
false, and not (simply) because one continues to be pregnant. “She could 
give the baby up for adoption instead” is false even setting aside the 
physicality of pregnancy.  Adoption simply cannot function as a stand-in 
for abortion.  
 
On the most plausible account of parental obligation—what I’ll call a 
bifurcated causal account of parental obligation—parental responsibility 
cannot be avoided by giving a child up for adoption. Because of this, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*A version of this chapter appears in the Journal of Applied Philosophy 
(2012) vol. 29, iss. 1, pp. 63-78, under the same title.  
1 For example, Hursthouse (1987) writes that “For if what she wants is not 
to increase her family!then those wants could be satisfied by continuing 
with the pregnancy and having the baby adopted” (210); and later 
“Nevertheless, there may be something selfish and self-indulgent in 
taking abortion as the easy way out of avoiding either the guilt of adoption 
or the responsibility of bringing up the child oneself. It may also be simply 
thoughtless—if the woman does not even get round to considering 
adoption as a possibility—or cowardly.” (212) 
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claim that adoption is always available as a remedy to parenthood, thus 
focusing the abortion debate on the physicality of pregnancy and 
presenting abortion as the morally-murkier of two options, is a false one. 
Put simply, there is no way other than abortion to have an abortion.  
 
In this chapter, I begin by discussing the three most plausible varieties of 
account of parental obligation: biological accounts; consent accounts; and 
causal accounts. I will argue that a causal account is the most successful 
of the three. Causal accounts suffer various weaknesses that can be 
remedied by amending them to reflect the bifurcated nature of 
parenthood: a birth parent who raises her own child is both a carer, and a 
progenitor. These two roles are separable, and each is morally salient. 
Because in giving a child up for adoption one ceases to be the child’s 
carer but does not cease to be the child’s progenitor; and because 
causing a child to exist generates obligation towards that child; birth 
parents are, in an important sense, always parents come what may. This 
is not a defence of abortion, but a clarification of one step routinely made 
in both defences of and arguments against the permissibility of abortion.  
 
1. What Grounds Parenthood?  
I will speak about parental obligation as a role obligation. Role obligations 
are moral obligations that attach to individuals indirectly: they attach 
directly to roles, and indirectly to whatever individuals fulfil those roles. If 
! is a role obligation, then I am obliged to ! in virtue of being in some role 
R. It is then, in some easy sense, not I who am obliged to !, but the R, 
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whoever she or he may be. Only in virtue of being the R do I thereby 
have (or acquire) an obligation to !.  
 
When we talk about parental obligations as role obligations, we mean 
simply that they are those obligations that attach to the role of parent2, 
and the person who has parental obligations is the relevant role-filler. 
This means, then, that what we want from a theory of parenthood, 
broadly speaking, is a way of knowing who fulfils the role ‘Parent’. The 
practical importance of getting this account right is that it will tell us (a) 
who has parental obligations towards a given child; and (b) who has 
parental rights with respect to a given child.  
 
For the purpose of this essay, parental obligations are the main concern, 
though many philosophers have focused on answering the question of 
who fills this role with an eye to grounding parental rights. The focus 
makes a difference: if one is concerned with obligations, more so than 
with rights, various theories of parenthood show themselves to be 
implausible from the outset. For example, some philosophers have 
argued for proprietary theories of parenthood, attempting to ground the 
claim that I am the parent by arguing for my ownership of the child—
maybe a la Locke, appealing to the labour I put into producing the child; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 N.B. my assumption is that ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ are not distinct roles, 
just gendered ways of calling the role Parent. 
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or a la Thomson, appealing to my ownership of my body, and thereby of 
my genes and genetic products.3  
 
A proprietary theory of parenthood might succeed in explaining parental 
rights. After all, to own a thing is just to have a unique and robust right to 
it. But it’s clear that such an account will do little to explain parental 
obligation: if I own my car, it’s clearer that I have a right to cut it in half 
than that I have an obligation to care for it. Michael Austin gives a 
thorough discussion of these sorts of accounts in his Conceptions of 
Parenthood, and points out, additionally, that children are probably not 
the sorts of entities that can be owned.4 I don’t find his argument for the 
moral status of babies particularly compelling; but it seems quite obvious 
that persons can’t be owned, and usually, babies turn into persons—and 
persons with parents, at that. So, even if babies can be owned, children 
probably can’t be. But again, if they could, this still wouldn’t tell us why we 
have to care for them.  
 
With the focus squarely on grounding parental obligations, three basic 
sorts of accounts stand out as plausible: biological accounts, consent 
accounts, and causal accounts. Biological accounts are simply those !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, tells us that one’s child is ‘one’s 
own!like a part of one’s self’ (like one’s wife and one’s chattels); book V, 
1134b. See Narveson (1988); or Gheaus (2011) for a labour-based 
proprietary account. See Page (1984) for a biological-proprietary account.  
4 Austin (2007)  
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accounts that ground parenthood in biology: the parents are the ones 
who share the DNA with the child. As was said earlier, one variant of a 
biological account is a proprietary biological account: I am the parent 
because I own the child because he is made with my DNA and I own my 
DNA. This sort of account has already been shown to be implausible. But 
a biological account needn’t be proprietary. One could simply say that the 
parent-child relationship just is a biological one, and that in virtue of that 
biological connectedness, people who stand in such a relation are obliged 
and have rights.  
 
The account is intuitively plausible, since the biological connection is 
concrete, testable, and unique. But of course, many parents are not the 
progenitors of their children. A theory of parenthood that fundamentally 
excludes non-genetic parents is simply unacceptable. Further, it’s not 
clear why a biological fact should imply a moral one; how a chemical 
configuration could generate an ethical obligation. Maybe it could, but lots 
more would need to be said. Michael Austin points out, for example, that 
if the genetic kinship between parent and child is what generates parental 
obligations, then twins ought to be each other’s parents, since their 
genetic kinship is even stronger than that between genetic parent and 
child. Biology, then, seems an implausible way to ground parenthood. 
 
According to a voluntarist or consent account, one takes on the role of 
Parent by consenting to do so. Once one has taken up the role, one is 
thereby obliged to care for the child. This sort of account has the 
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advantage of being able to explain non-biological parents’ obligations. 
More importantly, it actually works as a grounding for obligations: in 
general, consenting to take up a set of duties obliges you. There is 
nothing mysterious about the connection between the theory of 
parenthood, on the one hand, and parental obligation, on the other. Judith 
Thomson gives just such an account in her famous defence of abortion:  
 
Surely we do not have any such "special responsibility" for a 
person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly. If a 
set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an 
abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it 
out for adoption, but rather take it home with them, then they 
have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and 
they cannot now withdraw support from it at the cost of its life 
because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it.5   
 
On Thomson’s account, tacit consent is sufficient. One consents to 
Parent, in some sense, simply by parenting. The grounds on which we 
can claim that Parents are obliged to care, then, are readily apparent. 
They are obliged to care because they have agreed to do so. However, 
consent accounts are not trouble-free. In particular, one of the most 
important practical applications of a theory of parenthood is that it gives 
teeth to claims of parental wrongdoing. It should, exactly, hold to account 
the reluctant parent—so-called ‘dead-beat dads’, for example.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Thomson (1971): 65.  
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Elizabeth Brake argues compellingly, and I think rightly, that if consent 
grounds parental obligation, then unintentional fathers have no parental 
obligation.6 Brake accepts, and indeed argues for the claim that consent 
grounds parental obligation—because she takes the consent account of 
Parenthood as the grounding for a woman’s right to decline to gestate—
and takes it as proof for the claim that unintentional fathers have no 
parental obligation.  
 
Brake is arguing that unintentional fathers ought not be compelled to do 
things like pay child support. Her argument is simple and valid. She 
appeals to what is sometimes called the parity principle: ‘that being a 
father does not make an individual more of a parent than being a mother, 
and vice versa’.7 Applying this principle, Brake concludes that if women 
can choose (where women’s choice is grounded in consent), men can 
too. But looking at Brake’s argument outside of the context of the abortion 
debate (and in particular, outside the context of a Thomson-style defence 
of abortion), her argument is a neat reductio of consent accounts of 
parenthood: any account of parenthood that fails to generate a claim of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Brake (2005)   
7 Austin (2007): 24. For an account amenable to the suggestion that 
gestation is primary (and thus, dismissive of the parity principle) see, for 
example, Gheaus (2011), or Wieland (2011).  
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Parental  obligation for absent fathers is not an account we ought to 
accept.8  
 
This leaves us with a causal account. On a causal account, one occupies 
the role of parent in virtue of having caused the child in question to exist. 
This appears to have been Kant’s favoured theory of parenthood.  
 
So from a practical point of view it is a quite correct and even 
necessary idea to regard the act of procreation as one by which we 
have brought a person into the world without his consent and on our 
own initiative, for which deed the parents incur an obligation to make 
the child content with his condition so far as they can.9  
 
There is a worry regarding the exact sort of causation this kind of account 
needs,10 and I’ll address that worry briefly in the next section. But put !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8Brake is exactly right that trying to salvage the consent view by appeal to 
something like tacit consent ‘makes a mockery of the notion of consent’: I 
no more consent to procreation in consenting to sex than I consent to 
being knocked down by a bus in consenting to cross the road (60). 
Consent seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for parenthood. It is 
not necessary, because clearly there are some parents who didn’t choose 
to be so. It is not sufficient, because simply consenting to parent some 
child does not, on its own, make you that child’s parent.  
9 Kant (1991): §28.  
10 See, for example, Blustein (1997); or Nelson (1991). 
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simply, the idea is that a parent is someone who causes a new person to 
exist. The explanation for parental obligation, then, is just that the parent 
is the source of this child’s vulnerability, insofar as, had it not been for the 
parent’s actions, the child would not exist, and would therefore not be 
susceptible to harm.11 A causal account has the excellent advantage of 
being a coherent account of obligation: it’s a bit like ordinary liability; it fits 
with many other every-day intuitions we have about obligation and 
responsibility.  
 
Further, with its built-in emphasis on parental obligation, rather than 
rights, it gets us well out of the range of proprietary accounts. Children 
are certainly not, on this view, things that we own. Finally, causal 
accounts are more inclusive than biological accounts. Lots of people who 
we take to be parents, but who are not genetic parents, will count. For !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 This relies crucially on the intuition that things that don’t exist cannot be 
harmed.  
In addition, I should point out that many philosophers put great emphasis 
on the fact that the being who is brought into existence is brought into 
existence ‘vulnerable’. This opens up conceptual space for the claim that, 
even if I am responsible for the existence of a child, I am not thereby 
responsible for its being vulnerable, and so have no duty, outside of what 
I consent to, to attend to its vulnerability. But humans—especially 
children—just are vulnerable creatures. You can’t make a human without 
making a vulnerable creature, just like you can’t make a chair without 
making a piece of furniture.  
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example, fathers who have children via sperm donation will be causes of 
their children’s existence, and so will be parents on this view.12 And 
furthering both the inclusivity and explanatory power of the account, 
causal accounts cast unwitting and unwilling parents as parents.  
 
Causal theories of parenthood are not, however, perfect. In section III, I’ll 
be arguing for a bifurcated causal account to deal with some of its more 
worrying imperfections. First, adoptive parents do not cause their children 
to exist, yet still seem to be parents with parental obligations. Second, 
while I’ve just mentioned causal theories’ inclusivity as a virtue, it may 
also be a vice: what about the doctor who provides IVF treatment? She 
seems to have caused a person to exist; is she the IVF baby’s parent? 
This seems wrong. Below, and further in section V, I will discuss the 
worry at the centre of Brake’s (and Thomson’s) rejection of a causal 
account: that a causal account implies a duty to gestate. In section V, I 
will argue that this implication is only apparent, and depends on other 
judgments that remain up for grabs in the theory.13      
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 A causal account will also include birth mothers who are not genetic 
progenitors (i.e., mothers who have babies via egg donation). 
Confusingly, some ‘biological’ accounts do not include these mothers, 
though they are clearly biological mothers.  
13 Judgments about the moral status of the fetus; judgments about 
who/what can be harmed by death; judgments about what sorts of lives 
are unfortunate. 
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Brake raises two further worries about causal theories that seem worth 
exploring before going on to talk about my bifurcated causal account. 
First, she worries that causal accounts conflate causal responsibility with 
moral responsibility.14 She worries that standard examples of moral 
responsibility usually involve someone doing something they oughtn’t, or 
not doing something that they ought to have done. She gives the example 
of not shovelling the snow from the footpath in front of my house, such 
that you, innocent pedestrian, fall down on my property and injure 
yourself. In this case, Brake reckons, I am responsible for your injury 
because I failed to do something I ought (shovel the snow); there was 
something morally amiss with the behaviour that constituted the causing. 
If there had been a blizzard, and I was totally unable to keep the footpath 
clear, Brake reckons, we would not say that I was morally responsible for 
your injury. Likewise, the worry goes, since I have done nothing wrong in 
having sex (or otherwise procreating) it is unclear in what sense I am 
morally responsible for my child’s suffering, if he suffers. 
 
JL Nelson defends a causal theory of parenthood. Responding to a worry 
like Brake’s, he writes that  
 
A prudent driver who, despite due care, strikes a pedestrian bears 
some special responsibility for doing what can be done to succour 
the accident victim; saying “but I was extremely careful” may 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14(2005): 59-60. 
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reduce or even eliminate our tendency to blame the driver, but the 
responsibility to help out remains.15 
 
Bernard Williams, in ‘Moral Luck’, discussing a nearly identical example, 
writes that  
 
we feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists with, indeed 
presupposes, that there is something special about his relation to 
this happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated by 
the consideration that it was not his fault.16  
 
In Brake’s worry and Nelson’s reply, the conceptual divide between 
blameworthiness and responsibility becomes salient. The careful driver is 
to blame for the pedestrian’s predicament in a way that the blizzard-
bound homeowner is not: in no sense is the blizzard-bound homeowner 
responsible for a blizzard; the driver, on the other hand, might’ve stayed 
home. Like the driver, and unlike the homeowner, it may be quite right 
that the unwitting parent is not to blame for the child’s vulnerability, such 
that moral condemnation would be appropriate, but it is still the case that 
he or she is responsible for that vulnerability in a way that obliges.  
 
Further, as Kant pointed out, the child—like the pedestrian in both of 
these examples—is not a consenting party to the event. This is not a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 (1991): 55. 
16 Williams (1981) 
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throw-away fact: when we take decisions on behalf of others, and 
especially when we do not or can not even consider what decision would 
be consistent with their preferences, it means something, morally 
speaking. It commits us to actively working towards a situation in which 
the decision was in the interest of the person for whom we made it. In the 
case of bringing children into existence, this point is especially important, 
since, when we bring a child into existence, we don’t simply choose some 
sort of life or other for her; we choose the very fact of her. Our choice, on 
behalf of the child, is global in a way that no other choice can be.  
 
Brake’s second worry is about foetuses: it seems as though causal 
accounts of parental obligation imply that pregnant women have a duty to 
gestate. Since the woman is responsible for the foetus’s existence, and 
since without gestation the foetus will die, it appears that the causally-
responsible pregnant woman must gestate—that is, must not have an 
abortion. As has been mentioned, a duty to gestate does not, in fact, 
follow from a causal account of parenthood (and I’ll defend this claim in 
section 5). But it’s easy to see how one might take it to. Given, then, that 
we want to reject a duty to gestate, it seems that we must likewise reject 
the causal account.  
 
If we reject a causal account in favour of a consent account, then the 
standard moral picture of adoption emerges: when a parent gives her 
child up for adoption, she ceases to be its parent, and thus ceases to 
have parental obligation. As Brake rightly notes, birth mothers may 
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choose to give their babies up for adoption, but unwilling fathers, on the 
other hand, cannot do so. That is, it appears that mothers, but not fathers, 
are consensual parents. And this seems wrong. Brake then presents us 
with what is surely a true biconditional: female progenitors can decline to 
care for their offspring iff male progenitors can decline to care for their 
offspring. From this, Brake concludes that fathers can decline.  
 
In the next section, I’ll briefly take a closer look at causation. After that, I 
will explain my bifurcated causal account of parental obligation, and on 
grounds of it, claim that neither mothers nor fathers can decline to be 
obliged to their offspring.17 Since a causal account does not imply a duty 
to gestate, there is no reason to accept the counterintuitive proposal that 
unwitting fathers have no obligation towards their offspring; and strong 
reason to accept the claim that birth mothers cannot decline to be obliged 
to their offspring.   
 
 
2. What sort of causation? 
Of the three general forms that a theory of parenthood could take, a 
causal theory seems to do the best job of explaining parental obligation, 
and of gelling with our intuitions about who is and isn’t a parent; and has 
the most potential as a driver of moral progress. However, there are still !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 I am, of course, using ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’ very loosely here. I ought 
to say ‘female progenitors’ and ‘male progenitors’, or possibly ‘birth 
mothers’ and ‘birth fathers’.  
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problems with such an account. In particular, it seems to imply that 
adoptive parents aren’t parents (since they don’t cause their children to 
exist); and it seems to imply that other people—for example, IVF doctors, 
gamete donors, maybe parents’ matchmakers, etc.—are parents (since 
they do seem to play a causal role in the child’s coming into existence). 
So, we might say more generally that there’s an issue with the causal 
account’s permissiveness. Specifying what sort of causation we have in 
mind will get us part of the way towards dealing with this issue; bifurcation 
will do the rest.  
 
In ‘Procreation and Parental Responsibility’, Jeffry Blustein worries that 
picking out the wrong sort of causation will result in a ‘tremendous 
proliferation in the number of persons who could be considered the child’s 
“parents”.’18 He notes that there seem to be at least two things we might 
mean when we talk about something’s being a cause: Lewisian-style 
counterfactual causation, and so-called INUS causation (Insufficient 
Necessary link in an Unnecessary Sufficient causal chain). 19 It’s not clear 
that either of these gets it just right; and I take it there are other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Blustein (1997): 82.  
19 Blustein actually looks at three sorts of causation: counterfactual, 
INUS, and ‘proximate cause’. But listing proximate cause as a third sort of 
cause seems mistaken to me: surely this whole exercise of finding the 
right sort of causation just is an exercise in sorting out what we take to be 
the proximate cause. The term ‘INUS’, as well as the standard 
formulation, comes from Mackie (1965). 
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conceptions of what it is to be a cause out there. But as a first step, we 
can say that what we want is more like an INUS condition than a 
counterfactual cause. 
 
On David Lewis’s account of counterfactual (or ‘but for’) causation—and I 
take his to be the standard—an event c caused event e iff for any 
possible world in which c and not e, there is some closer possible world in 
which c and e.20 It’s difficult to know what this sort of account would mean 
for a causal account of parental responsibility.  But on the face of it, rather 
than being too permissive, it will probably be too restrictive. Most acts 
conducive to bringing a sperm and an egg together do not result in the 
existence of a new person. So, for any individual, there are close possible 
worlds in which their parents, if you will, did what they did, and the 
individual does not exist. Their having done it, then, won’t count as a 
counterfactual cause of the child’s coming into existence. So, if 
counterfactual causation were the grounding for parenthood, it could 
mean that, for most of us, we’re wrong about who our parents are. 
Perhaps gestational mothers would be parents: after all, most foetuses 
(these days, anyway) who are gestated go on to become persons—so, 
most acts of gestation do result in a new person’s coming into existence. 
But this is obviously not enough. 21 As a very minimal requirement, we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Lewis (1973). Lewis’s account is more complex than I have presented 
it, but not in ways that bear essentially on the present topic.  
21 Blustein actually looks at three sorts of causation: counterfactual, 
INUS, and ‘proximate cause’. But listing proximate cause as a third sort of 
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need our theory to pick out fathers as parents.22 As Bayne and Kolers 
point out, ‘it seems that including the gestational and genetic parents is a 
litmus test of any account of the right sort of causal linkage.’23 So 
counterfactual causation might not bring about a tremendous proliferation 
of parents, but it seems to go too far in the opposite direction. 
   
INUS conditions are more promising. Something’s being an INUS 
condition for some event E means that that event was a necessary part of 
the conditions that in fact occurred, and that are jointly sufficient for E. So 
for example, lightning may be the cause of the house’s catching fire, even 
though the house might’ve caught fire elsewise, or might not have caught 
fire if other facts were different, because, given how things actually 
went—the lightning struck the areal just so, the timber frame was very 
dry, etc.—the lightning was a necessary link in the actual, sufficient chain 
of events.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
cause seems mistaken to me: surely this whole exercise of finding the 
right sort of causation just is an exercise in sorting out what we take to be 
the proximate cause.  
22 See, for example, Austin (2007): 24. Austin calls this ‘the parity 
principle’: ‘that being a father does not make an individual more of a 
parent than being a mother, and vice versa’.  For an account amenable to 
the suggestion that gestation is primary (and thus, dismissive of the parity 
principle) see, for example, Gheaus (2011). 
23 Bayne and Kolers (2003) 
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To begin, every necessary condition is going to count as an INUS 
condition, because if it happens in every possible world in which E, then 
it’s a constituent in every set of conditions sufficient for E. (Mackie tells us 
that ‘A caused B’ means, then, that A is at least an INUS condition for B. 
(247)) So, in the usual circumstance, birth mother and father are going to 
count as causes, since mother and father are what made this egg meet 
with this sperm, and that’s having been the case is indeed a necessary 
condition. In addition, if anyone else should happen to have brought this 
sperm together with this egg—say someone steals gametes and makes a 
baby—they will also count, as their actions are at least INUS conditions. 
But further, if, say, the particular relevant embryo is such that it couldn’t 
have survived without a particular sort of medical treatment, and some 
doctor provides this, then the doctor’s actions will be INUS conditions. 
And even, if I introduce two friends, and they procreate together, it seems 
like I might be a parent to their baby, since my having introduced the 
parents will, it seems, be an INUS condition on the child’s having come to 
be.  
 
But INUS—as Mackie formulated it—is not quite so permissive as it may 
at first appear. Mackie specified that the sufficient sets must be ‘minimal 
specifications’. That is, they must specify all and only those events that 
need to be specified in order for the outcome to be implied by the set.24 In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The permissiveness worry was voiced about Mackie’s conception of 
causation more broadly in Denise (1984). Denise worried that, according 
to Mackie’s formalisation of INUS, irrelevant background facts would 
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order to articulate the set that leads to the birth of a baby, we normally 
don’t have to say more than what their parents did after they met. That is, 
their making a baby entails their having met somehow or other; so we 
needn’t specify anything about how that meeting happened. The minimal 
set, in standard cases of procreation, will probably only contain the fact 
that this egg fused with this sperm and was gestated (since all the details 
about how exactly it happened will be, themselves, unnecessary; only the 
fact that it did happen somehow will be necessary in order to imply that 
this baby came to be). So we can, anyway, rule out matchmakers; 
likewise, midwives who deliver babies, doctors who care for pregnant 
women, and so on. INUS, then, will pick out biological parents as causes; 
it will also pick out anyone else whose actions are such that they will be 
included in a minimal specification for the child’s having come into 
existence: IVF doctors, for example, as well as gamete donors. In section 
V, I’ll discuss how a bifurcated causal account can render these sorts of 
inclusions intuitively acceptable.  
 
3. A Bifurcated Causal Account 
INUS conditions are still too permissive. In particular, gamete donors 
seem to count as parents, if INUS is what we mean by ‘cause’, since their 
having provided the genetic material used in the conception of the 
embryo counts as a cause of the child’s coming to exist. INUS—and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
count as causes. For a reply to the worry (discussion of minimal 
specification) see Dale (1984).  
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indeed, any form of causation—is also still too restrictive: adoptive 
parents aren’t counted as parents. My key claim is that this is not a 
problem with causal accounts of parental responsibility: this is a problem 
with our use of the title ‘parent’. In particular, there are two very distinct 
roles we can and often do mean to pick out when we say ‘parent’. On the 
one hand, ‘parent’ can mean progenitor: a parent is the maker of a baby. 
On the other hand, ‘parent’ can mean carer: a parent stands in a unique 
and invaluable social, personal, love relation to the child. There are two 
distinct moral roles that a biological parent who raises her child fulfils: the 
social role of parent, and the metaphysical role of—as I shall call it—
maker.  
 
On a bifurcated causal account, in standard biological-familial 
circumstances, one parents because one is obliged to parent. One is 
obliged to parent in virtue of being the child’s maker. My claim is that 
what we usually think of as parental obligation is, indeed, maker 
obligation. That is, paradigm parents are obliged in virtue of being in the 
role of maker, rather than in virtue of being in the role of parent. Being in 
the role of parent does oblige one to do important and valuable things. 
But in standard instances, the crucial aspect of this most central of 
special obligations is that it’s not just that one is obliged qua parent: it is, 
indeed, that one is obliged to be a parent; to stand in the role of parent. 
The obligation is not simply to do what a parent must do, so long as one 
is the parent; it is, rather, to be a parent. 
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However, it is implausibly narrow to suppose that the maker obligation is 
simply ‘to be the parent’. People who willingly give over the role of parent 
to others are not usually shirking a duty. I suspect that the average birth 
parent who gives her child up for adoption is doing something loving and 
caring, and she is doing something that she judges best with respect to 
her obligation. That is, she is doing her best to fulfill her obligation to her 
child in giving the child up for adoption. It is a difficult task, then, to 
specify precisely what this obligation is. As an initial attempt, we might 
say that the obligation is something like ‘to do one’s best to make 
existence not a misfortune for the child’. But perhaps Kant’s formulation is 
better: to make the child content with her condition so far as one can. In 
most cases, then, the best way to fulfil this obligation will be to take on 
the role of parent, and to fulfil one’s obligations therein. It seems 
reasonable to suppose, then, that the maker obligation implies a prima 
facie obligation to take on the role of parent, though this obligation is 
overridden when parenting the child will not best fulfil the obligation.  
 
So, on this view, someone who causes a child to exist will thereby—in so 
causing—become the maker of that child. The maker of a child has an 
obligation to ‘make the child content with her condition so far as one can’. 
One who fulfils the role of maker is not automatically a parent, but is 
automatically obliged to the child, in the big and life-changing ways that 
we pre-theoretically think parents are: the child’s wellbeing is and will 
always be the maker’s concern. 
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It is consistent with this view that parents who are not also makers are 
still parents, and are still weightily obliged to their children. It is not the 
case that all and only makers are parents; it is the case that all and only 
makers have a prima facie obligation to parent. Those who take up the 
role of parent, whether out of obligation, or out of desire or big-
heartedness or otherwise, are obliged to care for their children because 
they have taken on that role.  
 
4. Maker Obligation 
On a bifurcated causal account of parenthood, those who cause a child to 
exist are thereby the makers of that child. In virtue of fulfilling this role, 
they are obliged to attend to the wellbeing of the child. Of course, not all 
makers are parents. Some makers never meet their children. Some 
makers seek out adoptive parents for the benefit of the child to whom 
they are obliged. Some makers fail so completely in fulfilling their 
obligations to the child that one could hardly call them parents at all, even 
if no other parent comes into the picture. Still, if one is a maker, one is 
obliged to the child one has made.  
 
In order to make the contours of the maker obligation clear, it is useful to 
talk again about role obligations. The important thing to notice about role 
obligations and their attending roles is the ways in which role obligations 
can be done away with --the ways in which one can cease to be so 
obliged. There appear to be two ways: one can discharge the obligation, 
or one can exit the role. To take a professional obligation as an example, 
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suppose that I am Susan’s research supervisor. I am obliged, as her 
supervisor, to supervise her thesis. If I want to cease to be so obliged, I 
can either supervise her thesis to completion (after which time I no longer 
have a thesis-supervisory obligation towards Susan); or I can cease to be 
her supervisor. Even if I arrange for a colleague to read and give 
feedback on all of Susan’s work, I still have this obligation if I am still her 
supervisor. So, while Susan is writing her thesis, the only way in which I 
could cease to be obliged to supervise her thesis is to quit being her 
supervisor.  
 
For the maker obligation, the implication should be clear. There is no way 
to quit being a maker. This, then, explains why we feel that absent fathers 
are obliged to their offspring, even if we couldn’t imagine using words like 
‘dad’ to describe them: it’s true, they are not parents; but they are 
makers, and in virtue of this, their offspring’s wellbeing is their business. 
Being the maker of a child is what obliges one to care for this child. It is 
what makes a particular person irrevocably morally bound to a particular 
child, in a way that no other persons (save other makers) are so bound.  
 
One might object that, once one becomes a parent to a child—whether 
through birth or adoption—one is likewise irrevocably bound. Surely 
parents are obliged to continue to parent, come what may. But the moral 
facts are subtly different in the case of parenting. If one abandons one’s 
role as parent, one has done something, probably, abominable. What 
could be more horrible? What could be more contrary to duty? All the 
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same, one can abandon the role. Not so with makers. There simply is no 
way to not be a maker any more, so long as that child lives.  
 
One might object, further, that though maker obligation is life-long, it is 
minimal: after all, if a child is adopted, and others parent her, then the 
maker will in practice have very little to do. The parent, of course, has all 
of the hard work. In practice, parents are the real champions. It is parents 
who do the every-day tasks, and the every-day worrying, and the life-
changing that is necessary to secure a good existence for a child. But this 
simply does not mean that the maker has her obligation done and dusted 
if she does not parent.  
 
This is most clear in the case of unforeseen destitution. Imagine a woman 
gives her baby up for adoption. Her circumstances are such that she is 
unable to parent effectively. She takes her obligation to the baby very 
seriously, and as such, does her utmost to secure a good future for her 
child, by finding good adoptive parents who are eager to parent her. And, 
were it not for bad luck—bad luck to which we are all vulnerable—the 
maker’s (ie, the ‘birth mother’s) obligation would have been met. 
However, the adoptive family are subject to misfortune. Their financial 
resources are devastated by an act of god. The circumstances for the 
adoptive family, and thus for the child, become dire.  
 
In this case, according to what I have said is the most plausible theory of 
parenthood, the makers of the child are obliged to assist. It simply does 
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not do to say ‘but I’m not the parent anymore’. To do so would be 
monstrous. And not in a vicious-but-not-really-contrary-to-duty way; it 
would be exactly contrary to duty. The maker and the adoptive parent(s) 
have made an agreement with each other. The maker has signed over 
day-to-day duties and rights to the adoptive parent(s). The adoptive 
parent(s) has taken it upon him/herself to be the parent to this child. But 
the adults agreeing amongst themselves simply cannot undo the maker’s 
obligation to the child in virtue of being her maker.25 
 
One can think of many scenarios like this: one’s birth child may need a 
kidney; one’s birth child may be subject to abuse in her home; one’s birth 
child may simply be unhappy. These troubles are the maker’s concern, 
and they will always be. If a child is adopted out, with the best of 
intentions on the part of the makers, and with all the best chances of a 
good life, and tragedy befalls the child unbeknownst to the makers, we 
might be reserved in blaming them; we might say something like ‘they did 
their best’; but it would still constitute a failure to fulfil their obligation to 
the child. It may be true that, in the normal course of things, the time, 
energy and care that a parent is obliged to expend on a child is greater 
than that of a mere maker, but it is still the case that the maker’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Imagine that I owe you a large sum of money. My friend Bill agrees to 
repay it you. This is just fine, so long as Bill pays. But if Bill fails to pay, it 
does not do for me to say ‘I don’t owe you anything; Bill and I had an 
agreement’. That Bill and I agreed a course of action does not change 
what is owed between you and me.  
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obligations are real, substantial, irrevocable, and prior to ‘parental’ 
obligation. 
 
5. Who is a Maker, and to what are they obliged 
I said in sections II and III that, if we take INUS conditions to be 
constitutive of ‘causes’ for the purpose of spelling out parenthood, then 
some people we wouldn’t normally think of as parents turn out to be 
makers. In particular, gamete donors will be makers. As well, doctors who 
assist in reproduction (administering IVF treatment, IUI, and so on) will 
also count as makers. It is an advantage, then, of a bifurcated account 
that it can make sense of intuitions regarding obligation or responsibility 
on the part of gamete donors, for example, without wrongly classifying 
such people as parents.  
 
In ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Bringing into Being’, David Benatar 
argues that ‘the overwhelming majority of gamete donors are amongst 
those who treat decisions about bringing children into existence too 
lightly’.26 Genetic parents, Benatar argues, have a ‘presumptive 
responsibility’ for rearing their genetic children—for ‘attend[ing] to the 
details’ of the offspring's nurturing and flourishing. The implication is that, 
mostly, gamete donation is immoral.  
 
On a simple causal account of parental responsibility, it is hard to see 
how this conclusion could be avoided. After all, parents are obliged to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Benatar (1999) 
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nurture their children. But on a bifurcated account, the picture is much 
more plausible: gamete donors are not parents, but they are makers. As 
such, they have an obligation towards the resultant children; they are 
obliged to see to it that the child’s existence is not a misfortune for her. 
So, Benatar is right: one mustn’t be ‘unbearably light’ about gamete 
donation. But there is no reason to think that a child suitably parented—
even by persons other than their makers—cannot have a good life.27 The 
situation of the gamete donor will be weighty, but not doomed to be 
immoral. And a similar story can be told for IVF doctors and the like.  
 
Key to Brake’s argument, discussed above, was the worry that certain 
accounts of parental obligation would imply a duty on the part of the 
pregnant woman to gestate. A bifurcated causal account does not, on its 
own, imply a duty to gestate—though it is compatible with such a duty. It’s 
crucial to this account that the thing being caused is a morally 
considerable thing. Only in creating a morally considerable entity could 
we plausibly be said to generate obligations towards the thing created in 
so creating. As Brake notes, if the foetus is not a morally considerable 
entity, then the pregnant woman has no duty to gestate, regardless of 
what theory of parenthood we adopt. But, even supposing that the foetus 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 The heft of Benatar’s argument, to my mind, rests on mysterious 
empirical claims, like ‘Child-rearing can be, and regularly is, done badly. 
There are so many ways to go wrong’ (176). I suspect this is moral panic, 
rather than good reasoning. Contrast with Bayne (2003).   
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is morally considerable, it is still an open question whether a pregnant 
woman has a duty to gestate on my account.  
 
If foetuses are morally considerable, it will follow from a bifurcated causal 
account of parenthood that the pregnant woman is obliged towards the 
foetus in the same way that she is obliged towards any child that she 
causes to exist: she is obliged to make the foetus’s existence not a 
misfortune. But from this, a duty to gestate does not cleanly follow, 
because after all, we don’t have a duty to gestate our (non-foetal) 
children. There are plainly differences in what constitutes good care 
towards children, on the one hand, and foetuses on the other. It stands to 
reason, then, that there will also be differences in what constitutes 
misfortune for each. So while it may be plausible to suppose that keeping 
a child alive is a key component to making that child’s existence non-bad, 
it does not follow that this will be so for a (morally considerable) foetus.  
 
A brief and trouble-free existence (as one would have, were one’s 
existence but a short stint in a womb) might actually be highly desirable. 
Arguably, one needs something like self-awareness, or awareness of 
one’s persistence through time, in order to be harmed by death. 
Foetuses, even morally considerable ones, do not have this. On the other 
hand, it may be that death is a misfortune to a morally considerable 
foetus—perhaps because they have a future like ours.28 Quite simply, a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Marquis (1989) 
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causal account of parental obligation does not preclude a duty to gestate, 
but also does not imply one.      
 
6. Little’s Intimate Duties View 
My bifurcated account owes much to the work of Margaret Little. Like 
myself, Little places importance on recognising, in her terminology, the 
different ‘layers’ of parenthood. She writes that ‘parenthood’ can mean a 
‘biological, legal, but also personal relationship—and that crucially, 
different moral responsibilities attach to different layers’.29 Further, Little 
observes that in addition to facts about how we are obliged qua parent, 
there are also facts about when we are obliged to enter into relationships 
that generate obligation, and about when it is permissible to exit.30 I agree 
with Little’s observation that there are obligations to enter into, or exit 
from or decline roles, as well as her insight that ‘parent’ can mean many 
things. However, I think that Little is wrong about what making obliges 
one to.  
 
According to Little, the lived, personal parental relationship is the one that 
generates substantive duties of care. Biological parenthood, on the other 
hand, obliges one, according to Little, only to ‘be open’ to entering into a 
personal relationship. I think this is a mistake. My claim is that (now in my 
terminology), makerhood (which, notice, is not co-extensive with 
biological parenthood) is the morally primary relationship. It brings with it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Little (1999) 
30 (1999): 307.  
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the heavy obligation. And more than being obliged to ‘be open’ to 
parenthood, makers have a prima facie obligation to Parent.  
 
Little’s starting point is the observation that pregnancy is unlike any other 
interpersonal moral situation: the intertwinement, ‘enmeshment’ of the 
two individuals involved (the foetus, and the pregnant woman; if one can 
even call them ‘individuals’) is so distinctly unlike any other circumstance 
in human life, that much of the discussion surrounding abortion—reliant 
as it is on analogy with other moral situations—is deeply flawed. Within 
this context, Little examines the role conceptions of motherhood, and 
intuitions about parental obligation play in forming our beliefs about 
abortion.  
 
Little argues that gestation is a form of physical intimacy, somewhat 
analogous in its moral contours to sex. Further, she points out that there 
is more than one role being fulfilled by a birth mother who raises her 
child. Finally, she argues that being the biological progenitor of a foetus 
does not oblige one to be intimately entwined with the foetus: being the 
biological progenitor is not the same as being the mother, so it does not 
imply a duty to care. Little writes that  
 
We need to understand what makes someone a parent in the 
thickly normative sense, and what the contours of the 
responsibility really are. I want to argue that parenthood can 
have different layers—biological, legal, but also personal 
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relationships—and that, crucially, different moral responsibilities 
attach to different layers.31 
 
Little is interested to show that some anti-abortion-rights intuitions 
regarding the morality of abortion spring from a misunderstanding of, in 
my terminology, roles. She sees the personal relationship of motherhood 
(what I have called the parent role32) as the relationship that gives rise to 
maternal obligation. The confusion, says Little, comes from failing to 
distinguish biology from relationship: from thinking a mother is a mother is 
a mother, and thereby assuming that mothers of all sorts are obliged to 
care for their offspring. This, she says, results in the (mistaken) 
impression that one has a duty to gestate.  
 
So, the biological relationship, according to Little, is not the sort of 
relationship that generates special obligations, save one:  
 
[It provides] children with a moral claim that the person so 
related be open towards developing a deeper relationship. 
!And the point isn’t that one must pursue the relationship, 
but that one must be open to doing so: there will certainly be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 (1999): 305-306. 
32 Though, her ‘personal relationship’ is set out as separate to the legal 
role that mothers play in the lives of their children. On my account, 
Mother will include all practical aspects of mothering (though I do not 
deny that the role could be broken down more finely).  
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cases in which a person biologically related to a child may 
legitimately decline to pursue any further relationship.33 
 
In other words, if I am the biological mother of a child, it’s not the case 
that I have care duties towards that child simply in virtue of my biological 
relation to her. Rather, in virtue of biology (makerhood), I have a duty to 
be open to a personal relationship (parenthood) with her; and should I 
enter into that relationship with her, I should thereby acquire care duties 
towards her. But to have a duty to be open to a relationship is not to have 
the duties that being in that relationship would place on me. So while 
Little’s is also (at least) a bifurcated account, the portioning of obligations 
happens in a way opposite to how I am proposing. Creating a child puts 
one under only minimal obligation; it is the acceptance of the parent role 
that places one under the weighty obligations of parenthood.  
 
Little’s goal is twofold. She wants to both explain the source of mistaken 
attributions of moral impermissibility to abortion; and to give a fuller 
picture of the wrong that’s done to a woman when she is forced to 
gestate. As to the former, Little assumes that something like this is 
thought by anti-abortionists: a mother has a duty to care for her child; and 
so a mother has a duty to gestate her child. Little’s reply is that a 
biological mother does not a parent make; and it’s only a parent who has 
a duty of care.      
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 (1999): 308.  
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I suspect that the reason Little’s maker/parent distinction runs in the 
opposite direction to mine it that we are conceptualising the biological 
relationship differently. In particular, the biological relationship between a 
parent and her child is not simply like that between a woman and her 
cousin: it is not simply a sharing of genes that may give us some natural 
urge, or prima facie reason to become or continue to be socially related to 
one another.34 It is crucially a causal relationship, in addition to being a 
genetic one. The biological mother causes the child to come into being. 
This causal relationship obliges one to something much more substantial 
than openness to enter into a personal relationship. 
 
Further, it is unclear whether the maker/parent distinction is even 
necessary to aid Little’s explication of forced gestation. The main theme 
of her picture is the characterization of forced gestation as intimacy 
without consent.  
 
To mandate that the woman remain pregnant is to mandate 
that she remain in a state of physical intertwinement against 
her consent. [!] Just as sexual intercourse can be a joy under 
consent and a violation without it, gestation can be a beautiful 
experience with it and a harmful one without it.35 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34(1999): 307 
35 (1999): 301-302. 
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So in other words, the physical intimacy involved in pregnancy is at least 
as important and as personal as that of sex; so being forced to gestate is 
like being raped.36 
 
It is unclear, however, what Little’s distinction between maternal duty, and 
duty to openness is doing for her argument. It does not seem that my lack 
of relationship with the foetus explains my right to refuse intimacy; it does 
not seem plausible that my being in a relationship with the foetus would 
generate a duty to be intimate. After all, my being in a romantic or even 
marital relationship with another person clearly does not generate a duty 
to be sexually intimate with them.37  
 
My claim is that the role of maker is the morally prior role. Further, the 
sort of obligation that attaches to a maker is not such that one may 
choose to decline it. While it is possible to decline an interpersonal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36  Little recognizes that, unlike rape, the other party to the non-
consensual intimacy is not an attacker, but an innocent. The perpetrator, 
on this picture, is the state (303).  
37 Perhaps Little should be read not as saying that if a pregnant woman 
were already a Parent, she would have a duty to gestate; but rather, as 
saying that she would have a prima facie duty to gestate: she could not 
simply decline for any old reason. But even this seems problematic, since 
surely a person does not need weighty reasons to refuse physical 
intimacy with her spouse or partner. Surely she can refuse for whatever 
reason she likes.    
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relationship with one’s offspring, what I am claiming is that one cannot 
thereby decline to be obliged. However, it’s important to note that this 
finding does not do what Little fears: it does not, on its own, place on the 
pregnant woman a duty to gestate, just as a loving romantic partnership 
does not place on a person a duty to have sexual intercourse.  
 
 
7. Maker obligation, adoption and abortion 
Of the theories of parenthood on offer, the most plausible of them is a 
causal theory, according to which one is a parent—and thus, has parental 
rights and obligations—in virtue of having caused the child to exist. But a 
causal theory only makes sense of our core, pre-theoretical 
understanding of parenthood if we build into the theory a recognition of 
the ambiguity lurking in the title ‘parent’: progenitors are sometimes called 
‘parents’, as are primary carers, and these two roles can and do come 
apart.  
 
A bifurcated causal account, on which parental obligation, in the normal 
course of things, follows from maker obligation, nicely explains both who 
is a parent and why; and why parents and makers are obliged to their 
children (and how). But on this theory, makers—that is, ‘birth parents’ and 
other causes—do not and cannot cease to be obliged to their birth 
children, even when adoption takes place.  
 
I said earlier that Brake’s key claim was that mothers may relinquish 
responsibility for their offspring iff fathers may do so. Because Brake 
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favours a consent account of parental obligation, there is nothing barring 
the claim that mothers may relinquish responsibility for their offspring. 
And the view that ‘she could always give the baby up for adoption’ 
assumes precisely that mothers may so relinquish. But a consent account 
of parental responsibility is implausible. So, my claim is that (a) Brake’s 
biconditional is true, and (b) neither mothers nor fathers may relinquish 
responsibility. At least, not in the way we suppose they can.  
 
Parenting agreements can be made between makers and adoptive 
parents, and often these agreements are in the best interest of everyone 
involved. But likewise, parenting agreements can be made between one 
maker and another, and again, for many children, being raised by one 
stable willing parent is better than being raised, chaotically, by two. But in 
both situations—in adoption, and in single-parenting—the makers 
continue to be obliged.38 The makers continue to be parents, in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 An anonymous referee raised the worry of whether birth parents are 
obliged to remain in contact with their offspring. I cannot answer this in a 
blanketed way. Surely every situation will be different. I suppose Makers 
ought to be willing to make ‘open’ adoption arrangements if that is, given 
the particulars of their situation, the best situation for the child. But this 
will not always be the case. There will no doubt be situations in which the 
very best thing a birth parent can do for her child is to step out of the 
picture. In this case, she must hope that the adoptive situation is a good 
one for her offspring. If it is not, she has failed in her duty, even though 
she has tried her best.  
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morally-salient ‘progenitor’ sense of ‘parent’. This means that, when faced 
with an unwanted pregnancy, and when the lack of want is explained by a 
lack of want of parenthood (as I assume it usually is), women have but 
one option: abortion. Adoption simply doesn’t do it. 

!197 
Chapter Six 
PATERNAL ABORTION, ECTOGENIC FOETICIDE, AND OTHER 
STRANGE ISSUES AT THE NEXUS OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
AND PARENTAL OBLIGATION 
 
Introduction  
The interface between parental obligation on the one hand, and 
reproductive rights on the other, rarely features in discussion of issues 
like abortion. Consent accounts of parental obligation are the norm in 
reproductive ethics, and for obvious reason: consent is so very central to 
our thinking about reproductive rights. But stepping outside the abortion 
debate, consent accounts of parental obligation simply do not work. It is 
implausible that one might have obligations to one’s children only if one 
agrees to be so obliged.  
 
The most plausible account of parental obligation, as I have argued in 
Chapters Four and Five, is a bifurcated causal account of parental 
obligation, on which one has a pro tanto obligation to parent in virtue of 
being a maker. This account picks out all those individuals a theory of 
parenthood really ought to pick out: all those people who collude in 
causing the new person to exist (and any others who sign up voluntarily). 
But this account has strange and potentially worrying consequences 
when it comes to reproductive rights. In this chapter, I will briefly review 
the reasons for favouring such an account of parental obligation, and then 
go on to explore some of its consequences for reproductive ethics.     
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1. What Grounds Parental Obligation? 
Usually, a consent account of parental obligation is assumed in 
discussion of reproductive rights, if any account is assumed.1 On such an 
account, what grounds parental obligation is that the parent consents to 
be so obliged: that is, she consents to parent. Stepping outside of the 
abortion debate, however, this account of parental obligation looks 
implausible. Surely parents who do not want to be parents still have 
obligations toward their children. If an account of parental obligation is to 
have any teeth at all, it must do things like ascribe obligations to unwilling 
parents: it must say, of parents who choose not to care adequately for the 
children, that they ought to. 
 
Of the non-voluntary accounts of parental obligations, there are three 
basic types on offer in the literature: proprietary accounts; biological 
accounts; and causal accounts.2 Proprietary accounts explain !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See Thomson (1971); Little (1999). Often times there is no account of 
parental obligation assumed, because the assumption is that the foetus is 
a non-morally-considerable entity, and thus (among other things) not the 
sort of creature towards which one could have parental rights. But as I 
shall argue, what grounds parental obligations is relevant, even on the 
assumption that the foetus is not morally considerable.  
2 For a proprietary account, see e.g. Gheaus (2011) or Aristotle (1999); 
for a biological account, see Page (1984); for a causal account, see 
Nelson (1991) or Archard (2010).  
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parenthood—and thus, parental rights and obligations—in terms of 
ownership. On this sort of account, the child is my responsibility because 
she is ‘mine’; I own her. These accounts are clear non-starters3: being the 
owner of an X does not oblige you to care for that X, except insofar as 
you desire to keep the X in good knick. So for example, if I am the owner 
of the Ford Fiesta that I drive, there is a sense in which I am obliged to 
take care of it, insofar as it is no one else’s responsibility to do so, and 
cars do need looking after if they’re to stay in good working order. But 
there’s also a sense in which it is very much my choice whether I look 
after it. Since I own the car, I can decide whether to care for it, or cut it to 
bits and sell it for scrap.4 Indeed, my ownership more strongly indicates 
my right to dismantle the thing owned than it does my obligation to care 
for it. This obviously is of little help in explaining parental obligation.5  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Proprietary accounts of parenthood usually come up in the context of 
explaining parental rights. In this context, there is some appeal: if I own 
my child, I obviously have a right to her. This seems like a good 
motivation for the claim that I have a right to parent my child. Its prima 
facie plausibility in light of parental rights explains its being on the 
theoretical table at all. With respect to obligations, it is implausible.  
4 One might think that something like pet ownership would be a better 
analogy. But this is surely question-begging. As well, it seems like pet 
owners have the right to give their pets away; even to have the pet put 
down.  
5 It has been pointed out to me that there are some situations of 
ownership in which one’s owning something does seem to imply a duty to 
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Biological accounts likewise fail to fit the bill. Adoptive parents will not 
have parental obligations on such an account. One could give a biological 
account on which biology was sufficient but not necessary for parental 
obligation, but this would still not capture all of our non-controversial 
intuitions about who is a parent. For example, on many biological 
accounts, gestational, non-genetic mothers would not count as parents.6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
care for it. For example, if I own a famous work of art, I am presumably 
under an obligation to keep it safe, see that it is maintained, etc. But in 
this case, it seems that my ownership is doing only part of the work—and 
indeed, my ownership is surely  some kind of ownership*: something 
more like stewardship. The ownership might explain why I have an 
obligation prior to anyone else’s, but it does not explain why I have an 
obligation at all. Something else, like the artwork’s place in the history of 
art or in culture, is doing the real moral work. 
6 On some biological accounts, gestation mothers count as parents, but 
merely genetic ones do not. On these accounts, it is usually also the case 
that either fathers do not count equally as parents (since fathers do not 
gestate); or fathers are parents in a derivative way via something like 
‘support for the mother in pregnancy’. See, e.g., Gheaus (2012). Such 
accounts are non-starters to my mind: whatever it is that grounds parental 
obligation, it surely obliges parents equally. This claim is often called ‘the 
parity principle’. (See Austin (2007).) An argument for it is out of the 
scope of this thesis, but I suspect that the parity principle will fall out of 
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The bigger problem with biological accounts, however, is that it is not 
clear why biological likeness would imply duty. What is the connection 
between the biological fact and the moral claim? Surely what is crucial is 
that the biological parent is the progenitor, and not just biologically 
related. The biological parent makes the child, and in so doing generates 
obligation towards the child. This, then, leads us to a causal account of 
parental obligation: on which parents are obliged because they cause 
their children to exist.  
 
On a causal account of parental obligation, one has parental obligation in 
virtue of causing the child to exist. This, then, is both more inclusive than 
a biological account (e.g. mothers whose children were conceived using 
donor eggs will count; parents whose children were conceived or 
gestated via surrogacy will count; and so on), and more strict than a 
consent account: unwilling (causal) parents will still be obliged. But a 
simple causal account of parental obligation, as I have argued, will not 
do. Not all parents are progenitors; not all progenitors are parents. The 
trouble seems to be that our use of the word ‘parent’ is ambiguous 
between, on the one hand, carers; and on the other, progenitors—or as I 
have called them, ‘makers’.7  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Hardimon’s reflective acceptability requirement on role obligations—or 
indeed, out of any justice-based requirement, etc.  
7 Since not all makers are progenitors, strictly speaking. Fathers whose 
children were conceived using donor sperm, for example, are makers, but 
not progenitors. 
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A birfurcated causal account of parental obligation disambiguates 
parenthood. On such an account, what generates the obligation, in the 
first instance, is the causal act: making the child exist. Doing so obliges 
one, as Kant puts it, ‘to make the child content with his condition so far as 
they can’.8 In practice, social facts as they are, this constitutes a pro tanto 
obligation to take on the role of parent, and all of its attendant every-day 
duties. However, it is clearly true that some makers will better fulfil their 
obligations towards their children by not parenting: by giving their children 
up for adoption. But in this case, it is not the case that the birth parent is 
‘transferring’ her duty: such a transferral would make no sense in the 
context of a causal account, since the obligation is acquired via being the 
maker of the child; and giving the child up for adoption does not cause 
one to cease to be a maker. Further, a lifelong obligation towards a child 
(as we assume parents have) is not the sort of obligation that can be 
‘discharged’ in one go, even if that one go is a handing-over of practical 
duties. If one is obliged to any child that he or she causes to exist, in 
virtue of having caused the child to exist, then he or she is obliged, so 
long as the child exists and so long as he or she has caused the child to 
exit; and she or he will have always caused the child to exist. 
 
I argued in Chapter Five that this means that adoption cannot function as 
a less morally-troublesome stand-in for abortion. When one seeks 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Kant (1991): §28. 
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abortion, what one usually wants is not to become a mother.9 The morally 
substantive sense of ‘become a mother’ (and thus, the one that probably 
matters) is surely something like ‘acquire life-long and important 
obligations to a/this child’. Since one does this, whether one gives the 
child up for adoption or not, it is clear that adoption doesn’t work as a 
substitute for abortion.   
 
This has important implications for our theorising about reproductive 
rights, since at present, the assumption that adoption is always an 
alternative to abortion means that the later existence of a child cannot 
figure into the reasons for or against abortion rights. But this is not the 
only noteworthy consequence of looking at reproductive rights in light of 
parenthood theory. In the next four sections, I will discuss four further 
apparent reproductive-rights consequences of such a view.  
 
First, it seems on the face of it that a bifurcated causal account of 
parenthood implies an obligation on the part of the pregnant woman to 
gestate. I suggested, in Chapter Five, that this is not so. In this chapter I 
will expand that argument. Second, if pregnant women do not have a duty 
to gestate, then we may need to wonder whether potential fathers have a 
right to choose abortion. I will argue that if women have a right to abort, 
then so do men, though given gestation, this right in practice is highly 
defeasible. Third, as has been mentioned, a causal account (bifurcated or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Or not to become a mother now; or not to mother this particular child; or 
etc.  
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not) will imply that gamete donors have parental obligation. I have already 
argued that this result ought not trouble us, but I will say more about this 
claim. And finally, fourth, a causal account will imply that, if abortion is 
permissible, then so is foeticide, full-stop: even in cases of ectogenesis, it 
seems that parents will have a right to choose.  
 
2. The View Appears to show that Abortion is Morally Impermissible 
One might worry that this view of parental obligation would show that 
abortion is impermissible. Indeed, we might worry that maker obligation—
the obligation one has in virtue of being the maker of a person—might 
mean that we are obliged to gestate, since being a maker obliges one to 
make the child ‘content with his condition’. Surely, then, pregnant women, 
having made a foetus, must make it content. And it seems that the only 
way to make a foetus content is to gestate it.  
 
But this does not follow. There are several possible states of fact that 
might affect how maker obligation figures into the moral equation. Firstly, 
whether a foetus is a morally considerable entity (and whether it has a 
right to life) matters.  
 
If the foetus is not morally considerable, then one cannot have parental 
obligation towards a foetus, since one can only be obliged to a morally 
considerable entity. (We may have obligations regarding entities that lack 
status; but this is not the right sort of obligation. parental obligation is 
obligation to the child, herself.) So, if we take the foetus’s lack of 
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personhood to be decisive, as regards moral status, then this account of 
parental obligation cannot imply a duty to gestate. If this is right, then our 
theory of parental obligation is probably neither here nor there with 
respect to the moral permissibility of abortion: it will say nothing about our 
obligations with respect to gestation.  
 
I have argued that we ought to accept a view of moral status on which 
both babies and foetuses of advanced gestational age are (at least 
minimally) morally considerable, though mayn’t have a right to life. If we 
grant that the foetus is morally considerable, it is still an open question 
whether parental obligation prescribes gestation. In particular, it seems 
plausible to assume that the obligation to strive to make the child content 
with her lot might manifest itself differently at different stages of 
development, since children need different things at different stages of 
development.  
 
If we understand ‘contentment’ quite literally, then it seems as though 
whether the woman gestates the foetus or not is irrelevant. We can 
assume that a gestating foetus is content: it has everything that it needs 
without a worry in the world. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a state of 
being that could be more contenting. But likewise, it is hard to see how a 
foetus that is not gestated suffers any discontent: there is nothing for 
which it wants either before or after it ceases to be gestated.  
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However, perhaps this strict focus on contentment is implausible: perhaps 
what is relevant is whether the foetus is afforded a reasonably good life 
by its maker (ie, the pregnant woman). If this is so, then we will need to 
decide what constitutes a good life for a merely sentient creature. 
Contentment will surely be a large part of this, but it mayn’t be all. Among 
other things, longevity seems to be taken very often as an important 
component of what generally makes a life go well. Indeed, some have 
argued that a life cut short just is less good than a long life.10 When we 
speak about persons, this idea—that a long life is a better life—has some 
purchase. After all, long life allows us to fulfil more of the hopes and 
ambitions we have. But merely-sentient foetuses have no such hopes 
and ambitions. So it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that longevity is 
less important than contentment. It may be the case that providing a 
short, and perfectly content existence to the foetus by ending gestation is 
a way of giving it a short but good life.     
 
If I am right that a foetus is a minimally morally considerable being with 
no right to life, then not only is it unclear that my account of parental !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 McMahan (2002) seems to accept this claim in his argument against 
Marquis (1989). He argues that Marquis’s future like ours view of the 
harm of death implies that early abortion is more serious than late 
abortion, because early abortion robs the foetus of more future than does 
late abortion  (p.271). This argument, it seems to me, assumes that more 
is better—as does Marquis’s—and it is not clear why we should make this 
assumption.     
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obligation implies a duty to gestate; but also, it may actually lend weight 
to the claim that abortion is morally permissible. The view implies that if a 
woman does not abort, then she is subject to weighty, lifelong, and non-
transferrable obligation towards the person who will come to be. And it 
seems like we want to say that, when there is opportunity to do so, I have 
a right to decline weighty, lifelong, non-transferrable obligation. If it is the 
case that abortion is consistent with an obligation to make the foetus’s life 
a good one, then this right on the part of the pregnant woman will 
strengthen the case for abortion’s permissibility.11       
 
If, contrary to what I have argued, the foetus is after all fully morally 
considerable with an inviolable right to life, my claims about maker 
obligations might after all strengthen the case against abortion rights. An 
obligation to care for an individual with an inviolable right to life certainly 
does seem to imply an obligation to keep that individual alive. But of 
course, it doesn’t seem as though I am a person with an inviolable right to 
life: you may be perfectly justified, for example, in killing me in self-
defence. So, even if the foetus is fully morally considerable, such that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Indeed, in a way this is rather a nicer defense of abortion than those 
standardly on offer: it gels with the reasons women actually have to abort, 
unlike, for example, Thomson’s (1971) defense. On this sort of account, 
we needn’t say that the woman doesn’t want to be a mother, and she 
doesn’t have to be because she has a right to control her body. We can 
say that the woman doesn’t want to be a mother, and she doesn’t have to 
be because she has a right not to be a mother.   
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bifurcated causal account of parental obligation implies a duty to gestate, 
it is at best a pro tanto duty. The rights of the woman, or indeed welfare 
concerns for the foetus, may trump such a right.  
 
3. Men May Have a Right to Choose 
What about fathers? A bifurcated causal account obeys the parity 
principle: it picks out fathers and mothers equally. If making it the case 
that a person exists creates obligation towards the new person that 
attaches permanently, clearly both parents are obliged. We said in the 
last section that this obligation might point to a harm in forced gestation, 
since forcing a woman to gestate (in addition to scuppering bodily 
autonomy, etc.) would force the woman to acquire weighty, lifelong, and 
non-transferable obligation. This then, was presented as a possible 
additional support for a woman’s right to choose. Given parental parity, 
then, one will no doubt wonder whether fathers, too, might have a right to 
choose. And it seems that the view commits us to answering ‘yes’. If the 
maker of a child has obligations to that child in virtue of her or his act of 
making, then the potential father of a child will be so obliged. And if 
potential mothers have a right to decline this obligation, then it seems so 
will fathers. 
 
Rosalind Hursthouse suggests that 
 
In a decision to terminate a pregnancy that resulted from a 
casual night with a stranger, consideration of his rights and 
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feelings is not called for. But if my decision amounts to killing 
what would be not only my child, but the child of someone with 
whom I have bonds of respect and trust, friendship if not love, 
then what he thinks and wants must be a consideration to be 
taken into account if I am not to be callous, irresponsible, 
arrogant and insensitive.12  
  
So, according to Hursthouse, whether the man has a right to ‘weigh in’ on 
whether the woman has an abortion depends on whether the man is in a 
relationship with the woman.13 But a correct account of parenthood will 
pick out mothers and fathers equally: men will be parents in virtue of 
having created their children, just like women are; and not derivatively via 
their relationship to the child’s mother. This will mean that men are 
equally obliged to the child, if gestation occurs and a child results. 
Further, since the account is non-voluntary, it will imply that men have 
obligation towards their children whether they choose it or not; whether 
they know about it or not. So, if a woman has a right to choose in virtue of 
having a right to decline lifelong obligation, then on pain of inconsistency 
we must say that men do, too. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 (1987): 213. 
13 It’s complicated, of course, since Hursthouse is talking in virtue terms. I 
assume that something’s being ‘callous’ is not exactly the same as its 
being wrong.   
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This conclusion is messy, practically speaking. It’s not clear how such a 
right would be realized, or anyway, it’s not clear how it would be realized 
without trampling badly on the rights of women—could it ever be realised 
without a woman’s rights being trampled? On might worry that a man’s 
having a right to choose is precisely a right so to trample. But I think this 
worry disappears on reflection.  
 
While it’s true that this is the sort of right that would hardly ever fail to 
conflict with competing rights, biological and technological facts as they 
are, it’s not difficult to imagine situations where it wouldn’t. For example, if 
a man’s pregnant partner falls into an irreversible coma; if (in the year 
2080) the foetus is being gestated in a jar and the woman abandons it (or 
doesn’t); in deciding whether embryos created using IVF may be 
gestated. If, simply, a woman is unsure what to do, we might say that the 
man’s right to choose will come into play where, not recognizing a man’s 
right to choose, we might say that it would be inappropriate, insensitive, 
callous or even objectifying for a man to weigh in on the decision.  
Indeed, current UK and European law seems to recognise a man’s right 
to choose. The case of Natalie Evans’s frozen embryos seem to show 
just such a recognition.  
 
In 2001, Natalie Evans and her partner had embryos—created with her 
ova and her partner, Howard Johnston’s sperm—frozen before Natalie 
underwent cancer treatment that would permanently damager her 
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reproductive capacity.14 Subsequently, Natalie and Johnston split up, and 
Johnston started a family with a new partner. When Natalie later decided 
to use some of the embryos to have a baby on her own, Johnston 
objected, withdrawing his consent for the embryos to be implanted.  
 
In 2007, after lengthy UK and EU court battles, the embryos were ordered 
destroyed.15 According to UK law, both parties to IVF treatment must 
consent to each successive phase of the process. Each is permitted to 
withdraw consent at any point up to and including implantation. The 
thinking seems to be that, even if in ‘natural’ conception the opportunity 
for the man to choose does not arise, this does not show he has no such 
right: if he is in a position to decline without infringing upon the woman’s 
more immediate bodily rights, he may do so.     
 
One cannot help but feel very sad for Natalie Evans. But if one considers 
how the case would look if things were slightly different, it is clear that this 
is the right result. If, for example, Natalie’s partner had declined to take 
steps to procreate in the usual way (that is, via sexual intercourse) before 
her treatment, we would surely not say that he had acted badly, even if it 
would be Natalie’s last chance to bear her own genetic offspring. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Full embryos, rather than simple ova, were frozen because, at the time 
the technology for ova preservation was unreliable.   
15 BBC Online (2007)  
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Johnston, like all of us, has a right to decide whether, when, and with 
whom to procreate.16  
 
If Natalie and her partner had conceived naturally before her treatment, 
and Natalie herself had then decided to abort, we would not say that she 
had acted impermissibly.17 We would say that she had exercised her right 
to reproductive autonomy. If Natalie can change her mind after 
conception, surely her partner can too when doing so is not in conflict 
with Natalie’s right to bodily autonomy. This seems to show that, even if it 
is merely a defeasible right, men also have a ‘right to choose’.    
If we think that Howard Johnston had a right to decline to proceed with 
the process of procreating with Natalie Evans, it seems we must conclude 
that male potential procreators have a right to choose. Competing rights 
in situations of ‘natural’ procreation are easily pointed to in order to 
explain why, in most cases, it is impermissible for men to exercise such a 
right.  
 
One final thing to say about men’s ‘right to choose’ is that when men are 
not informed of a pregnancy, and not given even a chance to ‘weigh in’ 
on the decision, we often think that they have been wronged. The woman !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 A right, insofar as he has a willing partner, that is. Obviously we do not 
have the right to procreate with whoever we please: we do not have the 
right to procreate with individuals who do not want to procreate with us. 
That, I suppose, is just the point in the Natalie Evans ruling.  
17 On the assumption that abortion is generally permissible.  
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may even be thereby obliged to take on at least some of the man’s 
obligation to the child, perhaps in the form of disproportionate care of the 
child. Elizabeth Brake argues that men in such situations do not have 
parental obligation, and that in principle they ought not be required to pay 
child support.18 But this is surely wrong: parental obligation is obligation 
to the child, not to the child’s mother. What a third party does cannot 
change the facts about the obligations one has to a person. Still, we 
might say that the woman—in causing the man to be weightily obliged 
against his will—thereby generates compensatory obligation towards him.  
 
4. Are Gamete Donors Makers?  
A related concern is that of the status of egg and sperm donors, 
discussed briefly in chapters Four and Five. In some sense, donors are 
completely separated from the process of procreation and the decision to 
procreate. This, of course, is exactly the point of sperm and egg donation. 
But if I am correct about how parental obligation attaches, then it will be 
unclear just how separated donors really are.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Brake (2005). Brake’s argument concerns cases in which the man has 
taken all reasonable precaution against procreation. She allows that there 
may be practical, justice reasons to legally oblige men in such cases to 
pay child support nonetheless. I find this unconvincing, as I have argued 
in Chapter Four.  
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It does not follow from a causal account that biological facts are decisive. 
If, for example, I were to have my eggs harvested for the purpose of IVF, 
and an unscrupulous nurse stole them and used them to conceive a child 
for herself, a causal account will probably not imply that I am obliged to 
the resultant child since the causal account relies on something I’ve done 
rather than simply on my genetic sequencing. But donating a gamete is 
very different to this: in donating, I am doing so with the intention, 
knowledge and consent that my gamete be used for the purpose of 
procreation. I am willingly and knowingly playing a crucial role in the 
creation of a new person. My donation is an INUS condition on the 
creation; I am, then, a maker.   
 
The bifurcated account, then, will pick out the gamete donor as a maker, 
and the gamete donor will have maker obligation. The gamete donor will 
be obliged to do her or his best to ensure that the child is content with 
his/her condition. But this does not show that the donor is a parent. As I 
argued in Chapter Four, makers are under a pro tanto obligation to take 
on the role of parent. Gamete donors, I take it, are an excellent illustration 
of that obligation being merely pro tanto. Other features of the situation of 
gestation will outweigh the gamete donor’s obligation to parent—and 
probably hugely so. However, on this account the gamete donors will 
have an obligation to aid if necessary, to ensure that the child’s life goes 
well. So, if the child’s parenting arrangements fall through, it may be that 
the gamete donor will be under an obligation to take on the role of parent. 
Chapter Six!
! 215 
But in ideal situations of gamete donation, this sort of obligation will 
simply not arise for the gamete donor.19  
 
The situation is surely complicated by the fact that the gamete donor is 
aiding the future parents (carers) in their own procreative ambitions; it is 
their project, their desire, and not that of the donor. So one might be 
tempted to think that this lessens the donor’s obligation to the child. But I 
don’t think this is quite right. What seems right is that in this case, in 
addition to parental obligations, the gamete recipients probably have an 
obligation to the donor to see that her/his obligation to the child is met. In 
this case, if the parents fail in their obligation to the child, they have not 
only failed the child; they have also failed the donor. (But notice that the 
reason they have failed the donor is that they have brought it about that 
the donor has failed the child.)  
 
5. A Right to Abort a Foetus Gestating in a Jar? 
If what I have said about reproductive rights in the context of the 
bifurcated causal account of parenthood is correct, then contra Thomson, 
it may be that a woman has a right to abortion even if gestation is not 
occurring in her body.20 This should be no surprise, since I’ve claimed 
that men may have a right to choose, and men do not gestate. But it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 I take it many instances of gamete donation are, in fact, non-ideal. It is 
still not clear, however, that many gamete donors are obliged, all things 
considered, to parent.  
20 (1971) 
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deviates from the standard account of abortion rights, on which the 
foetus’s reliance on the woman’s body is crucial to the right to abort.  
 
In her defence of abortion, Thomson writes 
 
I have argued that you are not morally required to spend nine 
months in bed, sustaining the life of that violinist; but to say this 
is by no means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there is 
a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to turn round 
and slit his throat. [!] I agree that the desire for the child’s 
death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out 
to be possible to detach the child alive.21  
 
Hursthouse (rhetorically) asks 
 
Suppose that medical technology had advanced to the point 
where foetuses, or even embryos, could be extracted from the 
womb alive and undamaged, and develop into normal healthy 
babies under laboratory conditions. Would we think then that a 
woman has a right to say whether her foetus was to be aborted 
dead or live, on the grounds that she would be devastated by 
feeling responsible for it for the rest of her life? And if she had 
such a right, that it was alright for her to exercise it?22  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 (1971): 66.  
22 Op. cit. 212. 
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If what I have said about parental obligation is correct, feeling devastated 
is not what’s at stake. Whether, when, how and with whom we take on 
the massively important and lifelong obligation of being a parent is 
probably the most important (moral) decision any of us makes in a life.  
Making this decision for oneself, then, is exactly central to leading an 
autonomous, self-authored life. And again, according to the bifurcated 
causal account of parental obligation, it is not that one will ‘feel’ obliged  
to the resulting child; it is that one will be obliged, life-long, come what 
may, even if the child is adopted by someone else. Since one cannot stop 
being a maker of the child, one does not cease to have maker obligation, 
no matter who is the parent of the child.  
 
On this picture, if abortion is morally permissible it is so not simply 
because it is permissible to assert one’s right to bodily autonomy; but also 
because it is permissible to assert one’s right to autonomy, full stop. And 
if this is so, then the right to abort does not depend on the location of the 
foetus.  
 
That right, if we have it, mightn’t necessarily be the prevailing right. If a 
causal account of parental obligation obliges one to make the foetus 
content with its condition, then, just as I discussed in section two, there 
will be questions about just what this obligation amounts to. So too in the 
case of ectogenesis. But it is unclear how ectogenesis will change our 
judgments about what the obligation to make the foetus content amounts 
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to. On the face of it, it might seem that the woman’s (or man’s) right to 
abort is weaker in ectogenesis, since there is no worry over women’s 
bodily autonomy coming into play. However, as I have argued, the right to 
decline to take on weighty obligation will be just as salient in this case as 
in cases of normal gestation. If this right is sufficient to trump competing 
care obligations towards the foetus, then it is so whether the foetus is in a 
woman’s body, or in a laboratory.    
 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that the standard account of parental obligation assumed in 
reproductive ethics (a consent account) is implausible as a theory of 
parental obligation. Further, I have argued that the most plausible 
account of parental obligation is a bifurcated causal account, on which 
the maker is obliged to the child in virtue of having caused the child to 
exist, and thereby has a pro tanto obligation to parent the child.  
 
I have then gone on to show that this account of parental obligation has 
certain surprising results, with respect to reproductive ethics. It seems to 
imply that men have a right to abort; that gamete donors have maker (but 
not parental) obligation; and that abortion is permissible in cases of 
ectogenesis, if it is permissible in standard-gestation cases. However, I 
have argued that the account does not on its own imply that pregnant 
women have a duty to gestate, and may even form a plausible foundation 
for the claim that women have a right to abort.  
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My wide aim in this thesis was to explore who counts—whose interests 
are the concern of morality; toward whom or what do our actions require 
moral deliberation; who is a moral patient and why—and how much their 
counting can tell us about morally right action.  
 
To that end, I have explored the problem of marginal humans. According 
to personhood-bound accounts of moral considerability, persons exhaust 
the class of fully morally considerable beings. Persons are full rights-
bearers; persons have a right to life; when we think about moral decision-
making, we take the primary units of concern to be persons. This sort of 
account is standard in moral philosophy. But on this sort of account, our 
intuitions about what we owe to human non-persons (‘marginal humans’) 
are mysterious. It is a challenge to any personhood-bound account of 
moral considerability to explain what we owe to marginal humans.  
 
I have taken babies as a case study. They are a particularly clear 
example of the marginal humans problem, in that we have clear and 
strong and benevolent intuitions about right treatment of them, and yet 
they are just as clearly not persons. In Part One of the thesis, I explored 
what we ought to say about the moral status of babies by looking at the 
moral significance of birth: in particular, whether birth can change the 
moral status of the foetus/baby. I argued that the most prima facie 
plausible way to motivate the moral significance of birth—a relational 
account of moral status—does not work. Relational accounts simply 
cannot motivate moral considerability claims for non-persons. That we in 
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fact care about a creature is not a reason that we ought to care for that 
creature (even if it may be a reason to suppose that there might be such 
a reason). I suggested that the moral importance of relationships is better 
understood as a part of the wider moral context of action, rather than as a 
feature salient to moral status.  
 
I also explored a variant on a relational account as a way of explaining 
the moral significance of birth. Jose Louis Bermúdez argues that 
relationships with persons can change a merely-sentient baby’s intrinsic 
features in morally salient ways. Bermúdez argues that babies, but not 
foetuses, can exercise the capacity for primitive self-awareness, and 
exercise of this capacity makes one morally considerable. I have argued 
that Bermúdez’s variant relational account of the moral significance of 
birth, like the relational account, is unsuccessful. Bermúdez does not 
succeed in proving that babies, but not foetuses, can so exercise this 
capacity, but rather simply shows that babies, but not foetuses can 
imitate. Furthermore, his overall theory of moral status is unsuccessful: 
the Principle of Derived Moral Significance amounts to no theory at all. 
Reliant as it is on intrinsic features necessary but insufficient for life-
valuing, it leads to a regress.  
 
This, then, seemed to leave us with a picture on which neither foetuses 
nor babies are morally considerable (or anyhow, not fully so), and 
infanticide is morally permissible if abortion is. So, in chapter three, I 
replied to an argument for this claim in specific. I argued that, contra 
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Giubilini and Minerva, sameness of moral status does not imply 
sameness of the moral quality of death. Because the wider moral context 
of abortion, on the one hand, and infanticide on the other are saliently 
different, generalisations across the two acts are invalid.  
 
But then, it seemed as though all of this left us with a very depleted moral 
picture of babies. In Part Two, then, I focused on what we could say—
outside of moral status—about how morality bears on right treatment of 
babies. I argued in the introduction that we can go some way to 
explaining what we owe to babies by delineating what special obligations 
we have to them.  
 
I began in Part Two by arguing that taking babies to be morally 
considerable on grounds of sentience is uncontentious. Sentience makes 
a creature capable of being an experiencer of harm, and this is a reason 
to take sentient beings into account on any normative theory. Mere 
sentience cannot motivate a right to life, but it can motivate a claim to 
moral consideration. This, then, means that merely-sentient beings are 
such that we can have obligations towards them.  
 
I then went on to discuss what I take to be the most central of the special 
obligations we might have towards babies: parental obligations. In order 
to flesh out a picture of what we owe to merely-sentient babies, such that 
we can explain the strong and unique obligations we have towards 
them—ones we do not have to non-human sentient non-persons—it is 
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necessary to give a non-voluntarist account of our obligations towards 
them. But this is at odds with the standard account of special obligations. 
So in sections four and five of the introduction to Part Two, I argued that 
we ought to accept Hardimon’s account of non-voluntary role obligations.  
 
In Chapter Four, I argued specifically for a non-voluntarist, causal 
account of parental obligation, by responding to Brake’s criticisms of 
causal accounts of parental obligation. Brake argues that the socially-
constructed nature of parental obligation is at odds with a causal account; 
and that there is an explanatory gap between causing existence and 
being so obliged.1  
 
I argued that, following Archard, we can take account of the social 
construction of parenthood by separating out the roles of (what I have 
called) maker and parent.2 On this sort of account, the maker of a new 
human person is obliged in virtue of having caused the person to exist, 
but only has parental obligation in virtue of becoming a parent. Maker 
obligation, then, is satisfied just in case the child is well parented, even if 
this role is not filled by the maker.  
 
Brake argues that a libellous causing model of causal obligation does not 
fit with our pretheoretical understanding of the scope of parental 
obligation. Procreative costs, she argues, are outstripped by parental 
                                                
1 Brake (2010) 
2 Archard (2010)  
Conclusion 
 225 
obligation; so, even if causing a child to exist generates a liability, this 
liability cannot account for what we take ourselves to owe to our children. 
I argued that liability is not the appropriate way to understand the 
connection between causing someone to exist and being obliged to them. 
I took Kant’s remarks on parental obligation as a jumping-off point, and 
argued that causing someone to exist is an instance of morally salient 
choosing for. Choosing for someone, when it is not an instance of 
paternalism or autonomy violation, is morally permissible only if one does 
one’s best to make the choice a good one. This, then, can explain why 
makers are obliged to make their offspring’s existence a good one in 
virtue of having caused them to exist.  
 
In Chapters Five and Six, then, I went on to explore how a bifurcated 
causal account of parental obligation bears on judgments about 
reproductive rights. I argued, first, that the account implies that adoption 
is not a genuine alternative to abortion, since maker obligation cannot be 
transferred. I then went on to explore how the account bears on a 
selection of other questions in reproductive ethics: what it means for 
gamete donors and unwilling fathers, and how the physicality of 
pregnancy factors in to the morality of abortion, given a presumed right to 
decline weighty obligation; and I further explored the question of whether 
maker obligation implies a duty to gestate.  
 
The discussion in Part Two is a fairly thorough account of what this 
understanding of parental obligations means for morally right treatment of 
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babies, so far as parents and progenitors are concerned. But of course, 
this will be merely a slice of the larger picture of obligations to babies. It is 
a key slice, but all the same merely a slice. Looking forward, much more 
would need to be said about special obligations to babies in order to 
motivate the claim that babies are owed significantly different treatment to 
other sentient non-persons. For example, it seems as though a total 
stranger who comes across a baby in distress has an obligation to assist 
the baby, where that same stranger might have no such obligation 
towards a pigeon or a frog in the same distress.3 Usually, we will describe 
the obligation to help a stranger baby as something like a general duty of 
rescue—so, not a special obligation at all. But there is a problem with this 
account, given the discussion above.  
 
To say that persons, and only persons, are fully morally considerable is 
just to say that we have a set of (general) obligations towards persons 
that we do not have towards non-persons, or that is different to the set of 
obligations we have towards non-persons. On a two-tiered account of 
moral considerability like the one for which I have argued, it makes sense 
to say that we have general obligations towards merely sentient 
creatures; but the two-tieredness of the account just amounts to the claim 
                                                
3 I am not actually sure that this is true. But it is at least true that we 
would, in fact, heap greater blame on someone who failed to help a baby 
than on someone who failed to help a pigeon. And it seems more clearly 
true if we consider a case in which one is faced with a choice of helping 
either the baby or the pigeon. Surely we ought to help the baby.  
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that we have one set of (probably minimal) obligations towards sentient 
creatures, and a different set of obligations (one that might subsume the 
sentient-creatures set) towards persons. It seems that a duty of rescue 
will fit more easily in the set of obligations we have towards persons. 
Indeed, if it were the case that we had a duty of rescue towards merely 
sentient creatures, then we would have to say that we are obliged to 
come to the aid of injured pigeons. This is not so unpalatable a claim; but 
it leaves the sense that our obligation to the baby is yet stronger 
unexplained.  
 
We must either explain why the baby has higher moral standing than the 
pigeon (that is, why we have general obligations towards the baby that 
are different or stronger than that to the pigeon); or we must suppose that 
our strong obligation to rescue the baby is something above or outside of 
general duty. As I argued in Part One, the most promising attempt to 
show that babies are more morally considerable than non-human animals 
on a personhood-bound account seems to fail. So, our strong obligation 
to help the baby ought, on a personhood-bound account, to be explained 
in terms of a special obligation we have towards it.    
 
One possible avenue for giving such an explanation would be to expand 
our understanding of moral roles—for example, to give an account on 
which ‘bystander’, and the like, are understood as morally salient roles. 
This will not, on its own, address the worry over injured babies and 
pigeons—why are we not bystanders to the agony of the pigeon?—but it 
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is, I suspect, the sort of framework one would need to work within in order 
to arrive at an account of what we owe to babies via special obligations.  
 
I have argued, then, that given a personhood-bound account of moral 
status, babies should be understood as at least minimally morally 
considerable on grounds of sentience. I have further argued that the 
strong obligations we have towards babies are best understood as 
special obligations. I have argued that (at least some of) the special 
obligations we have towards babies are non-voluntary, and that parental 
obligation, in particular, should be understood as non-voluntary and 
causally-generated. I have argued that, contrary to appearances, a 
causal account of parental obligation does not imply that abortion is 
morally impermissible; nor that gamete donors are parents. Finally, I have 
suggested that further inquiry into the nature of our special obligations to 
babies might require a broader understanding of morally salient roles.  
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